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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Objectives: The current work formulated theoretical models for empirical testing based 
on three objectives: 1) to explore the associations of familial variables, specifically with 
regards to parental socialization, with two cognitive aspects of good thinking in children 
- their informal reasoning skills and their epistemological beliefs, 2) to test the relation 
between these two competencies as epistemological beliefs have been found to enhance 
or constrain reasoning, and 3) to investigate if certain familial factors can significantly 
mediate the direct effects of socioeconomic status on these outcomes. 
 
Participants: A sample of 1994 participants, 997 fifth-graders and 997 of their 
respective parents, from the longitudinal project FUnDuS “The role of familial support 
from parents in discourse and written competence in lower secondary schools”  
conducted in North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany, was used. 
 
Measures: Questionnaires measuring the a) four Parenting Dimensions of Autonomy- 
support, Control, Responsiveness and Structure, b) Family Communication Patterns of 
Conversation- and Conformity-orientations, c) Epistemological beliefs of both parents 
and children, specifically beliefs in Justification by Authority, Personal Justification, 
and Simple and Certain Knowledge, and d) Socioeconomic status, were used. There 
were also two measures of evaluative reasoning competence in an everyday problem 
context: i) Reasons Evaluation and ii) Argument Differentiation. 
 
Results: The data was analyzed with quantitative statistical methods and path analyses. 
The results show that amongst the parenting dimensions, only Control emerged as 
significantly detrimental to children’s informal reasoning skills and is associated with 
lower-level epistemological beliefs of knowledge being simple and certain. 
Conformity-orientation within the family was also associated with poorer evaluative 
skills of children. More advanced parental epistemological beliefs, such as weaker 
iv  
 
 
 
 
beliefs in Simple and Certain Knowledge and Justification by Authority, were associated 
with more effective parenting practices of Autonomy-support, Responsiveness and 
Structure, and with less use of Control. Additionally, parental epistemological beliefs 
were found to be significant predictors  of  children’s  epistemological beliefs. The 
association between children’s  epistemological beliefs and reasoning skills was also 
confirmed: higher-level beliefs were related to more skilled evaluative reasoning. Lastly, 
familial variables of parental control and conformity-orientation were found to be 
significant mediators of the direct effects of SES on children’s Reasons Evaluation skills 
and on their Simple and Certain knowledge beliefs. 
 
Conclusion: The results are empirical evidence of first, the associations of parental 
epistemological beliefs and their parenting practices, and second, the significance that 
parental epistemological beliefs and parenting practices hold in the fostering of 
children’s reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs. To focus on skills of informal 
reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs is to focus on enhancing one's ability to 
thinkwell. The implications of the results, limitations and future research directions are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Marybeth Hicks (2012), an author and columnist of The Washington Times, 
suggested recently that a catching radical concept of smart thinking may be a real game 
changer in the field of parenting in America: the notion to think more about what we do 
as parents in order to act mindfully to cultivate children who can think smarter. 
Reflecting on the concept of smart thinking, which is the ability to solve new problems 
with current knowledge (cf. Art Markman, 2012), she  wrote  that  “imagine  what  might  
happen if we stop parenting by thoughtlessly developing habits over time and instead 
institute fundamental changes in the way we approach our roles as parents. Suppose we 
all  thought  more  about  what  we’re  doing and used the knowledge we gain in our thinking 
to  do  things  better”.  She  suggests  that  the  more  parents  know  and  practice  smart  thinking,  
the smarter they become and the more able they too become in helping their children to 
think smarter. When parents take time to step back, assess and think about their parenting 
strategies, there may be a reduction in thoughtless routines and a more mindful form of 
parenting comes into play; supporting children in their ability to solve problems, live 
more creatively and be productive (Markman, 2012).      
This insight is not totally unsupported by what researchers have known about 
parenting so far. Effective parenting is now recognized to not be an innate gifting but has 
been for the last few decades, shown to arise from mindful, reflective, observant learning, 
effort and practices that are conscientiously and meticulously crafted through day-to-day 
interactions with children (cf. Ruddick, 1989). Parents learn to think and reflect on their 
children’s  needs  and  actions, and they respond to their children according to this 
knowledge. It is a process amenable to change and improvement, which speaks to the 
continuous research and investments made in the formulations and evaluations of 
parenting programs and instructions (cf. Golding, 2000; Miller & Sambell, 2003). But the 
reality of parenting is that very often parenting practices become routine-like and 
habitual, and parents become less thoughtful about their use of strategies and 
communication methods. This thoughtlessness can also be evoked by parental beliefs, 
goals and individual dispositions. The family falls comfortably into a stable cycle of easy 
routines, and thus children may not receive the most optimal environment to foster good 
and smart thinking. Therefore, there is a need for the identification and support of 
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parenting practices and communication strategies which can contribute to providing these 
conditions for children to flourish in their ability to think effectively. 
This line of thought aligns itself well with the current educational climate where 
educators are being made increasingly aware of the value of educating for a thinking 
generation (cf. Kuhn, 2005, 1991).  Amongst other commonly acknowledged educational 
goals of instilling knowledge and developing skills, Kuhn (2005) emphasizes that 
education has to be for thinking. A thinking education focuses on teaching students how 
to think reflectively, critically and creatively, and to employ these skills and techniques 
across a wide spectrum of activities and subjects. She notes that a great deal of evidence 
reveals that students pass exams through means of drills and rote-memory exercises with 
the consequence that little thinking is applied in the accumulation of superficial 
knowledge where no reflection has occurred regarding its value or meaning. Therefore a 
refocusing of educational goals is critical and essential to ensure that schools foster high 
quality deep learning with an emphasis on thinking skills as opposed to superficial 
learning with little value.  
Kuhn (2005) focuses on two core components of thinking that education should 
focus more on: the development of skills of inquiry and argument. These skills, 
individually and collectively, are indispensible  “to  produce  individuals  who  can  thrive  in  
and contribute  maximally  to  a  democratic  society…  and  to  value  these  activities  as  the  
soundest path to achieving goals, solving problems, resolving conflicts, and maximizing 
individual  and  group  welfare”  (Kuhn,  2005,  p.14,).  These  intrinsically  valuable  skills 
extend beyond school boundaries for children to “develop  the  ability  to  make  informed  
decisions, to  exercise  judgment  and  to  regulate  their  own  behavior”  (Bradley  &  Corwyn, 
2000, p.248). They are essential for children to emerge as healthy, well-functioning 
adults capable  of  meeting  society’s  requirements  for  work,  social  relationships  and  
responsibility 
Future generations have to be supported and moulded to become good and 
effective thinkers. Inherent in the ability to think well lies two individual factors which 
can  shape  and  improve  one’s  thinking  ability.  These concern the individual’s skills of 
informal reasoning and his/her personal epistemological beliefs.  
Informal reasoning consists of reasoning processes applied to ill-structured 
problems that have shifting uncertain premises, commonly of an everyday nature. This 
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type of reasoning is more reliant on background knowledge and experience, compared to 
formal reasoning processes which often result in definite conclusions deduced from well-
structured premises of the problem. Problems utilizing informal reasoning may also not 
consist of one right solution. The use of informal reasoning occurs frequently in daily 
life; in mundane daily matters such as deciding which box of chocolates to buy at the 
supermarket, to issues at the school and community level such as dealing with school 
bullying, and to larger issues which have societal consequences and implications in 
everyday life such as the casting of a vote during government elections.  
So what forms informal reasoning? Skills of argument are postulated to be the 
core of informal reasoning (Means & Voss, 1996). The power of argument lies in its 
inherent  value  to  be  a  model  of  knowing  in  children’s  current  and  future  lives;;  active  and  
frequent engagements in authentic arguments, be it collaboratively in discourses or 
solitary reflections, can lead individuals to interiorize the structure of argument as a 
framework for their own thinking (Kuhn, 2005). In our highly complex and rapidly 
changing technological society, knowledge is highly accessible through various channels 
and vast amounts of knowledge are instantly made available at the click of a computer 
mouse. This highlights the increasingly crucial role of good reasoning skills for the 
effective and efficient filtering of these vast amounts of information; to manage, regulate 
and to evaluate knowledge claims as accepted knowledge  has  a  huge  influence  on  one’s  
beliefs and behaviors. The exercise of argument skills enriches individuals both 
individually and collectively as it equips them to engage effectively in local and global 
issues (Kuhn, 2005); to have the competence to weigh the pros and cons of multiple and 
conflicting viewpoints in order to reach a reasoned conclusion with well thought-out 
justifications. Skills of argument in informal reasoning are means to the end of knowing, 
and when they are frequently engaged and refined, they yield their own rewards in the 
pursuit of reasoned knowledge.  
Galotti  (1989)  writes  that  “good  thinking  (i.e. reflective or critical)… involves 
dispositions (e.g. to be open-minded)  as  well  as  skills”. Thus other than the development 
of argumentative reasoning skills which are intrinsically and instrumentally valuable for 
the exercise of good thinking, there is also a need to inculcate dispositions which may be 
beneficial to reasoning and thinking. Kuhn (1991) found that some sort of implicit 
epistemological theory exists behind the development of reasoning skills which even the 
individual may be unaware of. These epistemological theories are concerned with the 
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nature and justification of human knowledge (cf. Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Do individuals 
see knowledge as fixed, certain and unchanging as opposed to it being dynamic, complex 
and evolving? Are the claims of experts sufficient to justify knowledge claims, or are 
personal observations and experiences more reliable forms of justification?  
Recent studies have shown that more sophisticated epistemological beliefs are 
associated with higher argumentative reasoning skills in controversial everyday issues 
(Mason & Scirica, 2006; Kuhn, 1991, 2005). The progress of epistemological thinking is 
postulated to provide an essential foundation for the emergence, development and 
consolidation of effective intellectual values, although it may not automatically yield the 
value of intellectual engagement. Individuals who believe knowledge is fixed, concrete, 
simple and static may lack reasons to engage in sustained intellectual inquiry as there is 
no value in the evaluation of knowledge claims since these claims are already perceived 
as direct observations of unchanging external reality. It is only at more advanced 
epistemological positions where knowledge is recognized to be subjective, relative and 
changing that critical thinking and intellectual skills are recognized as essential for 
justifying and supporting knowledge claims. Therefore, epistemological beliefs prepare 
the foundation for individuals to see the value of inquiry and debate as a means of 
making informed reasoned choices between conflicting knowledge claims (Kuhn, 2005).   
Perkins, Faraday and Bushey (1991) made a differentiation between a critical and 
a makes-sense epistemology. In contrast to having a makes-sense epistemology where 
individuals only seek to ensure that given information fit well together with prior beliefs 
using the simplest explanations, a critical epistemologist goes beyond to seek further 
information and experiences which may be inconsistent with prior beliefs. A makes-
sense epistemologist works hard to avoid incongruities in order to hold on to the stability 
of prior beliefs but critical epistemologists actively seek to create a deeper understanding 
of the situation by working through the constraints, implications and options of a difficult 
situation. A critical epistemology is postulated to predict better reasoning, as a critical 
epistemologist  “incorporates  more  epistemic  feelings  and  values  about  objectivity,  fair  
play,  the  importance  of  taking  multiple  perspectives  and  so  on”  (Perkins,  Faraday  &  
Bushey, 1991, p.100), and thus is more willing to engage with controversies incongruent 
with prior beliefs and in employing higher-level reasoning strategies such as a more 
thorough search for inconsistencies of information and experience and the seeking of 
alternative means of explanations and counterarguments.  
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“The  habits  of  the  critical  epistemologist  equip  him  or  her  for  even  the  most  
difficult of decisions. These decisions cannot, of course, be made easily, but by being 
able to generate several alternatives and consider more than one point of view, a person 
can feel satisfied that he or she has made a reasonable decision. A well-reasoned 
decision is less likely to produce surprise or impotence in the face of its consequences. 
Further, if we grant that people do really  make  the  meaning  that  is  experienced  in  one’s  
life, then it is clear that critical epistemologists, individually and collectively, generate 
qualitatively different kinds of lives than makes-sense epistemologists. Critical 
epistemology leads to the construction of experience that is richer in possibilities and 
more manageable... their better models of the world afford more perspective, variety and 
control over fate and fortune”  (Perkins,  Faraday  &  Bushey,  1991,  p.101,  emphasis by the 
author).  
Therefore, a more advanced critical epistemology is not only beneficial to build 
better reasoning skills and to lay the foundation for intellectual values, but it is also 
postulated to lead to richer experiences in life whereby one perceives a higher sense of 
self-efficacy  and  agency.  “Perceived  self-efficacy  is  concerned  with  people’s  beliefs  in  
their capabilities to perform in ways that give them some control over events that affect 
their  lives”  (Bandura,  1997,  p.181).  A  critical  epistemology  predisposes  the  individual 
towards a stronger belief in his/her own capability to make good reasoned decisions in 
the face of problems and limitations. With the perception that the final decision made and 
the subsequent actions taken were the most effective with regards to the situational 
constraints, the individual gains a sense of subjective well-being which in turn also 
enhances his/her perceived self-efficacy. Bandura (2001) considers self-efficacy as the 
most  crucial  mechanism  of  agency  as  “unless  people  believe  they  can  produce desired 
results and forestall detrimental ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act or 
to  persevere  in  the  face  of  difficulties”  (p.10).  Thus  agency,  that  is  the  power  to  initiate  
action for given purposes (Bandura, 2001), and to do so “in  line  with  his  or  her  
conception  of  the  good”  (Sen,  1985,  p.206)  is  also  enhanced  by  the  relation  between  
critical epistemology and self-efficacy. Additionally in order to achieve agency, the 
conceptualization of valuable goals in line with what individuals  “value  and  have  reason  
to value” (Sen, 1985, p.204) entails reflective and assessment skills; a process in which 
skills of reasoning and a critical epistemology are also significantly implicated in. 
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Therefore thinking skills and dispositions which are amenable to change deserve 
greater attention because a greater understanding of their development can enable 
educators and psychologists to ensure better conditions for more optimal flourishing of 
these fundamentally important capabilities of effective thinking. Formal reasoning which 
mainly involves deductive reasoning skills with well-structured problems has been a 
focus of cognitive psychologists for many years, but more work has to be conducted in 
the area of informal reasoning where reasoning occurs in everyday problems of ill-
structured content and relies more on the use of background knowledge and experience 
rather than fixed given premises. If children are trained to think well, that is in this 
context, to have enhanced informal reasoning skills coupled with a critical 
epistemological disposition, the implications of these capabilities are far-reaching for 
their lives. To think and reason well is to “confer  an  unlimited  capacity  and  inclination  to  
learn  and  to  know”  (Kuhn,  2005,  p.179). These capabilities can enable individuals to 
possess a greater sense of self-efficacy and agency; notions which are significantly 
related to the expansion of well-being.  
There is therefore a need for a greater understanding of how these outcomes are 
fostered in different settings. Compared to empirical studies dealing with the role of 
teachers and schools in the development of these two areas, the role of parents within the 
family has been far less explored. To foster a thinking child also requires a thinking 
parent. Incidentally, the epistemological beliefs of parents have also been found to 
influence their parenting strategies and child development beliefs. Parents who have 
more advanced representations of knowledge and knowing hold a more complex and 
multi-faceted view of child development, and are more inclined to make use of more 
effective authoritative parenting strategies (Bond & Burns, 2006). Additionally, they 
prefer learning academic goals for their children as compared to performance goals 
(Ricco & Rodriguez, 2006).  Therefore,  parents’  representations of knowledge and 
knowing have associations with their choice of parenting goals and strategies. Having 
more sophisticated epistemological beliefs may enable them to be more mindful, 
evaluative and reflective of the way they parent. Hence, there is a need to further 
investigate the relation of these parental beliefs with the parenting process and  if the 
relation stands, to ponder on practical ways which can be implemented to support these 
knowledge beliefs of parents in the hope of shaping them for more effective and mindful 
thinking. 
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The  current  dissertation  has  two  aims  focusing  on  two  aspects  of  children’s  
thinking where the effects of family and parental socialization have been less explored. 
The first aim is to formulate informed theoretical models based on the findings of current 
literature on the basis of three objectives: 1. to explore the influence that familial 
variables have on two associated child outcomes - children’s  informal  reasoning  skills  
which has an  inherent  emphasis  on  argument  skills  and  children’s  personal  
epistemological  beliefs,  2.  to  test  the  significance  of  this  association  between  children’s  
informal reasoning skills and their personal epistemological beliefs as demonstrated in 
previous studies, and 3. to investigate if familial factors can significantly mediate the 
direct effects of socioeconomic status, a factor which is empirically established to affect 
family and parenting factors, on these child outcomes. The second aim is to empirically 
test these models with the use of quantitative statistical analyses and path analyses.  
The structure of the dissertation is outlined as follows: 
Literature reviews of related fields and concepts to the current work are first 
presented. In Chapter 2, an overview of the established work in parenting is presented, 
highlighting the significant role of parents in fostering positive child outcomes. The 
chapter begins with the introduction of an empirically proven style of effective parenting 
- authoritative parenting. The empirical support for the consistent relation of authoritative 
parenting to positive child outcomes is first presented, followed by a discussion on the 
suggested mechanisms behind the success of this parenting style. In trying to understand 
how authoritative parenting works, some researchers have suggested disaggregating the 
style into its components. This leads on to the following discussion on the two 
approaches which are used to conceptualize parenting work: the typological approach and
 the dimensional approach. Two well-established parenting models – Baumrind’s  
typological  model  of  parenting styles and the dimensional approach of 
Self-Determination Theory and parenting – are then used as elaborations of these 
respective approaches. The origins, formulation and development of each model are 
discussed with its relevant empirical studies. Some critiques of the models are also 
presented. To conclude this section, it is firmly established from past literature that 
parents play a vital role in supporting and fostering  their  children’s  competence  in  a  wide  
variety  of  domains,  and  this  process  has  long-term consequences for the psychological 
and relational functioning of the children. Therefore, the impact of parenting is 
hypothesized to also hold true for the fostering of 
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children’s  informal  reasoning  skills  and  personal  epistemological  beliefs,  although  
empirical studies attesting to this influence have been few.  
Chapter 3 and 4 present the literature review and the definitions of the outcome 
constructs of interest for the current dissertation – informal reasoning and personal 
epistemology. The literature on informal reasoning is first reviewed, followed by the 
literature on personal epistemology. 
 In Chapter 3, informal reasoning is contrasted with formal reasoning in order to 
make clear its definition as “a  goal-dependent process that involves generating or 
evaluating (or both) evidence pertaining to a claim or conclusion... which assumes 
importance when information is less accessible, or when problems are more open-ended, 
debatable, complex or ill-structured, and especially when the issue requires that the 
individual builds an  argument  to  support  a  claim”  (Means  &  Voss,  1996,  p.140)”. In the 
next part, the literature presents children and adolescents as capable reasoners, though in 
need of scaffolds in order to achieve higher levels of competence. Empirical studies 
reveal that their arguments are often limited and non-critical, displaying shallow 
engagement with information and less use of strategic and flexible argument skills. What 
then is needed for the support and development of argumentative informal reasoning? 
Reasoning is suggested to take place with introspective reflection and social learning. 
Parents can use conflict talk and casual family discussions to engage children in 
reasoning practice using social dilemmas faced in daily life. Family communication 
patterns in the forms of conversation- and conformity-orientations are also discussed as 
influential  in  the  shaping  of  children’s  communication  and  reasoning skills. Family 
studies are noted to be scarce as compared to classroom studies in the improvement of 
children’s  reasoning  skills.  Hence,  findings  from  classroom  studies  are  shortly  touched  
on to highlight that reasoning skills can be advanced through interventions which make 
use of collaborative dialogic learning and explicit reflection behind argument structures.   
In Chapter 4, the debates regarding the conceptualization of personal 
epistemology are first presented, whereby it is defined in the current work as beliefs of 
the nature of knowledge and knowing regarding the simplicity, certainty, source and 
justification of knowledge (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). There exists a variety of personal 
epistemology models and theories but only those which are relevant for the current work 
in terms of its sample (i.e., children and adolescents), and content of methodology (i.e. 
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links with reasoning and thinking) are reviewed in this section. These models are 
subsequently divided into three parts: a) developmental models, whereby the dimensions 
of personal epistemology are structurally integrated, coherent and develop together in a 
logical sequenced process, b) multidimensional models, whereby different dimensions 
can develop at varying speeds and does not proceed in a stage-like structure, and c) 
integrated models, which have characteristics of both developmental and 
multidimensional models. The formulation and defining characteristics of each model are 
briefly presented. Next, the literature on the development of personal epistemology is 
reviewed. The general consensus lies in the agreement that development undergoes 
transformation from a dualistic absolute view of knowledge as being right or wrong to a 
view of relativism where knowledge is self-constructed and open to different 
interpretations and then to a position of evaluativistic rationalism, whereby even in a 
relativistic context, individuals realise that they are able to make their own personal 
judgments and commitments. Development is postulated to be recursive, occurring 
especially at stressful transitions of education. Studies regarding the role of family in the 
fostering of personal epistemological beliefs are presented, highlighting the scarcity of 
empirical work in this area. Additionally, the relations of parental personal epistemology 
and parental practices are also explored. 
Chapter 4 closes with studies concerning the association of reasoning skills and 
personal epistemological beliefs. Recent research in scientific reasoning which is mainly 
restricted to the school domain has evidenced this link but in the current work, only 
literature which involves reasoning with problems of an informal everyday nature is 
reviewed.  
Chapter 5 presents the research model postulated by the current work on the basis 
of what is known from literature. The chapter begins by noting the research problems 
glimpsed from the literature review. The first concerns the scarcity of family-based 
research in both informal reasoning and personal epistemology development. The second 
is the need for a more informed understanding of the skills of informal reasoning 
implicated in everyday life as compared to formal reasoning with well-structured 
problem material which has been a prominent topic of cognitive psychologists for many 
decades. The third and last concerns the significant relation of reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs evidenced in many studies of scientific reasoning and the need to 
further investigate this within the domain of informal reasoning. In response to the 
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research problems highlighted above, a conceptual framework was formulated regarding 
the fostering of reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs of children within the family. 
The choice and rationales behind the instruments to measure the outcome constructs are 
first explained. Greene et al. (2008) Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development 
Model and instrument (Greene et al., 2010) was used to measure and interpret personal 
epistemological beliefs. For informal reasoning, two measures of evaluative skills of 
argument adapted from the study  of  Means  and  Voss’  (1996)  were used. Family variables 
for this study consisted of four parenting dimensions and two family communication 
patterns. Subsequently, the main research questions and specific hypotheses are 
formulated in structural models for empirical testing. The four research questions are as 
follows: 
Question 1. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and family 
communication  patterns  influence  children’s  informal  reasoning  competence? 
Question 2. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and parental 
epistemic and ontological cognition beliefs influence  children’s  epistemic  and  
ontological cognition beliefs? 
Question 3. Are dimensions and developmental positions of children’s epistemic 
and ontological cognition beliefs significant predictors of their reasoning skills? 
Question 4. Can familial variables be significant mediators of the direct 
relationship of socioeconomic status on children’s  reasoning  skills and epistemic 
and ontological cognition beliefs?  
The chapter closes by stating the two broad research aims of the current work: to 
formulate informed theoretical models from literature on relations between parenting and 
children’s informal reasoning skills and personal epistemological beliefs, and to test 
these models empirically using path analyses and quantitative data analyses.   
Chapter 6 explains the methodology of this dissertation. This includes the 
participants involved, materials used and the standardized procedure employed for data 
collection. Chapter 7 presents the results from analyses conducted on the data. These 
include preliminary analyses consisting of descriptive statistics and correlations of the 
variables used. This is subsequently followed by the results of the structural models 
which are empirical formulations of the research questions subjected to path analyses. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the empirical results found. First, results corresponding to the 
four research questions are presented. This is followed by a general discussion, which 
provides a comprehensive reflection of the most significant findings, along with the 
limitations of the current work and the future directions which can be derived from these 
results.  
Chapter 9 concludes the current dissertation by reinstating the aims, the findings, 
and the contributions of the significant results to the fields of parenting, informal 
reasoning and personal epistemology. It is expected that the current work will contribute 
to the developmental literature in terms of bringing a clearer informed understanding of 
the  fostering  of  children’s  informal  reasoning  skills  and  personal  epistemological  beliefs  
in the context of parental socialization, and to confirm and elaborate on the literature 
concerning the association of the two outcome constructs. Furthermore, the wider 
implication of this expected knowledge contribution is the practical suggestions it may 
contain to aid psychologists and educators in supporting parents for the nurturance of 
children who can think effectively and in doing so, thrive and flourish in their personal 
lives and in the greater society.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PARENTING 
 
2.1 Competent Parenting – Authoritativeness and child outcomes 
Authoritative parenting is one of three parenting styles coined by (Baumrind, 
1971), whereby  “each  of  the  three  parent  configurations  is  a  prototype,  that  is,  a  complex  
exemplifying the distinctive features of the group, as well as an explicit description of 
parenting  behaviors  that  characterize  each  group  member  (Baumrind,  2005,  p62)”.  
Parenting styles are constellations or aggregates of parental behaviors and attitudes that 
describe parent-child interactions over a range of situations. Each parenting style is an 
overarching emotional climate where specific goal-directed behaviors, through which 
parents perform their parental duties, and non-goal-directed behaviors, such as gestures, 
changes in tone of voice or spontaneous expression of emotion, are expressed (Darling & 
Steinberg, 1993).  
In the last four decades, authoritative parenting has produced a remarkably 
consistent picture of the successful socialization of children, though its beneficial 
influence has been challenged in terms of its applicability across cultures and 
socioeconomic classes. Authoritative parenting is defined by a host of distinctive 
features. Authoritative parents balance high nurturance and high demands with clear 
communication about what they require of the child (Baumrind, 1971, 1975, 1991, 
2005). In terms of high nurturance, they are actively responsive to the emotional needs of 
the child, providing the contingent warmth, support and positive affirmations the child 
needs. In terms of high demands, they set clear rules and standards and enforce them 
consistently.  They  are  not  fallible  to  child  coercion  and  shape  child’s behavior through 
these clear boundaries. However, they do not use intrusive disciplinary techniques which 
emphasize control and conformity. Instead, through bidirectional communication, they 
clearly establish their rules and expectations while proactively explaining the rationales 
behind them and the consequences when the child does not meet them. They use non-
intrusive firm disciplinary techniques such as reasoning when giving directives or 
sanctions to gain compliance.  There is an encouragement of verbal give-and-take while 
the  child’s  autonomy  and  expressions  of  individuality  are  valued,  encouraged  and  
considered. 
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Children and adolescents from authoritative families have consistently evidenced 
higher scores  in a variety of measures on competence and well-being as compared to 
peers raised with other parenting styles, namely authoritarian, indulgent or neglectful 
parenting. Academically, children and adolescents who have authoritative parents 
demonstrate higher school achievement and stronger school engagement (Gray and 
Steinberg, 1999; Steinberg, Lamborn, Darling, Mounts & Dornbusch, 1994; Steinberg, 
Lamborn, Dornsbuch & Darling, 1992). They are more cognitively motivated and 
achievement oriented. Additionally, this relation between parenting styles and school 
performance  is  partially  mediated  by  parents’  involvement  in  school-related activities 
(Wild & Wild, 1997). In psychosocial functioning, children from authoritative homes are 
better-adjusted, demonstrating higher empathy, higher self-reliance, self-efficacy and 
self-esteem, higher resistance to peer pressure and better self-regulatory skills 
(Baumrind, Larzelere & Owens, 2010; Gray and Steinberg, 1999; Steinberg, Blatt-
Eisengart & Cauffman, 2006; Steinberg, 2001; Baumrind, 1991). They are described as 
socially competent, more cooperative and more responsible. They are also seen as more 
agentic and possess an internal locus of control. With regards to behavioral problems, 
these children are less likely to engage in antisocial behavior and display fewer 
internalizing problems such as anxiety and depression, and externalizing problems such 
as drug use and aggression (Baumrind, Larzelere & Owens, 2010; Gray and Steinberg, 
1999; Steinberg, Blatt-Eisengart & Cauffman, 2006; Steinberg, 2001; Baumrind, 1991). 
Darling and Steinberg (1993) pointed out that the association between 
authoritative parenting and positive child outcomes was present in works as early as 
Symonds (1939), whereby there was a classification  of  ‘model  children’  as socialized, 
cooperative, friendly, loyal and emotionally stable. Similarly, through the use of cluster 
analysis on data of children's behaviors, Baumrind (1971) identified a group of children 
of whom she classified as 'instrumentally competent': socially responsible, secure and 
well-adjusted children. On further investigation, Baumrind (1971) and Symonds (1939) 
both noticed the consistent association between certain parenting practices and child 
outcomes.  Parents of these instrumentally competent model children were found to share 
similar practices and behaviors – they were warm, established clear, rational guidelines 
while allowing the child autonomy within those boundaries, and clearly communicated 
both their expectations and reasons behind them. 
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However, the establishment of the relation between authoritative parenting and 
positive child outcomes does not explain the process in between; how the similar 
characteristics of parents in this group work to shape child behavior, influence child 
development and produce good outcomes. Baumrind (1967) suggested early on that 
authoritative parenting altered how open children are to their parents' attempts of 
socialization by enhancing the value of parental reinforcement. The parent-child 
relationship is dynamic and through clear articulation of desired and prohibited 
behaviors, children acquire the sensitivity and discernment to select the correct responses 
to parental demands.  Authoritativeness alters child characteristics to be more open and 
willing for parental socialization, thus increasing the effectiveness of parenting strategies, 
which in turns strengthens the parents' abilities to act as socialization agents. Steinberg 
(2001)  elaborated  that  “authoritative  parenting  works  because  it  does  three  things:  the  
nurturance and parental involvement makes the child more receptive to parental 
influence, enabling more effective and efficient socialization; the combination of support 
and structure facilitates the development of self-regulatory skills, which enables the child 
to function as a responsible, competent individual; and the verbal give-and-take 
characteristic of parent-child exchanges in authoritative families engages the child in a 
process that fosters cognitive and social competence, thereby enhancing the functioning 
outside the family (p.10)”.  Durkin (1995) emphasized that in the domain of academic 
achievement, the bidirectional open communication characteristic of authoritativeness 
provides children with explanations for directives, a sense of awareness and 
understanding  of  parents’  goals, values and expectations and nurtures important 
interpersonal skills which help children to succeed in school, both socially and 
academically. 
Furthermore, authoritative parenting is also seen as adaptable to individual child 
characteristics (Hart, Newell & Olsen, 2003). The flexible use of defining characteristics 
of authoritativeness, in terms of warmth and involvement, non-coercive reasoning-
oriented disciplinary techniques and the provision of autonomy support, can be adjusted 
to match optimally to each child's individual temperament and his/her unique set of 
strengths and weaknesses. Authoritative parenting is perceived as an emotional climate 
which  can  be  individualized  to  benefit  the  child.  Hart  et  al.  (2003)  quoted  Kochanska’s  
(1997) work which indicated that while more anxious-fearful children can benefit more 
from gentle, reasoning-oriented regulation of authoritative parenting, non-fearful anxious 
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children can benefit more from the aspects of greater parental acceptance and sensitivity. 
Additionally, more impulsive or resistive children become more manageable with greater 
rather than with lesser exposure to regulatory limit setting. For difficult children, non-
punitive regulation appears to be particularly salient when accompanied by warm and 
supportive parenting. 
Thus, the benefits of authoritative parenting have been attributed to its high 
parental  involvement  in  altering  children’s  openness  and  receptiveness  to  parental  
socialization efforts, its combination of support and structure for the facilitation of self-
regulatory skills, its bidirectional communication for the fostering of both cognitive and 
social competence and its flexible adaptability of various characteristics to child 
disposition. Different components of authoritative parenting have been theorized to play 
different roles in various areas of child development and socialization processes. 
Viewing authoritative parenting as a typology allows focus to be placed on parenting 
pattern variations in their general organization and climate of parenting, and the relations 
of these patterns to child development aspects. Typologies can be convenient to 
systematically characterize certain aspects of family functioning, serving not only to 
describe but to predict, explain and prescribe important family processes and outcomes 
associated with various family types (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). However, as a 
typology consists of a host of distinctive features, the explanatory mechanisms for its 
relations to outcomes may be more difficult to identify and ascertain as there is more than 
one variable which may have causal influence on these outcomes. 
Thus, disaggregating the complex of authoritative parenting may provide a deeper 
understand to the relations of parenting components, both individually and interactively, 
to child development outcomes. Through the literature, three core characteristics of 
competent parenting have been consistently mentioned (Hart, Newell & Olsen, 2003): (a) 
the degree of parental warmth, support and involvement shown to a child such as the 
acceptance, affection, time and nurturance that parents dedicate to their children, (b) the 
degree of behavioral control exercised by parents through clear limit settings and 
supervision, and  (c) the degree of psychological autonomy-support by employing non-
intrusive and coercive discipline and encouraging child's individuality, acknowledging 
child's opinion, giving choices and valuing child input. These three dimensions of 
competent parenting have also been respectively referred to as connection, regulation and
 autonomy-granting (Barber & Olsen, 1997). 
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Gray and Steinberg (1999) attempted to empirically disaggregate authoritative 
parenting into its three components and found, through a series of hierarchical regression 
analyzes, that separate components of authoritative parenting facilitated different 
psychological processes in adolescents and interactively, they worked in combinations to 
exert influence on child outcomes. The three components which they tested are similar to 
those mentioned above, namely parental involvement, behavioral control and autonomy-
granting. Academic success, measured through grades and academic self-image, was 
found to be significantly influenced by all three components, with the most benefit 
gained from high parental involvement, high autonomy-granting and modest levels of 
behavioral control.  With regards to behavioral problems, higher behavioral control and 
parental involvement was significantly associated with fewer problems. Interactive 
analyses revealed that high parental involvement and high autonomy-granting were 
compensatory for the lack of the other component in the prevention of internalizing 
problems. For psychosocial development, parental involvement and autonomy-granting 
contributed strongly to healthier development, while behavioral control had significant 
but modest associations. Thus to conclude shortly, high parental involvement made 
significant contributions to every aspect of development, academically, psychologically 
and socially, and promoted a global sense of personal well-being. Behavioral control and 
structure inculcated self-control and discipline in adolescents, acting as a protective 
factor against externalizing problem behaviors. Autonomy-granting increased self-
competence and self-confidence in both academic and social domains, thus fostering 
greater achievement ambitions and the belief of making them happen. In contrast, the 
lack of autonomy-granting negatively affected emotional health, in particular by 
increasing internal distress and stunting psychosocial development. Thus the more 
parents involved themselves in their adolescents' lives, provided clear behavioral control 
and high autonomy-support, the more positively adolescents perceived and evaluated 
their own conduct and development. 
The benefits of competent parenting have been shown to be undermined or 
accentuated by forces outside the family. The peer group is one such influential external 
force. Fletcher, Darling, Steinberg & Dornbusch (1995) found that the positive effects of 
authoritativeness were amplified when adolescents had friends whose parents were also 
authoritative. The neighborhood also acts as an external force which can affect parenting 
efforts. Studies show that the beneficial influence of authoritative parenting was 
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enhanced when other parents in the community were also authoritative. This may be 
attributed to the collective fostering of a more positive peer culture. Additionally, the 
effects  of  parental  involvement  on  children’s  school  performance in neighborhoods 
where other parents were also involved was nearly the double of student performance in 
neighborhoods where parents were, for most part, not (Cauffman & Steinberg, 1995; 
Darling, Steinberg & Gringlas, 1993).   
The overtime impact of authoritative parenting style has also been investigated in 
longitudinal studies (Steinberg et al., 1989, 1994, 2001). By modeling if child 
characteristics  predicted  outcomes  at  later  time  points,  results  confirmed  Baumrind’s  
(1971) earlier conclusion that parenting style was a characteristic of the parent and not 
the child. Parenting styles instead of child characteristics were found to be significantly 
predictive of later child outcomes. Although parent-child relationships are recognized as 
dynamic and reciprocal, these results solidified the notion that authoritative parenting 
significantly influences adolescent competence rather than adolescent competence 
determining parenting styles. This highlights the critical importance of competent 
parenting for optimal child outcomes. The studies also revealed a cumulative effect of the 
disadvantages of non-authoritative parenting over time – during each year of high school, 
adolescents from authoritative homes gained a widening advantage over those whose 
parents are neither responsive nor demanding. Thus it can be concluded that authoritative 
parenting  in  preadolescence  is  “a  process  that  guides  young  people  along  a  trajectory  that  
leads towards increasing competence and psychological well-being over the adolescence 
period”  (Steinberg,  2001,  p.8). 
 
Inclusion rationale of parenting paradigms 
It is not within the scope of the current dissertation to give an extensive review of 
the history and development of theoretical and empirical work related to parenting which 
has spanned almost five decades. However, for a clearer understanding of the typological 
and disaggregated dimensional approaches that parenting work can be classified under, 
Diana  Baumrind’s  parenting  typology  will  be  further  elaborated  in Section 2.2 and the 
parenting dimensions related to the motivational and socialization theory of Self-
Determination Theory will be reviewed in Section 2.3.  The reviews will aim to explain 
the origins and development of each paradigm, and attempt to succinctly summarize their 
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core concepts. Additionally, to  the  author’s  knowledge,  these  two  paradigms  are  not  
often linked together in a single piece of work, though in parenting literature, the 
empirical work generated in these two paradigms can complement and aid each other in 
deeper understanding of the mechanics of parenting. 
 
2.2 Diana  Baumrind’s  Typological  Model  of  Parenting  Styles 
Diana  Baumrind’s  tripartite  parenting  style  classification  (1967,  1971,  1991,  
2005) was a radical change from the factor analytic and circumplex tradition of the early 
work in parenting research. Her typological approach meant that any one aspect of 
parenting was dependent on the configuration of all other aspects, unlike the highly-
favored approach in parenting literature at that time in which parenting aspects were 
clearly delineated to separate linear dimensions. Baumrind’s  three  core  parenting  types  
were empirically-derived and continually refined from vast empirical data. They have 
been widely replicated across cultures, spanning a huge repertoire of empirical studies, 
sealing its importance in parenting literature and attesting to its prolific status. 
Baumrind’s  work has thus proven to be highly useful in correlating child outcomes, 
whether optimal or dysfunctional, to certain types of parenting styles. 
Baumrind (1966) first introduced her three parenting styles in a review 
concerning the effects of discipline on child behavior.  She focused on one broad parental 
function – control, as opposed to dimensions of parenting. Control was defined as 
parental demands for behavioral compliance of the child as an attempt to integrate the 
child into the family and society, and was measured by parents' ability to enforce 
directives, the consistency of this enforcement, the ability to withstand deviant nuisance 
behaviors such as whining and crying, and the use of incentives and reinforcements. 
Through the initial analyses of extensive detailed parent-child observations and interview 
transcriptions with parents of preschool children, Baumrind (1966) noted the consistent 
associations of different patterns of parental control to various clusters of child behavior. 
This led her to distinguish between three types of parental control – authoritarian, 
permissive and authoritative. Subsequent analyses led to two publications the following 
year (Baumrind, 1967; Baumrind & Black, 1967) which provided further empirical 
support for these three parenting styles. 
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Initially concerned with only one central factor of authority and control, 
Baumrind (1967, 1971) later realized that parents who differed in this factor also tended 
to differ along other factors, thus providing empirical and conceptual support for the 
typological approach. Darling and Steinberg (1993) noted that analyses with parenting 
styles  are  “more  predictive  of  child  attributes  than  analyses based on specific parenting 
practices because the influence of any particular parenting practice on child development 
would  easily  be  lost  among  the  complexity  of  other  parental  attributes”(p.488).    
Baumrind’s  investigation  of  parenting  practices  thus  began to extend beyond the single 
issue of authority to include other factors such as maturity demands, communication 
style, warmth and involvement (Baumrind, 1967).  Maturity demands were teaching 
demands made by parents to prepare the child for intellectual, social and emotional 
independence while communication style was concerned with reasoning-oriented 
patterns for directives, provision of debate opportunities for difficult issues and the 
directionality of the communication. Lastly, warmth and involvement was the degree of 
parental affect shown, which encompassed the extent of emotional support, parental time 
and attention, and the use of positive rewards and reinforcement. 
Notably, another interesting shift from earlier parenting models was Baumrind's 
recognition of the bidirectionality of the parent-child relationship and her efforts to take 
this into account empirically. By measuring parents' attempts to gain compliance 
independent of children's actual compliance, Baumrind (1967, 1971) concluded that 
parenting style was a characteristic of the parent rather than the parent-child relationship. 
 
Characteristics  of  Baumrind’s  Parenting  Styles 
Three parenting styles were conceptualized by Baumrind in her early work (1967, 
1971, 1978) - authoritarian, permissive and authoritative. Her later publications revealed 
more parenting conceptualizations (cf. Baumrind, 1991, 2005; Baumrind, Larzelere & 
Owens, 2010) but  it  can  be  argued  that  Baumrind’s three core parenting styles remained 
the most influential of her work, having been widely established and repeatedly used as 
an organizing heuristics  for  child  development  research.  Baumrind’s  conceptualizations  
were mainly data-driven and thus were subjected to changes depending on the sample 
characteristics such as the age of children. As mentioned before, Baumrind's (1967) 
initial study used cluster analysis to group children who displayed similar characteristics 
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and behaviors together. Three groups were identified: the first group was socially 
detached, passively hostile, vulnerable to stress and easily distressed; the second was 
relatively immature, displayed impulsive behaviors and aimlessly pursued activities; and 
the third was the most self-controlled, self-reliant, socially and emotionally competent. 
Subsequently, these three clusters of children corresponded respectively with three 
strands of parenting styles named authoritarian, permissive and authoritative. 
Authoritative parenting has been elaborated in Section 2.1 above but the following 
elaborates on the other two types of parenting: 
 
a) Authoritarian parenting – parents hold a strict absolute set of standards, and use it 
to  measure  and  evaluate  their  child’s  behavior  and  attitudes.  When  children  do  
not comply with these high standards, intrusive disciplinary measures such as 
love withdrawal and harsh physical punishment may be enforced to obtain his/her 
obedience. Bidirectional communication is not encouraged and parents tend not to 
practice reasoning when giving directives. Children's autonomy and expressions 
of individuality are not actively encouraged, in keeping with their emphasis on 
the traditional hierarchy of order within the family, valuing obedience to and 
respect for authorities. They are less contingently responsive to the needs of the 
child and demonstrate less explicit expressions of positive affect - they are less 
warm, less approving, less empathetic and less sympathetic. 
 
b) Permissive parenting – parents do not have high demands and do not expect their 
children to live up to these demands. They are overly lax with rules and 
expectations and provide little structure and consistency in their disciplinary 
methods; often not seeking to guide or correct misbehaviors. Rather, the child is 
allowed to self-regulate his/her own activities as much as possible. Parents are 
highly  responsive  and  affirmative  but  overly  accepting  towards  their  child’s  
deviant behaviors, impulses and wayward desires. They allow the child to use 
them as a resource, presenting themselves neither as a role model for him/her to 
emulate, nor as an active agent with authority to shape the child's behaviors.   
 
Children of authoritarian parents have been found to exhibit less psychosocial 
maturity such as low self-esteem, lack of empathy and temperance, low communal 
competence, low agency and more internalizing problems such as depression and 
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anxiety. Academically, they also display poorer performances compared to peers from 
authoritative families (Baumrind, Larzelere  & Owens, 2010; Steinberg & Blatt-
Eisengart, 2006; Baumrind, 1991). These negative child outcomes have been attributed to 
the coercive disciplinary techniques of authoritarian parenting, which have been found to 
undermine children's autonomy and development. However, adolescents of ethnic 
minorities or lower social classes, such as Asian-, African- or Latin-American 
adolescents, have been found to benefit from authoritarian parenting in the domain of 
academic achievement (Leung et al., 1998; Dornbusch et al., 1987). Steinberg (2001), 
however, argued that evidence for the benefits of authoritative parenting is stronger, 
having been empirically replicated across the world, with empirical studies supporting its 
usefulness beyond ethnicity and socioeconomic status (cf. Steinberg, Mounts, Lamborn 
& Dornbusch, 1991). Steinberg suggested that this difference in results may be due to 
minority adolescents being less affected by authoritarian parenting compared to White 
peers but this does not necessarily indicate that they benefit more from authoritarian 
parenting.  He supported his conclusion with evidence that minority adolescents raised in 
authoritative homes still exhibited higher competence and maturity compared to peers 
from non-authoritative homes. Baumrind, Larzelere and Owens (2010), however, 
interpreted these results in a different way. They postulated that authoritarian parenting 
should be distinguished from directive parenting. The former and latter are alike in that 
they are highly confrontive and ideologically conservative, but only the latter remains 
child-oriented, is moderately responsive and avoids severe levels of verbal and physical 
discipline. Thus directive parenting is confrontational but not coercive, thus perhaps 
providing an explanation that authoritarian-like parenting can be optimal in some cultural 
contexts. 
Children of permissive parents have similarly been found to be less well-adjusted 
and less well-performing compared to children of authoritative parents. They are less 
academically competent and lack self-regulation and social responsibility. Additionally, 
they are shown to be more prone to delinquency; being more vulnerable to antisocial 
behavior and externalizing problem behaviors such as drug use (Steinberg & Blatt-
Eisenberg, 2006; Baumrind, 1991). In later work, permissive parenting is further 
specified into indulgent permissive and neglectful or disengaged permissive parenting 
(Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Baumrind, 1991). These two sub-types of permissive 
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parenting and their respective consequences on child development will be further 
elaborated on in a later section. 
This tripartite classification of Baumrind has generated many empirical studies, 
most notably by Steinberg and colleagues (cf. Steinberg, 2001). These studies have 
validated and supported the effectiveness of authoritative parenting and by the early 
1980s, Baumrind's classification was firmly established in the field of child development. 
However, researchers around this time also began to recognize the restrictions of 
Baumrind's classification methodology in that her typology was specifically formulated 
for the purpose of differentiating among children reared in well-functioning middle-class 
European American families (Baumrind, Larzelere  & Owens, 2010). There was a 
growing interest in a broader range of parenting variations and researchers started to 
question the applicability of Baumrind's model beyond these well-functioning families. 
Maccoby and Martin (1983) facilitated the generalizability of Baumrind's model 
to other populations by transforming her typological approach back into a circumplex 
linear formulation alike to earlier parenting work. By defining parenting along two linear 
dimensions, these theoretically important aspects of parenting can now be measured in 
various populations.  
Figure 2-1.  Maccoby  &  Martin’s  dimensional  model  of  parenting 
 
Two specific processes underlying parenting were conceptualized: (a) demandingness – 
the number and type of maturity demands made by parents and (b) responsiveness – the 
contingency of parental reinforcement. Parental responsiveness is not the equivalent of 
warmth or positive affect as Maccoby and Martin (1983) noted: “the  concept  differs  
importantly from that of warmth, which includes affection or praise when they are 
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contingently  but  also  when  they  are  given  on  the  parent’s  impulse  regardless  of  the  
concurrent  state,  signals,  and  behavior  of  the  child”  (p.39).    Figure 2-1 illustrates 
Maccoby  &  Martin’s  (1983)  two  dimensional  model.     
As can be seen in Figure 2-1, authoritative parents score high on both measures of 
demandingness and responsiveness. They have high expectations of mature behavior 
from their children, but also respond contingently to the needs of their children through 
the dedication of time and resources. Authoritarian parents score high on measures of 
maturity demands but low on measures of responsiveness. They demand children to 
behave maturely, but do not provide appropriate responses to satisfy children's needs of 
affirmation and guidance. With regards to the permissive parenting style, Maccoby & 
Martin (1983) made a distinction between two types of parenting which could fall under 
this category – the indulgent permissive parent and the neglecting permissive parent. 
Indulgent permissive parents score moderately high on measures of responsiveness and 
low on measures of demandingness but neglecting permissive parenting, similar to 
Baumrind’s  ‘neglecting’  style,  are low on both measures of control and responsiveness. 
For further elaboration: 
 Indulgent permissive parents make few or almost no demands for mature 
behaviors but they are highly responsive to their children's needs. However, they 
are  overly  tolerant  and  accepting  towards  the  child’s  deviant  behavior  and  
wayward impulses, including sexual and aggressive ones. They avoid asserting 
their authority and use as little punishment as possible. They allow children to 
self-regulate and make their own decisions when at all possible, and impose no 
controls  or  restrictions  to  govern  the  child’s  schedule. 
 Neglecting permissive parents, alike to indulgent parents, make no maturity 
demands but unlike them, have no response to their children's needs. If there is an 
unavoidable immediate need to respond to, they seek to minimize their time and 
interactions with the child by responding in such a way as to terminate the need 
and primarily orientate their behavior towards the avoidance of inconvenience. 
However, Maccoby and Martin (1983) cautioned that their linear reformulation does 
not  directly  corresponds  to  Baumrind’s  model  as  its  two  dimensional  structure  does  not  
include assessments of other distinguishing  features  of  Baumrind’s  parenting  style  such  
as the quality of parental control, warmth and affection given, coerciveness of discipline 
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and autonomy granting practices. Nevertheless, their reformulation allowed for the 
measurement of quantitative differences in parenting practices and was highly useful for 
expanding the scope of Baumrind's classification. Baumrind (1991) also adopted these 
dimensional concepts of demandingness and responsiveness in her later work and 
elaborated  that:  “Demandingness  refers to the claims parents make on the child to 
become integrated in the family whole by their maturity demands, supervision, 
disciplinary efforts and willingness to confront the child who disobeys. Responsiveness 
refers to actions which intentionally foster individuality, self-regulation and self-assertion 
by  being  attuned,  supportive  and  acquiescent  to  the  child’s  special  needs  and  demands  
(p.61-62).”  She postulated that demandingness represented the demands a society made 
on the child (as conveyed through the parent’s  socializing  role)  and  contrastingly,  
responsiveness represented the demands the child made on society.  Competent parenting 
was found in the balance parents made between responsiveness and demandingness; in 
other  words,  “how  children  balanced other-oriented, rule-following tendencies with 
individualistic,  autonomous,  active  thinking”  (Darling  and  Steinberg,  1993,  p.492). 
Baumrind (1991) observed that neglecting or disengaged parents had children who 
had the lowest social and psychological adjustment and academic competence as 
compared to their peers. These children generally lacked social regulation, social 
responsibility, and cognitive competence, suffered from internalizing and externalizing 
behaviors and rejected their parents as role models. They suffered from the highest level 
of externalizing problems of drug use and alcohol abuse. Academically, they performed 
poorly on achievement tests and possessed an external locus of control (Baumrind, 
1991).   
In Baumrind's later work, seven parenting types were derived from 
differentiations among the earlier three patterns (Baumrind, 1991; Baumrind, Larzelere 
& Owens, 2010).  These seven patterns are elaborated in Table 2-1. Although Baumrind 
(1991; Baumrind et al., 2010) has used these seven typologies in later studies, many 
empirical parenting studies have continued to use the three main prototypic types of 
parenting established in her earlier work, namely authoritative, authoritarian and 
permissive parenting 
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Table 2-1.  Baumrind’s  Seven  parenting  types 
1. Authoritative Highly demanding, responsive, 
autonomy-supportive and low 
psychological control 
Authoritative  
(demanding and 
responsive) 
2. Authoritarian High-psychologically controlling, 
high-demanding, and low-
responsive 
Directorial  
(more demanding than 
responsive) 
3. Directive High-demanding and moderate-
responsive 
4. Permissive Low-demanding and high-
responsive 
Lenient 
(more responsive than 
demanding) 5. Democratic Moderate-demanding, high 
responsive, and high autonomy-
support 
6. Good enough Moderately-responsive, demanding 
and autonomy supportive 
(moderate in all) 
7. Disengaged Low-demanding, low-responsive 
and low-autonomy supportive 
(low in all) 
Despite  its  established  status,  Baumrind’s  model  of  typological  styles  has had its 
share of criticisms. Lewis (1981) critiqued Baumrind's focus on parental control and her 
suggestions of the role that control plays in contribution to positive child outcomes. 
Lewis (1981) argued that the high control used by authoritative parents seemed unlikely 
to explain and account for this positive association and suggested that although high 
parental control might obtain external behavioral compliance, it was likely to retard the 
internalization of parental values. This is in line with findings of SDT that the use of 
controlling parental discipline interferes with the process of the child internalizing 
socially desirable values. Rather, Lewis believed that the positive child outcomes 
Baumrind obtained were a consequence of the respect given to the child and the space for 
open bidirectional communication provided in authoritative parenting. Baumrind (1983) 
agreed with Lewis to a certain degree but remained unchanged in her stance that parental 
control was a necessary ingredient for children to develop instrumental competence. 
However, the concept of control received renewed attention in later work, with control 
being differentiated between intrusive psychological control and well meaning behavioral 
control (Steinberg, 1990).  
Grolnick (2003) additionally argued that Baumrind's model lacked contextual 
emphasis. She argued that parenting situations differed, and with changing situational 
contexts, children's needs also differed. Thus the effectiveness of parenting strategies 
could vary in different contexts. She referred to Darling and Steinberg's contextual model 
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(1993); which interpreted and explained specific parenting practices in the context of a 
more global parenting style found to enhance or diminish the effects of the practices. 
Grolnick (2003) noted that control could easily be seen as parental aggressiveness and 
emphasized that instead of using control, parents should actively support their child's 
need for autonomy. In valuing child input and supporting their self-initiated behaviors, 
children are empowered to be more agentic and can flourish developmentally.  
Lastly, Baumrind's model has been critiqued for its lack of the concept of 
'tolerance', defined as parents having to practice detachment or restraint in certain 
situations when it is not appropriate to set limits (Greenspan, 2006). Competent parents, 
even those relatively high on control, need to make judgments all the time about when to 
and  when  not  to  intervene  but  Baumrind’s  model  does  not  account  for  unique  situations  
when parents have to practice tolerance for the achievement of higher purposes. Thus to 
conclude briefly, Baumrind's model has been criticized on three points: a) parental 
control as beneficial to child internalization instead of it being rigid and detrimental, b) 
contextual inflexibility and c) lacking the factor of parental tolerance when parents have 
to be detached or restrained in certain situations for more effective teaching. 
Grolnick,  Deci  &  Ryan  (1997),  in  the  book  “Parenting  and  Children’s  
Internalization  of  Values”,  pointed  out that Baumrind’s  parenting  patterns  could be 
understood in terms of the parenting dimensions outlined in Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT):  “authoritative  parenting  can  be  described  as  a  combination  of  high  autonomy  
support and high structure, while the more controlling authoritarian style involved high 
levels  of  both  control  and  structure”  (Grolnick,  Deci  &  Ryan,  1997,  p.152).  Grolnick, 
Deci and Ryan acknowledged though that the features of authoritative parenting need not 
be mutually exclusive and can work to affect each other. Parents’  active  support  of  
autonomy can help increase their involvement and warmth in interactions with children 
and this involvement can subsequently alter children to be more open and responsive to 
rules and regulations set by parents. The next section introduces the Self-Determination 
Theory and further elaborates on parenting research conducted within this theory. 
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2.3 Self Determination Theory (SDT) and Parenting 
The Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Deci, Ryan, 1985, 2000, 2008) is an 
organismic dialectical approach that uses the concept of innate, universal, psychological 
needs to explain the process of human motivation and internalization. Strictly speaking, 
SDT is not considered as a developmental theory as the theory gives little attention to 
age-related changes in socialization content and practices. However, it has been found to 
be highly relevant and useful to understanding the socialization of children, their 
internalization process and their development that entails  “individuals’  working  to  
elaborate or expand themselves while striving to maintain or enhance integration and 
harmony  among  all  aspects  of  themselves”  (Grolnick,  Deci  &  Ryan,  1997,  p.136). 
 SDT postulates that there are three basic needs: a) the need for autonomy refers 
to a natural desire to experience behavior as volitional and freely chosen, b) the need for 
competence refers to the desire to feel effective and skilful in the activities one 
undertakes, and c) the need for relatedness refers to the desire to feel connected to others; 
to care and be cared for (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The satisfaction of these basic needs is 
assumed to energize, propel and direct human behavior and allows internalization to 
function optimally. The internalization of values, behaviors and attitudes in the social 
environment is theorized as a spontaneous process (Ryan, 1995). SDT advocates that 
these three needs are not automatically satisfied, but requires ongoing support from 
surrounding social contexts. 
Children are assumed to have an innate curiosity and tendency towards actively 
mastering their environment. Parents are recognized as significant social agents who can 
successfully facilitate this process and support their children's motivation and 
engagement in tasks, especially when these tasks are not inherently enjoyable. 
Internalization - the  learning  of  external  social  regulations,  integrating  them  into  one’s  
sense of self and volitionally performing them without prompts - is viewed as the central 
socialization goal of parenting (Joussemet, Landry & Koestner, 2008; Grolnick, Deci & 
Ryan, 1997; Schaefer, 1968). Thus although parents can obtain child compliance to 
certain adult requirements with force, the real goal of parenting should be for children to 
accept these behaviors as their own. The social parenting context can either facilitate or 
undermine  children’s  natural  tendencies  toward  active  engagement  and  psychological  
growth, or it can catalyze lack of integration and defense. Parents are the socializing 
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agents that not only must provide the structures to be internalized, but they must also 
provide an involving positive surround for the child to be willing to engage these 
structures.  
A remarkable finding of SDT is that children are more likely to internalize values 
and attitudes that are congruent with their intrinsic nature when less, rather than more, 
pressure is exerted on them (Joussemet, Landry & Koestner, 2008). External pressure 
that goes against children's developmental tendencies can actually have a negative effect 
on their development. Therefore, parents have to be sensitive about these thresholds and 
find ways to promote internalization without diminishing the natural curiosity, creativity, 
vitality and excitement of the child. When parents succeed in creating optimal supportive 
surrounds for the fostering of children's intrinsic motivation and internalization, 
children’s  learning  and  psychosocial  adjustment  greatly  benefit  and  a  sense  of  agency  
and well-being is achieved. 
In SDT, three separate but dynamically related aspects of the family environment 
form the key components of successful parenting and are expected to have long-term 
consequences for the psychological and relational functioning of children – autonomy 
support, structure and involvement (Joussemet, Landry & Koestner, 2008; Grolnick, Deci 
& Ryan, 1997). In contrast, parental control has been found to consistently undermine 
intrinsic motivation and produce non-optimal forms of internalization. These four 
constructs will be individually defined in the following sections and elaborated in 
relations to supporting empirical studies. When relevant, ongoing theoretical debates 
related to these constructs will also be discussed. 
1. Autonomy-support 
The need for autonomy is one of three basic needs postulated in SDT and when 
supported,  promotes  individuals’  internalization,  flourishing  and  well-being (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000). Autonomy-support  refers  to  the  active  support  of  the  child’s  capacity  to  be  
self-initiating and to feel that he/she has input in determining behaviors (Grolnick & 
Ryan, 1989). Autonomy is the experience of freedom in initiating and endorsing 
behaviors, that is, to authentically concur with the internal or external forces that 
influence behaviors. Autonomous behavior is volitional, harmonious and integrated 
functioning, in contrast to more pressured, conflicted or alienated experiences (Ryan, 
Deci, Grolnick, & La Guardia, 2006; Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
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Social environments are autonomy supportive when they provide choices, 
encourage self-initiation, acknowledge perspectives and feelings, provide meaningful 
rationales and avoid controlling techniques (Joussemet, Koestner, Lekes and Landry, 
2005). In parenting, this means the encouragement of parents towards their children to do 
certain activities with the goal of fostering autonomous self-regulation rather than mere 
compliance. They value their children's ideas and emotions, and encourage self-initiated 
expressions of individuality. They abstain from using coercive disciplinary techniques 
and allow the child to make choices when possible. When an activity is of intrinsic 
interest to the child, parents only have to avoid using controlling strategies and this is 
sufficient to allow the developmental process of intrinsic motivation to flourish. 
However, when activities are not inherently enjoyable, parents have to be more proactive 
in supporting the child's autonomy by being contingently responsive to his/her needs, 
considering the child's perspectives and encouraging self-initiated behavior in order to 
successfully facilitate the internalization of external values, attitudes and behaviors.  
There has been debate over the developmental process of autonomy-support and 
how it should be defined and assessed (Soenens et al., 2007). While SDT researchers 
conceptualize autonomy-support as the degree to which behaviors are volitionally 
enacted (i.e., the promotion of volitional functioning), other parenting researchers have 
defined it as the promotion of independent functioning (Gray & Steinberg, 1999; Silk, 
Morris, Kanaya & Steinberg, 2003). The opposite of independence is conformity to 
expectations or dependence on parents for making decisions, but the opposite of 
volitional functioning is not dependence but heteronomy, that is, the feeling of being 
controlled  in  one’s  actions  by  external forces or by internal compulsions. It does not 
encompass making children fully independent from others, self-reliant and detached. It is 
fully possible for autonomy to be provided while still being related to others and being 
reliant on them for support. The promotion of independence primarily pertains to what 
parents promote (independence versus dependence) rather than to how parents promote 
autonomy (promotion of volitional functioning). Soenens et al. (2007) showed that these 
two concepts can be empirically distinguished using confirmatory factor analyses which 
revealed a better fit of a two-factor model to the empirical data than a one-factor model, 
supporting the factorial distinctiveness of promotion of independence and promotion of 
volitional functioning. The results also showed that only the promotion of volitional 
functioning was a unique predictor of adolescent psychosocial functioning, supporting 
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the  notion  that  promotion  of  independence  is  less  strongly  related  to  adolescents’  optimal  
functioning compared to the degree that parents support their children to act upon their 
true interests and values. Therefore, autonomy support conceptualized as promotion of 
volitional  functioning  is  more  important  for  adolescents’  well-being as opposed to just 
promoting independence, presumably because it encourages them to be more reflective 
and aware of their personal interests, goals and values and to act upon them. 
Additionally, autonomy-support should not be confounded with permissiveness, 
that is, the lack of structure, or neglect as the lack of involvement (Joussemet, Landry & 
Koestner, 2008). Valuing and respecting child input, the encouragement of self-initiated 
behavior and the provision of choice do not equate to freely allowing the child to do 
anything he/she wants without any boundaries or guidance.  
Fulfilling the need for autonomy has received paramount importance in parenting 
literature as parental autonomy-support has been shown to be associated with greater 
internalization and integration of important but uninteresting activities (cf. Joussemet, 
Landry & Koestner, 2008; Joussemet, Koestner, Lekes & Houlfort, 2004) across various 
domains of life such as school performance, social competence and job-seeking (Soenens 
& Vansteenkiste, 2005). 
Through videotaped observational studies of parent-child interactions during 
play- and task-oriented sessions, autonomy-supportive parenting has been shown to 
foster intrinsic motivation and promote higher social competence in children. Greater 
task-oriented persistence and competence during solo play sessions of toddlers were 
found to be associated with higher maternal autonomy-support in contrast to mothers 
who were more controlling (Grolnick, Frodi & Bridges, 1984). A follow-up study one 
year later indicated sustained beneficial effects on task persistence of children with 
autonomy-supportive mothers (Frodi, Bridges & Grolnick, 1985). Koestner, Ryan, 
Bernieri & Holt (1984) demonstrated that when parents acted in an autonomy-supportive 
manner to gain child's compliance in which they do not use coercive intrusive methods, 
compliance can be obtained without adverse negative effects on children's intrinsic 
motivation. Similarly, Kochanska, Coy & Murray (2001) showed that children of 
autonomy-supportive mothers displayed  higher  levels  of  “committed  compliance”  across  
various tasks, that is, the reflection of a genuine adoption of mother's agenda which is 
considered a preliminary form of internalization and self-regulation.  One such task was 
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the prohibition of the child to touch attractive objects (Kochanska & Aksan, 1995). When 
mothers used reasoning, polite requests, positive comments, suggestions and distractions, 
children were more likely to internalize this prohibition and not touch the object when 
left alone for a few minutes with the prohibited object. However, when mothers used 
negative control such as giving out threats, harsh physical interventions and negative 
statements,  these  children  exhibited  only  “situational  compliance”  that  is,  superficial  
obedience to request, and were more likely to touch the object when left alone. 
Additionally, higher maternal autonomy-support was positively correlated with child's 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, Driver, Hotchkiss, Robbins & Wilson, 1993). In two 
videotaped sessions of play with construction toys accompanied by their mothers, 
children of autonomy-supportive mothers indicated greater interest and enjoyment. 
Children's perceived autonomy-support from parents has also been found to act as 
a significant mediator between parenting environments and school outcomes.  Grolnick 
and Ryan (1989) demonstrated that the autonomy-supportive practices of parents were 
positively  related  to  children’s  self-regulation and higher achievement and competence in 
school. Grolnick, Ryan & Deci (1991) showed that higher levels  of  child’s  perceived  
autonomy-support  from  parents  were  positively  associated  with  children’s  self-esteem 
and feelings of competence and autonomy, which in turn predicted their school 
performance. Maternal autonomy-support has been associated with higher performance 
on a homework-like task (Grolnick, Gurland, DeCourcey and Jacob, 2002). Subsequent 
research has also confirmed the importance of perceived parental autonomy-support to 
adolescents’  self-regulated motivation, adjustment and school success (Guay, Ratelle & 
Chanal, 2008; Exeler & Wild, 2003; Lorenz & Wild, 2007; Vallerand, Fortier & Guay, 
1997).  
Longitudinally, Joussemet, Koestner, Lekes and Landry (2005) found that early 
experiences of parental autonomy-support had sustained beneficial effects on children’s  
academic and social achievement. Maternal autonomy-support was coded from 
interviews about childrearing when children were five years old. The study followed 
children from age five till nine on measures of teacher-rated academic and social 
adjustment measures and found that maternal autonomy-support was positively related to 
social adjustment and academic achievement. Autonomy-support also led to higher 
overall adjustment as evidenced by children showing simultaneously high competence in 
both domains. These findings support conclusions of recent studies which suggest that 
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autonomy-supportive contexts promote consistency and congruence among various 
behavioral areas and are aligned  with  SDT’s  postulation  that  the  fulfillment of autonomy 
support facilitates integrated functioning (cf. Deci, Eghrari, Patrick & Leone, 1994; 
Joussemet, Koestner, Lekes & Houlfort, 2004). 
2. Control  
Control here refers to psychological control; coercive, intrusive and manipulative 
parenting behaviors which intrude upon the child's psychological world (Soenens & 
Vansteenkiste, 2010; Ryan, 1982) and is characterized by parental hostility and negative 
affect. This type of control is covert and aims to change the child. Controlling techniques 
consists of the invalidation of feelings, guilt induction, love withdrawal and creating an 
environment in which acceptance is conditional and contingent on children's behavior 
(Barber, Stolz & Olsen, 2005; Silk, Morris, Kanaya & Steinberg, 2003). Controlling 
parents  undermine  children’s  tendencies  for  autonomous  regulation  and  pressure  children  
to think, behave or feel in particular ways.  
While autonomy-supportive practices are related to positive child and adolescent 
development, control has consistently been found to have detrimental effects on 
development (cf. Barber et al., 2001; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010), being linked with 
social withdrawal (Baumrind, 1967), internalizing problems (Silk et al., 2003; Gray & 
Steinberg, 1999; Barber et al., 1994), and externalizing problems (Barber & Olsen, 
1997). In observational studies with infants, controlling communications, defined as 
maternal vocalizations seeking to change  infants’  ongoing  activity,  were found to lead to 
less task-oriented persistence and competence in children during solo play (Grolnick, 
Frodi & Bridges). These effects were found to be sustained in a follow-up study (Frodi, 
Bridges & Grolnick, 1985). Controlling vocalizations have also been associated with 
lower  levels  of  young  children’s  intrinsic motivation during play sessions (Deci, Driver, 
Hotchkiss, Robbins & Wilson, 1993). Child compliance  to  parents’  authority  was  found  
to be negatively related to power-assertive parenting practices and a lack of 
internalization was seen (Kochanska & Aksan, 2006). When parents used internal 
controlling methods such as love withdrawal and guilt induction, children sensed 
rejection from their parents and expressed resentment towards their parents (Assor et al., 
2004; Roth, Assor, Niemiec, Ryan & Deci, 2009). Thus, controlling socialization 
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practices interfere with child and adolescent development and increase the tendency for 
child maladjustment. 
Baumrind’s  model  was  criticized on her assertion that parental control was 
necessary and beneficial for child development (cf. Lewis, 1981). Later theorizing and 
research make a distinction between psychological control and behavioral control 
(Barber, Olsen & Shagle, 1994; Barber, 1996; Steinberg, 1990). Behavioral control 
consists of parental attempts to regulate and structure child behavior (e.g., manners, study 
activities and involvement with peers), for instance, through the communication of rules 
for appropriate behavior and monitoring of child whereabouts (Grolnick & Pomerantz, 
2009). Monitoring has been associated with less involvement in delinquency and other 
norm-breaking behaviors but recent studies have suggested that decreased levels of 
deviant behaviors may be attributed to child disclosure instead of parental monitoring 
and surveillance (Stattin & Kerr, 2000; Kerr & Stattin, 2000). In contrast to behavioral 
control, psychological control consists of the use of manipulative techniques to control 
the  child’s  psychological  experiences  (e.g.,  feelings,  aspirations  and  identity  choices)  
instead  of  the  child’s  behavior (Barber & Harmon, 2002). Barber (1996) advocated that 
this distinction allowed for a more fine-grained analysis of how parenting affected child 
development as behavioral control has been found to be uniquely predictive of 
externalizing problems while psychological control was uniquely predictive of 
internalizing problems (Barber et al., 1994; Barber, Stolz & Olsen, 2005). Other studies 
have also found this positive relation of psychological control to externalizing problems 
(Barber, 1996) but some studies did not replicate this finding (Gray & Steinberg, 1999).  
However, Soenens & Vansteenkiste (2010) noted that the distinction between 
psychological  control  and  behavioral  control  as  ‘control  over  a  child’s  psychological  
world’  versus  ‘control  over  a  child’s  behavior’  can  be  trickier  than  expected  as  “there  
may not be a clear-cut line between psychological and behavioral control, in that parents 
could  use  psychological  control  for  behavioral  outcomes  in  children…  whereas  
behavioral control could affect how  children  think  and  feel”  (Wang  et  al.,  2007,  p.  1608).  
An evaluation of certain assessment scales for behavioral control has supported that these 
concepts are easily confounded as some items found in behavioral control scales were 
reflective of psychological control (cf. Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010). Despite efforts 
to theoretically delineate these concepts, there exists the common feature of pressure and 
coercion when behavioral control involves pressuring parenting tactics such as physical 
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punishment and threats of withdrawing privileges. As a solution, Soenens & 
Vansteenkiste  (2010)  suggested  that  behavioral  control  should  be  used  to  define  “parental  
attempts  to  structure  and  regulate  children’s  behavior”  (p.87);;  a  qualitatively  different  
concept from parental control in the sense of pressure and coercion. This is equivalent to 
the dimension of structure in SDT, which will be further elaborated in the next section. 
A last debate worth mentioning is that of intrusive psychological control being 
equated to the absence of autonomy-support (cf. Steinberg, 1990), implying that control 
and autonomy-support are opposite ends of a continuum (Barber, Bean & Erickson, 
2001). Silk et al. (2003) found factorial validity of two constructs which are empirically 
distinct from each other rather than opposite ends of one unitary construct. Psychological 
control, but not autonomy-support, was found to significantly relate to internalizing 
problems, suggesting that these constructs had different unique influences on 
adolescent’s  mental health. However, in order to understand if control is the absence of 
autonomy-support, one must first clarify about the conceptualization of autonomy-
support.  Soenens  et  al.’s  (2007) differentiation of autonomy-support into promotion of 
volitional functioning and promotion of independence helps to support the existence of 
both perspectives that can be found in empirical literature: autonomy-support as opposite 
of control, and autonomy-support as distinct from control. Autonomy-support as 
promotion of volitional functioning is the opposite of psychological control, but 
promotion of independence can be postulated as relatively orthogonal to psychological 
control (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010). Parents can promote independence or 
dependence in a controlling or non-controlling manner. Correlation analyses confirmed 
these conclusions as weak correlations were obtained between the promotion of 
independence and control, but strong negative correlations were found between the 
promotion of volitional functioning and control (Soenens et al., 2007; Silk et al., 2003). 
However, Lorenz and Wild (2007) suggested that autonomy-support in terms of 
volitional functioning may be more than the absence of pressure and control. In their 
study, these two dimensions were related to different aspects of student motivation and 
learning behaviours. Additionally, these relations lasted over a year or even partly for 
three years in their longitudinal study. Thus, they proposed that several mechanisms were 
involved in this parental influence on student motivation as opposed to volitional 
functioning and control strictly operating as two ends of one spectrum. 
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3. Structure 
Structure is parents' conveyance of the relations between child behaviors and 
outcomes through the consistent provision of clear unambiguous expectations, guidelines 
and constraints (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989). It is the parents' organization of children's 
environment to facilitate children's competence; using provisions to monitor and evaluate 
children’s  behaviors and to follow through with the necessary consequences for 
misdemeanors. Apart from targeting behaviors, structure can also be targeted at 
children's thoughts and feelings for the internalization of key values (Grolnick & 
Pomerantz, 2009). A structured environment is supposed to facilitate the development of 
self-regulation and self-control (Barber, 1996; Soenens, Vanstennkiste, Luyckx & 
Goossens, 2006). In  contrast,  a  chaotic  environment  undermines  children’s  competence  
by lack of support (Skinner, Johnson & Snyder, 2005). 
As previously mentioned, structure has often been compared to behavioral 
control. However, while most studies on behavioral control rely more on parental 
monitoring and limit setting, structure refers more broadly to the imposition of clear, 
consistent and developmentally appropriate structure on children's behaviors (Joussemet, 
Landry & Koestner, 2008). Structure is inherent in behavioral control but it does not 
involve pressure, intrusiveness and coercion (Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009). Lorenz and 
Wild  (2007)  likens  it  more  to  Baumrind’s  (1991)  concept  of  supportive  control. In its 
relations to autonomy-support and control, Grolnick (2003) suggests that structure is 
orthogonal  to  these  dimensions.  Structure  deals  primarily  with  “what”  parents do to 
monitor  and  regulate  their  children’s  behavior,  but  controlling  versus  autonomy-
supportive  parenting  pertains  to  “how”  parents  implement  this  structure  (cf.  Soenens  &  
Vansteenkiste,  2010).    The  effect  of  structure  depends  on  the  climate:  “language that 
pressures children and close surveillance to ensure compliance make the structure 
controlling, but simply conveying information in a reasoned and empathetic way allows 
the  structure  to  provide  guidance  while  at  the  same  time  supporting  autonomy”  
(Grolnick, Deci & Ryan, 1997, p.148). Therefore, the style in which parental guidelines 
are put across and behavioral monitoring is done has huge impact on the motivational 
dynamics of children. An autonomy-supportive parenting style increases self-determined 
forms of motivation, while a controlling style leads to maladjusted forms of motivation 
(Grolnick, 2003). 
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Grolnick & Ryan (1989) found that parental provision of structure was most 
highly correlated with children's control understanding in school and in general. Home 
environments, which have clear and consistent expectations and rules, facilitate children's 
differentiation of control processes. Structured environments, coupled with autonomy-
support, have been found to facilitate internalization of external regulations. When faced 
with highly boring tasks, participants who were placed in more facilitative conditions 
demonstrated more self-determined behavior after the tasks; spending more subsequent 
free time on these tasks and having the experience of more positive feelings (Deci, 
Eghrari, Patrick & Leone, 1994). 
A low degree of structure in home environments can make it difficult for children 
to develop optimally and securely as they are unsure of parental expectations and rules, 
and thus they lack guidance and awareness towards what the connections between certain 
actions and outcomes are. Structure  equips  children  with  “a  sense  of  predictability  and  
with a sense of personal efficacy to meet challenges and to competently execute 
instrumental  actions”  (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010, p.79). With a moderate degree of 
structure, children are more able to understand the consequences of their actions and 
better direct their efforts to more beneficial activities and attitudes. 
4. Involvement 
Lastly, involvement is the dedication of time, attention and resources to the child 
(Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Joussemet, Landry & Koestner, 2008). This includes activities 
that maintain interpersonal connection, such as practical and emotional support and 
nurturance. Highly involved parents put more effort to spend time with their children and 
invest  more  resources  to  maintain  their  connection  to  their  children’s  daily  lives. 
Parental involvement has been less explored but some studies have demonstrated 
the importance of a secure relational support network in the flourishing of intrinsic 
motivation and facilitation of internalization, which in turn is associated with higher 
competencies and better control understandings (Grolnick, Deci & Ryan, 1997). When 
parents are actively involved and highly responsive to their children’s needs, secure 
parent-child attachments are formed and these children display higher exploratory and 
mastery orientations as compared to their peers (Frodi, Bridges & Grolnick, 1985). 
Congruent with attachment theory research, these results confirm the significance of 
contingent and warm parental provisions to their infants. Children who are secure are 
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more likely to respond positively to parental requests in subsequent years with less 
aggression and less opposition to requests, thus suggesting greater internalization 
(Grolnick, Deci & Ryan, 1997). Maternal involvement has been shown to indirectly 
predict school performance of young adolescents through mediated pathways of 
perceived competence and control understanding, while paternal involvement influences 
school performance through perceived competence (Grolnick and Slowiaczek, 1994).  
Parental responsiveness has also been found to predict more autonomous forms of 
motivation in children, which in turn are associated with a better quality of learning and 
performance (Lorenz & Wild, 2007). 
Looking at the broader picture, a combination of parental provisions of 
autonomy-support, structure and involvement, coupled with low psychological control, 
has been perceived as highly  beneficial  for  children’s  growth  and  development.  Grolnick 
and Ryan (1989) conducted parent interview studies to examine how these four 
dimensions were related to children's adjustment and competence in school- and home-
related tasks. The outcome measures  consisted  of  children’s  school  outcomes  which  
included  children’s  self-ratings on self-regulation, competence and control at school, 
teachers’  ratings  of  children’s  social  and  academic  achievement,  and  child’s  academic  
achievement based on standardized tests and classroom grades. Higher autonomy-support 
from parents was found to be associated with more autonomous self-regulation, teacher-
rated competence and adjustment, and higher academic scores. When parents valued 
autonomy and self-initiation, used reasoning and provided choices, children were more 
able to self-regulate autonomously and scored better on competence and adjustment 
measures.  In contrast, when parents used controlling methods to impose their own 
agenda and gain compliance, children scored lower. There was a positive relation of 
structure with children's control of success and failure in school and in general. When 
parental rules and expectations were articulated clearly and consistently, children were 
empowered with a greater sense of control. Lastly, higher parental involvement had a 
positive relation to teacher-rated competence and adjustment, and to school outcomes. 
When parents were interested in and were actively involved in children's lives, children 
demonstrated higher competence and adjustment and had higher school grades and 
achievements. In the school domain, Lorenz and Wild (2007) and Exeler and Wild 
(2003) confirmed these findings and found that this combination of emotionally 
involved, autonomy-supportive and consistently structured parenting behaviors led to 
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higher forms of autonomous motivation while achievement-oriented and controlling 
parental instructional strategies proved detrimental for self-determined forms of learning 
motivation.  
In conclusion, SDT postulates that an environment characterized by autonomy-
support, structure and involvement can help to greatly facilitate children's internalization 
process and foster greater competence, healthier adaptation and overall well-being. 
Children require autonomy-support to learn through social interactions that they are 
capable, effective and agentic individuals with their own sense of personal identity. 
Structure is needed for the child to recognize expectations and rules which must be 
adhered to in order to become a competent member of society. Involvement fosters a 
more open child disposition which is more receptive of parental socialization efforts. In 
contrast, psychological control has been found to be detrimental to child development; 
undermining children’s  autonomy  and  associated with more problem behaviors. These 
findings in parenting research in SDT mainly complement the wider parenting literature, 
and reinforce the findings of Baumrind’s  (1971)  authoritative  parenting  style.   
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has sought to highlight the vital role parents play in fostering 
children’s  competence  in  a  wide  variety  of  domains,  in supporting  their  children’s  
intrinsic motivation and internalization processes, and in this process of socialization 
promote their children’s  well-being and flourishing in the long run. Competent parenting 
has  been  studied  in  Baumrind’s  (1971)  typological  manner  of  authoritative  parenting  – a 
complex of parenting characteristics defined by the balance of high involvement and high 
demands with clear communication about what parents require of the child and the use of 
non-controlling intrusive disciplinary methods – and in the dimensional approach of the 
SDT namely made up of three positive parenting dimensions – autonomy-support, 
involvement and structure – and one which undermines positive child outcomes – 
intrusive psychological control. The exercise of competent parenting practices are 
expected to have long-term consequences for the psychological and relational 
functioning of children.  
Up till now, parenting dimensions have been scarcely investigated in relation to 
children’s  thinking  skills  of  informal  reasoning  and  beliefs  of  personal  epistemology, 
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although past  literature  has  shown  that  children’s  development  of  cognitive  functioning  is  
associated with parenting and achievement (Burleson, Delia & Applegate, 1992). Thus, 
the focus of this dissertation is to investigate the role of parents in the fostering of these 
two specific child outcomes. Empirical literature has demonstrated a positive association 
between reasoning and epistemological beliefs, with higher reasoning skills evidencing a 
more sophisticated and critical personal epistemology. The next two chapters will further 
elaborate on these constructs, their definitions and the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INFORMAL REASONING 
 
3.1 Conceptualization of Informal Reasoning 
Reasoning  is  a  broad  cognitive  process  which  can  be  defined  as  “mental  activity  
that consists of transforming given information in order to reach  conclusions”  (Galotti,  
1989, p.335). It underlies many processes in everyday cognition such as planning, 
decision-making and problem-solving. The psychology of reasoning has often been 
placed into two domains – formal and informal reasoning (cf. Evans, 2002; Evans & 
Thompson, 2004).  
Formal reasoning is the assessment of logical competencies and was the main 
focus of the field for many decades, making significant theoretical and empirical 
contributions to our understanding of human nature. Being deductive in nature, formal 
reasoning can be completely divorced from external reality. Studies in this domain often 
centre on deductive reasoning paradigms, in which people are asked to assess logical 
arguments or to generate valid conclusions from given premises (Evans, 2002). Some 
examples of deductive paradigms are classical syllogisms or statistical inference (Evans 
& Thompson, 2004).  
In recent years, the restrictiveness of formal reasoning has been highlighted, and 
questions arose regarding the extent that formal reasoning research can actually inform 
us about the reasoning people typically engage in during everyday lives (Evans & 
Thompson, 2004; Galotti, 1989). The reductionist strategy of decomposing complex 
behavior into smaller units and analyzing how these individual units function in highly 
controlled tasks has not been effective for cognitive psychologists as even simpler 
cognitive processes like categorization has made it evident that reasoning does not occur 
in an isolated manner but instead, is embedded in a broader set of ideas and theories (cf. 
Kuhn, 1991). Studies on reasoning thus began to venture towards investigating reasoning 
in everyday situations, with a greater interest in the use of realistic ill-structured problem 
materials as opposed to structured settings with abstract problem materials (Evans, 2002). 
In everyday reasoning, individuals draw conclusions with varying degrees of confidence 
as fixed premises often do not exist.  
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In the hope of clearly defining informal reasoning, the contrast between formal 
and informal reasoning will be highlighted to aid this understanding. Formal reasoning 
concerns first, a well-structured problem with explicit background premises to solve the 
problem; and second, the endpoint of only one correct solution to the given problem (cf. 
Evans & Thompson, 2004; Evans, 2002). It is usually evoked when problems are familiar 
and compatible with existing knowledge. The well-structured  problem  “can  be  solved  by  
use of the information provided and no other; in fact, the correct solution to these 
problems often requires the reasoned to use only the information provided in the 
premises, and to avoid adding background information and knowledge to the problem 
domain”  (Evans  &  Thompson,  2004, p.69). Explicitly stated premises generally contain 
all the information that the individual should take into account and consider when 
reasoning in order to arrive at the solution. The single correct answer or conclusion is 
often deduced with a standard, agreed-upon method of reasoning. For example, experts 
solving physics or mathematics problems have typically achieved advanced formal 
reasoning competence as they often rely on a similar store of patterned schemata in order 
to find the correct solution to a problem.  
In contrast, informal reasoning concerns first, an ill-structured problem with less 
dependence  on  given  premises  but  more  on  individual’s  background  knowledge  and  
experience; and second, the possibility of having more than one solution to the problem. 
Everyday tasks are contextualized in uncertain changing environments, characterized by 
shifting, ill-defined or competing goals or by missing and uncertain information (Evans 
& Thompson, 2004). These decisions can involve time stress, high stakes and multiple 
participants (Woll, 2002).  Premises are not clearly defined and can change with 
additional information (Perkins, Farady & Bushey, 1991). Successful informal reasoning 
requires people to go beyond what they are told, by searching memory or consulting 
outside resources to find relevant information (Galotti, 1989). It is more dependent on the 
individual’s  background  knowledge  and  experience,  as a greater depth and breadth of 
stored knowledge helps to sort through the catalogs of knowledge and determine exactly 
what pieces of knowledge are relevant to the solution (Simon, 1973). Informal reasoning 
requires more of the individual to consider the causes and consequences, pros and cons of 
particular propositions or various decision alternatives in order to reach a conclusion 
(Zohar, & Nemet, 2002). Furthermore, ill-structured problems often have more than one 
right solution. These problems may also not be solved via one single,  consensual  ‘form’  
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or method, and its resulting conclusion, unlike that of formal reasoning which is clear 
and unambiguous, often (but not always) is not (Evans & Thompson, 2004).   
Additionally, informal reasoning problems typically bear some personal relevance 
and occur as part of a larger context, whereas those involving formal reasoning can be 
separate from external reality and be self-contained (Evans & Thompson, 2004). When 
problem material has personal links, changes in the reasoning process may result (Evans, 
1989). Emotions can enhance or diminish reasoning skills and this holds especially true 
for highly-charged topics such as political reasoning or publicly debated socioscientific 
dilemmas (e.g. cloning). Personal goals can also affect the reasoning process when there 
are multiple players involved and the desire to maintain a relationship overrides the goal 
of finding the best solution to the problem (cf. Stein & Albro, 2001). Formal arguments 
are regulated by the intellectual goal of validating the truth value and logic of evidence, 
whereas everyday arguments are regulated by interpersonal goals. Informal problems are 
often solved as a means of achieving other goals but formal problems often are engaged 
for their own sake.  
Table 3-1. Main features of formal and informal reasoning 
  CONTRASTING FORMAL AND INFORMAL REASONING 
Formal Informal 
1. Well-structured problems 
2. Given premises must be considered 
to solve problem; answer is a 
function of domain-specific 
knowledge and expertise 
3. Usually has one established method 
to get to one definite correct 
solution 
4. Self-contained and engaged for its 
own sake 
1. Ill-structured problems 
2. Individual ability to generate or 
retrieve the relevant premises based 
on stored background knowledge 
and experience, rather than given 
premises 
3. Possible to have more than one 
solution and more than one method 
of arriving at solutions 
4. Personally relevant and occurs as 
part of a larger context 
 
Defining  “Informal  Reasoning”   
Although the broad defining characteristics of informal reasoning are outlined 
above, an exact succinct definition of it is elusive and the ways of measuring it, tricky 
(Galotti, 1989). Means & Voss (1996) argued that despite its fuzzy nature, argument 
skills remain at the core of informal reasoning. Argumentation has been recognized as a 
broader general human process under which more specific forms of reasoning can be 
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found (Oaksford, Chater & Hahn, 2008; Goldstein, Crowell & Kuhn, 2009). Reasoning 
skills are applied through the assertion, support and refutation of claims and conclusions 
(Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). Sadler (2004) noted that 
“research from a variety of disciplines supports the notion that studying argumentation 
serves as an effective means of accessing an individual’s  informal  reasoning  (p.  516)”.  
Thus in my dissertation, informal reasoning is defined similarly to that of Means and 
Voss  (1996)  and  Kuhn  (1991,  2005):  “a  goal-dependent process that involves generating 
or evaluating (or both) evidence pertaining to a claim or conclusion... which assumes 
importance when information is less accessible, or when problems are more open-ended, 
debatable, complex or ill-structured, and especially when the issue requires that the 
individual builds an  argument  to  support  a  claim”  (Means  &  Voss,  1996,  p.140)”.    The  
process of searching, evaluating and selecting relevant information is intertwined 
inextricably with the problem one is faced with. The individual has to evaluate different 
alternatives and positions in order to reach a final decision, which can be complex, 
multifaceted, and unique to the construction of the argument. The terms of ‘informal 
reasoning’  and  ‘everyday  reasoning’  may be used interchangeably in this work as both 
represents the same form of reasoning explored in this study. 
 
3.2 Children and Adolescents as Reasoners 
In the past, most work on reasoning had been done on older participants from 
adolescence onwards as it was presumed that young children were unable to produce 
sophisticated thinking strategies due to their tender age. However, later empirical work 
proved otherwise (cf. Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1991). Literature on scientific 
reasoning (Zimmerman, 2000, 2007) has now made it evident that children are far more 
competent than first suspected. Metz (2004) suggested that failures of previous research 
could be due to researchers not being demanding enough and not providing particular 
scaffolds needed to enable the successful participation of children in authentic inquiry.  
Relatively young children have been found to demonstrate some competence in 
producing arguments in support of a claim (Stein & Miller, 1993) and in understanding 
the structure of an argument (Chambliss & Murphy, 2002). Children of three to four 
years  have  rarely  allowed  disputes  to  end  with  a  simple  refusal  of  being  told  ‘no’, but are 
more likely to end a dispute with a justification or a mutually acceptable alternative 
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proposition  (Eisenberg  and  Garvey,  1981).  Despite  children’s  justifications  not  being  
always convincing or compelling to adults, the point that they do provide justifications 
represents an understanding of its role in argumentation. Furthermore, Orsolini (1993) 
found that in certain contexts where young children have experience and the 
understanding of the expectation and value of justifications, they can produce them 
without prompts. Using recorded hours of spontaneous arguments between children, 
Orsolini found three contexts in which this often happened: (1) when children described 
negative events, (2) when children made negative assertions, and (3) when children had a 
high commitment of truth to what they were saying.  Throughout, children demonstrated 
a clear capacity for producing justifications of their ideas, assertions and observations. 
On further investigation, Orsolini found that teachers often prompted justifications with 
‘why’  questions across these three contexts, thus suggesting that children may be made 
aware of the notion of justifications through the experience of discourse with adults. 
Amsterlaw (2006) demonstrated that children as young as first graders (6-7 years) 
showed some capability to distinguish between everyday situations which involved 
reasoning from those which did not. Reasoning cases were distinguished by the use of 
more thinking, mental effort and logic, more strategies, clearer goals, and less automatic 
responding. Non-reasoning cases, in contrast, used shortcut problem solving (e.g., 
flipping a coin to decide) or were responses using automatic reflex instincts (e.g., 
removing hand from hot stove). First-graders were able to distinguish reasoning cases 
successfully from shortcut problem solving, but had more problems with distinguishing 
reasoning from automatic cases. They indicated similar high amounts of deliberate, 
effortful thinking for automatic as well as for reasoning cases. However, by third grade 
(8-9 years), automatic cases were correctly classified as utilizing little mental effort and 
by fifth-grade (10-11 years), there was an emergence of an adult-like, process-focused 
concept of thinking quality in which children seemed aware of important process features 
that underlay problem solving, such as the degree of mental effort and length of time 
needed for a problem, and used these features to distinguish between various thinking 
strategies.  
Amsterlaw (2006) further investigated if children had the ability to distinguish 
good from bad reasoning processes with the use of two conditions: the first condition 
tested if children were sensitive to basic quality distinctions in the thinking process by 
providing scenarios which included only information about the thinking process and 
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none about outcome, while the second condition tested the belief if the characteristics of 
the thinking process were more important to assess good/bad reasoning despite the 
outcome which was inconsistent with process quality (i.e., good thinking with bad 
outcome or bad thinking with good outcome). Participants were asked to rate each given 
scenario on the exercise of good or bad thinking and to provide explanations for these 
ratings. Explanations were coded into process- or outcome- based, or mixed. The 
response patterns of first-graders, third-graders, fifth-graders and adults revealed similar 
trends, with higher percentages of older participants providing correct answers to the 
scenarios given. The tendency to explain thinking quality ratings by referencing thinking 
process features increased with age, particularly for children between first and third 
grade. Adults rated good-process with bad-outcome scenarios higher than bad-process 
with good-outcome scenarios but in contrast, first graders’  dominant  response  rated  bad-
process with good-outcome scenarios as higher. Although adults evaluated thinking 
quality as a function of underlying thinking processes even when outcomes were 
mismatched, first-graders in contrast tended to privilege outcomes over processes. 
However, children appeared to weigh process and outcomes equally by third grade. 
Amsterlaw (2006) postulated that when outcomes were inconsistent with process quality, 
older children and adults might have discounted them  as  due  to  factors  beyond  the  actor’s  
control while younger children held actors equally accountable for both strategy choices 
and outcomes.  
Overall, Amsterlaw (2006) demonstrated that even first graders have some basic 
intuitions about the difference between good and bad thinking. By third grade, they have 
the ability to successfully differentiate between cases which need reasoning from those 
which do not as their concepts of thinking quality become increasingly process-based as 
opposed to outcome-based  explanations.    “Children’s  responses  to  reasoning  assessments 
in everyday contexts suggest that children readily recognize the legitimate problems 
these situations present, are interested in questions about the status of various problem-
solving approaches, and have an emerging set of important insights about these issues” 
(Amsterlaw, 2006, p.459). However, this relationship is not always straightforward as 
children’s  reasoning  does  not always improve with age (cf. Jacobs & Klacynski, 2002) 
and knowledge of appropriate strategies and standards considered necessary for effective 
reasoning is also not always sufficient, such as when adults fail to live up to standards of 
normative judgments.  
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Although children have been shown to be capable of understanding reasoning and 
argumentation, they still have much to learn with regards to being able to argue well (c.f. 
Kuhn, 2005). When evaluating argument skills with fixed premises in the context of 
everyday life, children and adolescents and sometimes even adults struggle to 
differentiate and coordinate theory and evidence, often bending them to fit prior beliefs. 
Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) demonstrated this failure to distinguish between evidence and 
theoretical explanations as basis for simple knowledge claims in a sample of four to six-
year-olds children. An example consists of children being shown a sequence of pictures 
in which two runners compete in a race. A cue in the pictures suggests a theoretical 
explanation concerning why one might win – one runner has fancy running shoes, the 
other does not. The final picture in the sequence provides evidence of the outcome - one 
runner holds a trophy and exhibits a wide grin. When children were asked to indicate the 
outcome and to justify this knowledge, four-year-olds showed a fragile distinction 
between the evidence for their claim (the outcome cue in the case) versus their 
explanation as to why it is plausible (the theory-generating cue). Rather, the two merged 
into a single representation of what happened. Thus, in the race example, young children 
often  answered  the  “how  do  you  know  (he  won)?”  question  not  with  evidence  (“he’s  
holding  the  trophy”)  but  with  a  theory  of  why  this  state  of  affairs  made  sense  (“because  
he  has  fast  sneakers”).    These  confusions  between  theory  and  evidence  diminished 
sharply among six-year-olds, who still made mistakes but who usually distinguished the 
evidence for their event claim from a theoretical explanation that made the claim 
plausible.  
A monotonic developmental trend regarding the differentiation and coordination 
of evidence and theory was found from middle childhood (grades 3 to 6) to adolescence 
(grade 9) to adulthood (Kuhn, 1989). Adults were most successful in differentiating these 
concepts although some adults still tended to meld theory and evidence into a single 
representation, thus suggesting that these skills may not necessarily be well developed by 
adulthood. Kuhn, Amsel and O’Loughlin’s  (1988)  series  of  studies  also  found  that  
participants tended to use a variety of strategies to keep discrepant theory and evidence 
aligned. These strategies include ignoring or distorting certain evidence, or selectively 
attending to evidence that was consistent with their beliefs or theory. Additionally, 
participants tended to adjust theory to fit evidence. When evidence did not match their 
beliefs, participants would modify their theories to fit the evidence. An example was a 
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ninth grader who had a theory that the type of condiment (mustard vs ketchup) was not 
causally related to catching colds. When faced with cumulative covariation data 
evidence, he had to acknowledge the data but made sense of this evidence by elaborating 
on his theory with regards to the amount of ingredients or vitamins and the temperature 
of the food the condiment was served with. 
Kuhn  et  al’s  (1988)  studies have been criticized regarding the presence of 
confounding variables such as the task complexity and strength of prior beliefs in 
children (Zimmerman, 2007). Although Kuhn and her colleagues used naturalistic 
settings as a method of evoking reasoning, the focus in their studies was more on 
deductive reasoning; with conclusions drawn from given data evidence without reliance 
on prior beliefs. However, problems reflective of everyday reasoning are often complex. 
Prior beliefs do play a role in the navigation of the problem premises and they affect the 
filtering and selection of background knowledge in order to reach a reasonable 
conclusion.  
Alike to Kuhn and colleagues, Means and Voss (1996) used everyday contexts to 
assess reasoning of children, but unlike Kuhn, they did not give premises and data for 
reasoning but used open-ended ill-structured problems to generate arguments and 
justifications from participants. They investigated the relations of ability level (gifted, 
average or below average) as defined by standardized tests of intelligence, grade level 
(fifth, seventh, ninth and eleventh) and knowledge level with informal reasoning 
performance. Three tasks were given to each participant: 1) an ill-structured problem task 
where open-ended everyday problems with debatable solutions (e.g., “If  students  
misbehave in  school,  what  should  be  done?”)  were  presented  and  participants’  skills  in  
argument generation were assessed, 2) a problem solution assessment task where four 
responses were given to the problem scenarios and participants had to rank them by 
quality and to provide explanations, and (3) a problem difficulty assessment task  where 
problem sets, each consisting of three problems along a well-structured to ill-structured 
continuum, were presented and participants had to judge in what circumstances informal 
reasoning had to be applied and to justify their answers.    Participants’  responses  were 
analyzed in terms of components of an argument, such as the number of sound arguments 
and counterarguments, the correctness of their rank orders and the justifications provided 
for the orders being acceptable or vague. Results showed that ability had the strongest 
significant effect in differentiating reasoning performance: participants of high ability 
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performed well in all three tasks and evidence more developed and elaborated argument 
structure with a higher proportion of high quality reasons. Grade level, however, only 
had a weak significant relation. Overall, reasoning improved across increasing grades and 
ability levels.  
Means and Voss (1996) further investigated if topic knowledge could be a 
confounding factor as it could be argued that higher-ability students had more knowledge 
about the topics. On the topic of drug and alcohol, Means and Voss measured 
participant’s  knowledge of domain along with ability and grade levels. Participants were 
first given four controversial propositions (e.g. “The  use  of  marijuana  should  be  
legalized”) and asked to rate their opinion on a ten-point scale along with explanations.  
Next, the same set of propositions were given, but each proposition was paired with two 
reasons and participants were asked to rate how strongly each reason supported the 
proposition on a ten-point scale and to justify differences in ratings of reasons. 
Participants’  responses  were  coded into components of an argument and analyzed. The 
results showed that knowledge was significantly related to generation of more reasons, 
but it was not related to the number of sound arguments or the generation of high-quality 
reasons when ability level was factored in. Vague low quality reasons were found to be 
significantly related to ability level but not knowledge. Thus, this supports the first 
study’s  conclusion  that  ability level, not knowledge, best explains high quality reasoning 
performance. Reasoning performance as a function of the interaction of ability level and 
grade was also not significant, thus demonstrating that ability level differences are 
critical for informal reasoning regardless of grade level. This notion is confirmed by the 
results that high-ability fifth-graders sometimes performed better than eleventh-graders.  
Additional to the mere inclusion of everyday contexts for reasoning studies, 
controversial issues of a social moral nature (e.g. teenage pregnancy or capital 
punishment) or a socio-scientific nature (i.e. with conceptual or technological links to 
science; e.g. genetic cloning) are increasingly being utilized as reasoning problems for 
children from middle grades to adolescents in high school. These ill-structured problems 
are often  in  national  spotlights,  have  unclear  boundaries,  and  no  ‘right’  solution.  The  use  
of these complex issues has been argued to equip students with skills to effectively 
handle contentious issues that shape their current world and those which will determine 
their future world (Sadler, 2004). Educators are increasingly aware of the critical 
significance of classroom curriculums being more reflective of and relevant to current 
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debates of society, in contrast to it being an isolated, irrelevant academic discipline 
(Kuhn, 2005).  
Kortland (1996) found that middle-schoolers (aged 13-14 years) possessed the 
ability to structure a basic argument, but these arguments were of limited range, clarity 
and application with regards to environmental issues related to waste management and 
recycling. Alike  to  Kuhn’s  (1989)  finding  that  individuals  tended  to  employ  strategies  to  
support their theories, participants limited their arguments to include only factors which 
provided direct support for their stated position, with no counterarguments or rebuttals 
offered. In the context of genetic and environmental variability of farm-raised chickens, 
Jime´nez-Aleixandre, Rodriguez and Duschl (2000) also demonstrated the limited nature 
of ninth-graders’  argumentation  skills. Small-group discussions between participants 
were analyzed with the task of advising biologists studying fictional chickens which have 
deviant feather types (yellow coloured instead of spotted) and to suggest causes for this 
variability with reasons and justifications. Analyses of these discussions showed that 
most of the argumentative statements made were claims backed up with some warrants 
but most argumentation focused on causality and appeals to analogies, and participants 
appeared far less concerned with issues of consistency and plausibility. In one particular 
group which the report focused on, no qualifiers or rebuttals were made. This particular 
group of ninth-graders appeared to lack the skills of argumentation to contribute to the 
discussion.  
Adolescents have also been found with the tendency to engage in shallow 
analyses of information (Kolstø, 2001). Interviews were conducted on the issue of 
whether the presence of power transmission lines increased risk of childhood leukaemia. 
After analysing the ways in which adolescents evaluate knowledge and knowledge 
claims as they prepare for socioscientific decision making, Kolstø found that 
participants’  responses  could  be  interpreted  in  a  two-factor matrix. First, they based their 
judgment on either the information statements or the authorities who gave the 
information. Second, they displayed two general modes of judgment: acceptance or 
active evaluation. Therefore, participants accepted or evaluated the informational 
statements, or they accepted or evaluated the source of knowledge. A group of 
participants accepted knowledge claims at face value while another group subjected them 
to evaluation by describing ways to test reliability of information by seeking independent 
support for the statements. When it came to source of knowledge, information was 
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accepted based on two general criteria: they conveyed confidence in their research or 
they are perceived as experts in that specific area. A final group of participants was 
willing to judge the validity of information on its source, but would not accept the 
authority without an evaluative process. This evaluative process consisted of one of four 
standards: assessment of risk, interest, neutrality or competence. Assessment of risk 
refers  to  the  authority  figure’s  discussion of risk associated with the decision to be made; 
the more they talked about potential risk, the more credibility they were given. Interest 
refers to sources with vested interest versus uninvolved, neutral sources; some 
participants ascribed more validity to sources with vested interest while others preferred 
neutral sources. Competence refers to the seeking of independent support of the authority 
figure’s  competence.  Although some evaluative strategies were employed by most 
participants to assess given information, the conclusions reached were partially based on 
empirical evidence but most were based on rather superficial contextual information. The 
conclusions were often short sighted or inaccurate, revealing the shallowness of the 
analyses conducted.  
Adolescents also revealed a lack of capability in strategic and flexible behaviour 
with respect to goals of dialogic argumentative discourse (Felton & Kuhn, 2001).  On the 
topic of capital punishment in three samples of seventh-graders, eighth-graders and 
young adults, participants were placed into agreeing, disagreeing or neutral dyads based 
on their positions on capital punishment identified through an opinion scale. Agreeing 
dyads had the same position on capital punishment, disagreeing had opposite positions, 
while neutral dyads had somewhere in between. Over the course of five dialogues 
conducted with different partners, every participant was assigned to at least one of each 
dyad. Dyad members in agreement were asked to identify all the reasons which 
supported their stand while those in disagreement were asked to try to find a consensus. 
Their dialogues were coded into categories which reflected different dialogic elements 
that formed argumentation (e.g., clarification, advancing, countering). Analyses of these 
dialogues revealed that seventh- and eighth-graders were less capable in the use of 
counterarguments  and  rebuttals,  were  less  able  to  direct  and  define  partner’s  argument  
with the intent to weaken it, and showed less adaptation of strategies to the changing 
requirements of discourse contexts, such as when they are moved from disagreeing to 
agreeing partners. Overall, they tended to be more preoccupied with producing dialogue 
and behaved less strategically and flexibly to the goals of argumentative discourse.  
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Thus to conclude shortly, children and adolescents are often able to form basic 
arguments, but their arguments are often limited and non-critical, especially in the 
provision of counterarguments and rebuttals (Kortland, 1996; Jime´nez -Aleixandre, 
Rodriguez and Duschl, 2000). Kolstø (2001) elaborated that adolescents engaged in 
shallow analyses of information and did not frequently engage in the kind of 
comprehensive reflection and evaluation needed to assess the usefulness of information 
in complex issues.  Felton & Kuhn (2001) added that in dialogic argumentation 
performed in dyads, adolescents were less strategic, less flexible, less consistent and less 
able to direct and define the argument as compared to young adults. Therefore, although 
the present literature demonstrates that children and adolescents are capable of 
argumentative reasoning, their ability to argue well is limited and needs to be supported 
and enhanced. This leads on to the next section of how informal reasoning develops and 
the conditions which bring about change and development.  
 
3.3 Development of Informal Argumentative Reasoning 
Moshman (1994) suggested two likely mechanisms that led to developmental 
change  in  children’s  reasoning: (1)  children’s  introspective  reflection  about their 
reasoning experiences and (2) social learning in interaction with adults. Reflection 
increases  one’s  metacognitive  awareness,  making  one  aware  of  effective  strategies  for  
higher reasoning. Moshman (1994) suggested that the encouragement of reflection is 
facilitated with the fostering of appropriate self-concepts, attitudes and intentions, 
including philosophical concepts of seeking for truth and clarity and inculcating a 
“critical  spirit”.    Genuine reflection encompasses the enablement of social settings for the 
questioning of deeply ingrained and accepted ideas even if they may seem disconcerting 
for others involved. The true flourishing of reasoning occurs in an environment where 
education is fully committed to promoting active thinking, questioning, exploring diverse 
sources  of  information  and  openly  expressing  one’s  own  ideas,  coupled  with  the  
allowance and encouragement to critique deeply ingrained assumptions and ideas. 
In line with Vygotskian theory of cognitive development, the value of external 
social collaboration is emphasized in promoting more advanced forms of individual 
reasoning. Joint participation in an activity permits cognitive processes to be displayed, 
shared and practiced. Day, French and Hall (1985) elaborated on the significance of the 
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social world in cognitive growth through four points: a) cognitive abilities are socially 
transmitted from experts to children, b) cognitive abilities are socially constrained, that 
is, certain cognitive skills can only be employed in social interactions and not in isolated 
working, c) cognitive abilities are socially nurtured as experts can help assume 
responsibility for some aspects of the activity while the child can concentrate on one 
component, thus reducing cognitive workload and facilitating successful mastery, and 
lastly d) cognitive abilities are socially encouraged for independent use as experts reduce 
responsibility held in activity when child demonstrates increasing competence. 
Children’s  earliest  forays  into  problem-solving and decision-making often occur in social 
collaboration with more expert individuals, such as with parents and teachers. Social 
contexts provide children with the opportunities to acquire and share knowledge, to 
display competencies, and to learn and practice new skills. Through direct (e.g. 
instructional) and indirect (e.g. modelling, practices, feedback) teaching, children acquire 
the specific knowledge and skills needed for successful reasoning. Parents and teachers 
hold significant roles in providing the necessary structure and support to scaffold 
learning and to help children to refine their skills.  
Empirical studies have provided support for the two above-mentioned points – 
reflection and social learning. However, compared to classroom-based studies which 
have recently spawned many empirical works investigating the development of reasoning 
and formulating interventions for improved argumentation, family-based studies 
investigating the specific development of argumentative reasoning in everyday contexts 
are sparse in psychology.  
Empirical studies on family conflict talk have been one method of glimpsing 
argumentation at home. Participation in family conflict interchanges and acquiring 
conflict resolution strategies help children to gradually learn mutual regard and 
understanding  for  others,  influencing  children’s  reasoning  and  thinking  skills  and  
subsequently, their strategies when participating in constructive and effective social 
interchanges (cf. Stein & Albro, 2001). Findings show that through observations from a 
young age, children learn how to raise opposition to dominant, older members of the 
family. As their linguistic competence and cognitive skills improve, coupled with an 
increasing social knowledge about rules and rights, they become more successful at 
negotiating (Ross, Filyer, Lollis, Perlman & Martin, 1994; Telsa & Dunn, 1992). They 
may even prevail at times in disputes with parents or older siblings (Eisenberg, 1992).  
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However, family conflict often involves relational goals which can cause children 
and adolescents to use less complex reasoning in family negotiations (cf. Stein & Albro, 
2001). Children are sensitive to changing contexts of arguing, and with the nature of the 
relationship at stake, at times they may appear to be irrational and incapable of complex 
and language skills in one situation but highly rational in another.  The nature of their 
social relationships as well as their feelings for each family member are reflected in and 
affected by the types of interactions children have with each family member. Vuchinich, 
Vuchinich and Coughlin (1992) showed that adolescents who participated in negotiations 
with their parents used less complex reasoning in the throes of an ongoing argument as 
compared to their recall and evaluation of an earlier argument. The decline in skill 
expression during face-to-face conflicts is due partially to the fact that different goals 
operate in face-to-face interactions than in individual interviews. During an interaction, 
old arguments may be rekindled, causing two arguers to engage in an intense emotional 
exchange rather than in a logical discussion about the pros and cons of each position. The 
missing logic during face-to-face interaction is often expressed in an elaborated fashion 
during individual interviews.  
Additional to conflict talk, reasoning skills may also be improved through casual 
family talk during leisure moments. Ladd, Profilet & Hart (1992) found that parents often 
engaged  children  in  ‘decontextualized  discussions’  that  could occur during dinner, after 
school, before bedtime or during travel. These discussions helped to prepare children to 
face future social dilemmas (note: often involving informal reasoning) such as 
discussions on how to dissuade a bully, or to provide  a  sounding  board  for  children’s  
self-generated solutions such as on solutions to mend a friendship. Parental engagement 
reflecting authoritative connection and autonomy-supportive features has been positively 
associated with increased socio-communicative competence in children. Such 
engagement may include frequent conversations in which there is reciprocity in turn 
taking, the high quality of advice that is relevant to resolving a peer issue, good listening 
skills and warmth (Profilet & Ladd, 1996 in Hart, Newell & Olsen, 2003).  
Families have also been found to be characterized by their communication 
patterns (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). Family communication orientations, namely 
conversation-orientation (i.e., the degree of unrestrained open family interaction about a 
wide range of topics) and conformity-orientation (i.e., the degree of homogeneity of 
attitudes, values and beliefs in the family), have been shown to influence reasoning 
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strategies and cognitive development (Fitzpatrick & Ritchie, 1994; Koerner & 
Fitzpatrick, 2002). Children of families high in conversation-orientation are more 
influenced by the quality of an argument (i.e., structure and quality of supporting 
evidence), whereas children of families high in conformity-orientation are more 
influenced by the social status of the message source (Fitzpatrick & Ritchie, 1994). This 
shows that when families have a communication climate that encourages their children to 
participate openly in frequent discussions over different topics, children acquire higher 
level reasoning skills and learn to differentiate good arguments from poor ones by 
evaluating the argument content, structure and given evidence. However, when families 
enforce a conforming communication climate emphasizing interdependency and conflict 
avoidance, children are more influenced by the source of argument rather than the 
content of the argument itself. Furthermore, children of families high in conversation-
orientation demonstrate better developed communicative and problem-solving skills, thus 
allowing them to better negotiate their roles and expectations with others and be more 
resilient in difficult environments (Fitzpatrick & Koerner, 1996). Contrastingly, families 
high in conformity-orientation perform less well in both social and problem-solving 
skills, being unable to be flexible to changing situations and unable to solicit help and 
existence from the social environment. Conformity-orientation has also been shown to 
have a negative association with empathy and perspective taking (Koerner, 1995). In 
studying conflict interactions (Koerner and Fitzpatrick, 1997), conformity-orientation 
was positively correlated with conflict avoidance and the venting of negative feelings, 
perhaps due to the pressure to avoid violating family norms which dictate against 
engaging in conflict and the growing hostility and resentment stemming from previous 
unresolved conflicts. In contrast, conversation-orientation was negatively correlated with 
conflict avoidance and positively correlated with seeking social support. Thus, 
conversation-orientation may support children to acquire better conflict communication 
skills and more tools to mitigate the negative consequences of interpersonal conflict. 
Apart from the few family studies around, some classroom-based intervention 
studies can be complementary in illustrating the effectiveness of social contexts and 
reflection in the development of reasoning. These studies have shown that extended 
engagement in reasoning tasks produces positive effects on thinking and argumentation, 
presumably because they learn from reflected task feedback. The importance of social 
context is highlighted in the use of dyadic dialogues for improving argumentation and the 
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effective presence of expert individuals, such as teachers, in making explicit explanations 
and reflections of argument structures.  Felton (2004) suggests three possible means by 
which such dyadic practice can improve argumentative discourse: (1) participants adopt 
new critiques from their partners; (2) they generate new critiques themselves; or (3) they 
generate them with their peers in the course of dialogue.  
Kuhn, Shaw and Felton (1997) demonstrated the effectiveness of dyadic 
interventions for improving argumentation skills with seventh-graders, eighth-graders 
and young adults. Dyadic dialogues with conditions similar to that described in Felton 
and Kuhn (2001) in Section 3.2 were used: participants were placed into dyads with 
different partners who either had opinions congruent or discrepant  from  the  participant’s.    
Dyads were asked to discuss their opinions about capital punishment, and to try to reach 
a consensus over it. If that is not possible, they are asked to identify the nature of their 
disagreement. All dialogues were recorded, transcribed and coded with an analytic 
scheme in terms of the presence of various argument elements. In both adolescents and 
young adults, post-test results showed that sustained engagement of dyadic 
argumentation produced significant changes in both the range of arguments (i.e. no of 
arguments) exhibited and the quality of argumentation (i.e. more metacognitive 
statements, more two-sided arguments). However, adolescents demonstrated much less 
proficiency in arguing in a framework of alternatives while adults considered more of 
multiple alternatives with their accompanying evidence. Adolescents were less likely to 
report change in opinions compared to adults, even though more objective quantitative 
assessments of their arguments say otherwise. The latter assessment was done by 
classifying the change from pre-test to post-test assessment.  Adolescents were found to 
be twice as likely as adults to have a quantitative opinion change while adults were more 
likely to have only small to moderate changes in position, such as the movement from a 
more to less extreme position without changing sides. The overall increase in 
argumentation exhibited in both age groups suggested a social transmission of new 
content through interaction with peers. Dialogic interventions targeting argumentation 
skills have also been found to be effective in other populations, such as in academically 
at-risk students (Kuhn & Udell, 2003) and severely disadvantaged juvenile delinquents 
(Kuhn & DeFuccio, 2002).  
Likewise, Goldstein, Crowell & Kuhn (2009) showed that extended engagement 
in argumentation with partners of varying perspectives produced significant 
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improvements in sixth- and seventh-graders’  ability  to  address  opposing  peer’s  
arguments with cogent counterarguments. The year-long intervention conducted in a 
twice-weekly philosophy class provided dense experience in argumentative discourse as 
students debated on real-world social issues, first in interchanges with a succession of 
peers holding an opposing view and finally in a whole-class debate. At the end of the 
year, middle school students showed themselves capable of learning to produce higher-
level counterarguments, though when presented with two counterarguments, students did 
not improve significantly in recognizing which was stronger with respect to power to 
weaken a claim. Nevertheless, extended practice with reasoning was shown to improve 
thinking and argumentation.  
Felton (2004) later found that a combination of practice and structured reflection 
was more effective in promoting change than practice alone. Five weekly dialogues were 
conducted in groups of four consisting of two assigned dyads, with each dyad having 
partners with opposing views on the topic of capital punishment. In the experimental 
condition, participants engaged in a combination of dialogues and paired reflection on 
these dialogues. In the dialogues, participants were instructed to find out what they 
agreed and disagreed on about capital punishment and to come to an agreement if 
possible. When one dyad engaged in dialogic argumentation, the other dyad was asked to 
observe without interruption, and vice versa. After each dialogic session, participants 
underwent reflective exercises which consisted of reviewing with a like-minded peer the 
major arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals in the dialogue provided.  Control 
group participants, however, only engaged in the dialogues without the reflective 
exercises.  The  dialogues  were  transcribed  and  coded  according  to  Felton  and  Kuhn’s  
(2001) analytic scheme for argumentative discourse; each utterance being coded into 
specific sequences of argumentation. Both groups showed improvements in 
argumentation after the intervention but the experimental group demonstrated greater 
advances in argumentative discourse than control participants, as evidenced by the higher 
use of more sophisticated strategies  such  as  rebuttals  and  critiques  of  opponent’s  
argument. Additionally, Felton (2004) found that experimental participants also 
performed better on a transfer topic of abortion, employing higher level argumentative 
strategies, thus suggesting that reflection may help one to understand the relative value of 
the strategy independent of the topic of argument. Thus, although practice alone can 
improve discourse, its effects may be limited to the topic practiced. Reflection enhances 
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development by focusing on the structure behind argumentative discourse in order to 
support a greater sensitivity to the function of strategies in argumentative discourse, and 
an awareness of the structure and goals of discourse in order for them to be used 
effectively. This leads to more advanced and generalizable strategies characteristic of 
adult argumentative discourse. 
The transfer of argument skills has also been demonstrated by Zohar and Nemet 
(2002) to be possible from school to everyday domains. The explicit classroom teaching 
of argumentation in the specific domain of genetics proved to be useful for everyday 
moral dilemmas as adolescents learnt to apply the argumentative strategies acquired in 
class to their everyday life. After a twelve-weeks intervention teaching biological 
knowledge and argumentative strategies in the construction of arguments in genetics, 
results revealed that similar gains in the formulation of successful arguments, evidenced 
by an increased number of justifications and increased complexity of arguments, were 
seen in a post-test consisting of a moral dilemma in everyday life (i.e. cheating in a class 
test). Thus Zohar and Nemet argued that explicit teaching of argumentation not only 
advances skills in school-based topics, but also enhances performance in everyday 
domain-general argumentation.  
However, although extended practice with argumentation coupled with reflective 
exercises have been shown to facilitate improvements in argument skills and to increase 
the likelihood for an effective transfer of these skills to other topics and to other domains, 
Udell (2007) demonstrated that the transfer of argument skills may be more successful 
from personal to less personal issues but not the other way round, that is, that reasoning 
skills learned from arguments on broad issues of low personal relevance has little success 
of being transferred over into personal matters. In an intervention study, adolescent girls 
aged fourteen to fifteen years old were divided into two groups, with one group dealing 
with the topic of capital punishment (less personal issue) and the other with unwanted 
teenage pregnancy (highly relevant issue). Participants who had the capital punishment 
topic for intervention had the other topic of teenage pregnancy as a transfer topic at post-
test, and vice versa. Results showed that although both groups showed gains in 
argumentative skills after the intervention, only the group which received argumentative 
intervention on the highly personal topic of teenage pregnancy evidenced similar gains 
(e.g., higher use of counterarguments) in the less personal transfer topic of capital 
punishment. However, these results were not reflected in the group which received 
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intervention on the topic of capital punishment and given the transfer topic of teenage 
pregnancy. Udell (2007) suggested that emotional salience may be a possible factor that 
accounted for this one-directional result, as personal topics evoke higher emotional 
affect, thus participants have to practice emotion dysregulation which takes focus away 
from utilizing effective discourse strategies. This loss of focus causes the transfer of 
skills from less personal to more personal issues to be more challenging and therefore, 
requiring more effort.  
Hence, although Zohar  and  Nemet’s  (2002) study suggested that argumentative 
skills taught in school can be successfully transferred to everyday dilemmas, Udell’s  
(2007) results suggested that these skills may not be as successfully transferred from 
broad issues to personally relevant issues due to emotional affect. However, broad issues 
rather than personally salient issues are more often used as reasoning problems in the 
school context. Therefore as much as schools and teachers are essential for the shaping of 
children’s  reasoning  skills  in  issues  of  high  relevance to science and society, there is a 
need for children to have practicing opportunities for issues that may not be popular 
school material but hold high personal relevance in their everyday lives. The home 
environment comes to mind as an appropriate surround to discuss these issues. Parents 
need to recognize that the role of the home environment is as critical as the role of the 
school; that they are highly influential agents who  can  help  foster  their  children’s  
argumentative reasoning in issues external to the school domain, and in doing so, provide 
their children with a capability to effectively reason across a variety of topics in different 
settings.  
To shortly conclude this section, the development of reasoning has been 
suggested to take place when introspective reflection occurs and when social learning in 
interactions with experts is experienced. Within the family, conflict talk has been shown 
to be vital for the  child’s  cognitive  growth  and  reasoning  as  children  gradually learn 
ways to successfully negotiate with older family members and may even prevail at times 
in disputes with parents and older siblings (cf. Stein & Albro, 2001). However, relational 
goals can confound the use of logical and complex reasoning when social relationships as 
well as emotions for family affect the type of interaction and strategies one uses. 
Additional to conflict talk, casual family time can also act as useful learning points for 
parents  to  engage  children  in  ‘decontextualized  discussions’  to  guide  them  in  reasoning 
about social dilemmas faced in daily life, with authoritative practices of autonomy-
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support positively associated with increased socio-communicative competence of the 
child (cf. Hart, Newell & Olsen, 2003). Family communication orientations (Koerner & 
Fitzpatrick,  2002)  are  also  influential  in  shaping  children’s  communication  and  reasoning  
skills. Conversation-orientation is associated with children being able to differentiate 
quality of argument from structure and supporting evidence, demonstrating better 
developed communicative and problem-solving skills and evidencing higher resiliency in 
difficult situations. In contrast, conformity-orientation leads to children demonstrating 
more shallow information processing (i.e., being more influenced by source of argument 
rather than the content of the argument itself), possessing less competent social and 
problem-solving skills and displaying more conflict avoidance and venting of negative 
feelings.  
Classroom studies have also contributed to our understanding of essential 
elements helpful for the development of argumentative reasoning. Dyadic dialogic 
interventions have consistently led to improvements in argumentation, suggesting that 
participants learn from social debates where they pick up new arguments and critiques or 
in the process generate new ones themselves (Kuhn, Shaw and Felton,1997; Felton, 
2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Udell, 2007). These interventions help adolescents to 
advance in their development by reducing the use of ill-suited strategies and increasing 
those well-suited to argumentative discourse. Argumentative skills can be greatly 
advanced in collaborations with peers, and also under the guidance of an expert adult. 
Goldstein, Crowell & Kuhn (2009) demonstrated that incorporating collaborative 
exercises focused on argumentation in the education curriculum can help middle-
schoolers to achieve higher argumentative strategies. Additional to practice alone, Felton 
(2004) showed that structured reflection can help to significantly enhance the 
transference of these acquired skills of argument to other topics. Therefore, helping 
adolescents to understand the argument structure behind discourse, to reflect on it 
explicitly and to practice it in different contexts can lead to the development of more 
advanced and generalizable argumentative strategies characteristic of adult discourse.  
In conclusion, Sections 3.1– 3.3 have sought to conceptualize and define informal 
reasoning and to present empirical evidence demonstrating that although children are 
now recognized to be capable of reasoning at a young age, there remains a great need to 
foster and shape their argumentative skills as even till late adolescence, they are observed 
to use less strategic, critical and flexible strategies. The development of informal 
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reasoning is also discussed and the lack of family research, as compared to classroom-
based studies, highlighted. Informal reasoning has been found in recent empirical work to 
have associations with the development of personal epistemological beliefs, an area of 
growing interest for psychologists in its application to learning and child development.  
Epistemological beliefs are postulated to hold a powerful role in what and how one 
learns, thinks and reasons as individuals act in ways that are congruent with their 
knowledge (c.f. Hofer, 2004, Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). In the next chapter, the definition, 
models and research in the field of personal epistemology will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PERSONAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
4.1 Conceptualization of Personal Epistemology 
In the last five decades, psychologists  adopted  the  term  “personal  epistemology”  
to describe how individuals form knowledge and how they come to know, the beliefs and 
theories they hold about this process, and how these beliefs affect and are affected by 
their cognitive processes of learning, thinking, shaping and understanding of the world 
(cf. Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The origins of personal epistemology come from ancient 
philosophy, whereby for many centuries, philosophers have debated over the origin, 
nature, sources, limits, methods and justification of human knowledge (cf. Hofer, 2002; 
Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 2006). Personal epistemology is actively constructed and 
complex and is situated on the highest level of meta-knowing (Kuhn, 2000). As 
mentioned, personal epistemology concerns wider beliefs on knowledge and knowing, 
that is, beliefs which deal with the source of knowledge, the structure and certainty of 
knowledge, and the justifications given for the acceptance or rejection of various pieces 
of information. In some theories, personal epistemology also extends to beliefs of 
learning.  
There is a growing body of empirical research on personal epistemology 
encompassing different theories and its relation to other aspects of learning and 
understanding of the world but despite all this research, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) noted 
that  “there  is  very  little  agreement  on  the  actual  construct  under  study,  the  dimensions  it  
encompasses, whether epistemological beliefs are domain specific, or how such beliefs 
might connect to disciplinary beliefs, and what the linkages might be to other constructs 
in  cognition  and  motivation”  (p.89).  Differences  in  defining  the  construct  reflect  the  
different theoretical assumptions the theorists have of the nature of personal 
epistemology, and debates regarding what should or should not be included are still 
ongoing, reflecting the complexity of this construct (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
Researchers mainly approach this construct in two ways, either as (a) a cognitive 
developmental structure (e.g., Perry, 1970; Boyes & Chandler, 1992), or (b) a set of 
beliefs, attitudes or assumptions that reflect cognitive processes (Schommer, 1994). The 
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former type proposes an invariant, hierarchical model that is structurally integrated, 
coherent and in a logically sequenced developmental process. It acknowledges different 
components of epistemological thinking, but the cognitive structures and the 
accompanying general levels or stages imply that these components are not separable and 
are not orthogonal, hence making these models unidimensional.  In contrast, the latter 
type has chosen to use the terms position and perspective in a multidimensional 
conceptualization rather than accept the deterministic, integrative assumptions of 
hierarchical developmental models. Different epistemological components can be 
orthogonal and there can be variations within individuals. Thus, the difference between 
the assumptions of these two approaches lie in the relationship among the components or 
dimensions of the models. As Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) wrote:  “If  the  theory  is  
unidimensional, the assumption is made that if one dimension develops, the other 
dimensions also develop. However, if the theory is multidimensional, it suggests that if 
one dimension develops, the others may or may not develop. In short, the unidimensional 
theory looks at personal epistemology as an aggregate whereas the multidimensional 
theory looks at personal epistemology as a disaggregate as well as an aggregate. (p. 421)”   
Additionally, different theories have their own justifications concerning their 
selection criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of certain dimensions that are postulated 
to approximate personal epistemology. Schommer-Aikins (2004) conceptualized nature 
of learning as one aspect of personal epistemology based on previous research which has 
shown learning beliefs to be linked with student performance. Two dimensions were 
postulated under this category – innate ability and speed of learning. However, Hofer & 
Pintrich (1997) suggested that personal epistemological beliefs should be restricted to 
individuals’  beliefs  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  (i.e.,  source  and  structure)  and  the  
process of knowing (i.e., role of evidence and process of justifying knowledge). Beliefs 
about learning, intelligence and teaching should be excluded as the authors argued that 
these do not explicitly deal with the philosophical and psychological concepts of defining 
and justifying knowledge. Statistically, a lack of factorial validity in a dimension of 
learning -‘fixed  ability’  - also supports the exclusion of learning beliefs dimensions 
(Clarebout et al., 2001).  
On a different note, Greene, Torney-Purta and Azevedo (2010) argued for the 
inclusion of justification dimensions in personal epistemology, emphasizing that the 
justification of knowledge formed a core concept of philosophical epistemology where 
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psychological research in personal epistemology originates from. Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997) did include a dimension of justification in their theory, but Greene, Azevedo & 
Torney-Purta  (2008) argued that the definition of this dimension was vague and not 
sufficiently elaborated on. They noted  that  “in  philosophical  epistemology,  the  nature  and  
limits of knowledge do not refer to whether knowledge itself is simple or certain but 
rather  what  kinds  of  claims  have  the  potential  to  be  justified  as  knowledge”  (Grenne  et  
al., 2008, p.148). In  Greene  et  al’s  model  (2010),  they  elaborated  on  the  justification  
factor by formulating two dimensions of justification – justification by authority and 
personal justification. The former refers to justifying knowledge based on its source 
while the latter justifies knowledge based on personal experience and observation.  
Another ongoing debate in the field addresses if personal epistemology is 
domain-specific or domain-general (cf. Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 2006). Although some 
researchers have found empirical support for domain-generality (e.g. Schommer & 
Walker, 1995; Schommer-Aikins, Duell & Barker, 2003), others have found that beliefs 
are domain-specific (e.g. Hofer, 2000). There are others, however, that propose beliefs to 
be both general and specific, and that there may be important interactions between the 
two (e.g. Buehl, Alexander & Murphy, 2002; Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Hofer, 2000). 
As Sternberg (1989) purports, the domain specificity/generality debate may create a false 
dichotomy and it may not be the case that one is right and one is wrong. Instead, there 
may be evidence to support a more balanced hypothesis. Muis, Bendixen & Haerle 
(2006)  wrote  “different  epistemologies  may  apply  to  different  domains  of  knowledge,  but  
developmentally, predictable patterns in the development of epistemic beliefs across 
different  domains  may  be  similar.”  (p.  5).    Schraw (2001) proposed one possibility in that 
domain-specific beliefs play a predominant role in task-specific facets of learning, 
whereas domain-general beliefs may be more influential in general motivation and 
academic engagement.  
From briefly reviewing the problems faced with regards to the conceptualization 
of personal epistemology, one cannot help but notice that the process of defining this 
construct and establishing clear boundaries of inclusion and exclusion has been far from 
easy. However, despite having different focuses of inquiry, approaches, methods and 
populations, scholars have agreed that there are some points of convergence about what 
personal  epistemology  encompasses.  A  consensus  can  be  seen  across  models  where  “the  
view of knowledge is transformed from one in which knowledge is right or wrong to a 
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position of relativism and then to a position in which individuals are active constructors 
of  meaning,  able  to  make  judgments  and  commitments  in  a  relativistic  context”  (Hofer  &  
Pintrich, 1997, p. 121). Furthermore, there have been calls for unified models which have 
instigated some new developments in the field, namely models that integrate previous 
differences such as the domain-specific versus domain-general issue (Muis et al., 2006) 
and the developmental versus multidimensional issue (Greene et al., 2010).   
For this dissertation, personal epistemology refers to the beliefs of the nature of 
knowledge and knowing such as the simplicity, certainty, source and justification of 
knowledge. Knowledge can be justified either through authorities or personal experiences 
(Greene  et  al.,  2010).  Similar  to  Hofer  and  Pintrich’s  (1997)  conceptualization, the 
construct will exclude beliefs on learning as these beliefs do not explicitly deal with the 
philosophical and psychological concepts of personal epistemology. Developmentally, 
epistemological beliefs consist of different dimensions which can progress 
asynchronously. Collectively, beliefs typically progress through hierarchical stage-like 
stages from an absolutist black-and-white perspective to an evaluativistic multi-faceted 
perspective of knowledge and knowing. Furthermore, beliefs can be both domain-
specific and domain-general with important interactions between them. Domain-specific 
beliefs can exist in different domains of knowledge, but there still exists overarching 
domain-general epistemological beliefs which form early in life and develop in a similar 
manner across the lifespan (cf. Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 2006).  
 
4.2 Relevant Models of Personal Epistemology 
There exists a variety of personal epistemology models in the last four decades 
but the following section seeks only to review models and theories which are significant 
and relevant to informing the current work. This concerns the inclusion of children and 
adolescents in the theory; a factor not reflective of earlier models in the field, and the 
content of the methodology (i.e., links with informal reasoning and thinking). It is not a 
detailed comprehensive coverage of all that has been achieved in this growing field of 
interest.  If  such  is  needed,  Hofer  &  Pintrich’s  (1997,  2002)  excellent  review  or  Hofer  
(2004) should suffice. There are three sections as follows: developmental, 
multidimensional and integrated models. Each section briefly introduces and highlights 
the main characteristics of the included models. 
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Developmental Models 
The  developmental  models  included  in  this  section  are  (a)  Perry’s  Scheme  of  
Intellectual Development (1970), (b) King and Kitchener’s  Reflective  Judgment  model  
(1994), (c) Chandler et al.’s  Model  of  Epistemic  Development (2002), and (d) Kuhn et 
al.’s  Epistemological  Understanding  Model (2000). Table 4-1 shows the main features of 
each model and their stage similarities. 
William  Perry’s  (1970,  1999)  Scheme  of  Intellectual  Development is often cited 
as an early piece of significant work which many later epistemological models are based 
upon (Chandler et al., 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). From longitudinal interviews done 
with Harvard university students, Perry found that college students understood and 
structured their educational experiences through beliefs concerning the nature of 
knowledge and the sources of knowledge, and not due to differences in their personality 
dispositions. Perry identified four main positions which are on a continuum of 
development – dualism, multiplicity, relativism and commitment to relativism. 
Dualists have an absolute view of knowledge, with external authorities being experts and 
transmitters of knowledge. Knowledge exists in simple forms of right and wrong, with no 
position in between. As individuals become aware of different multiple opinions on a 
single matter, they transit to the multiplist position whereby authority figures are no 
longer the experts. Knowledge is subjective and relative, all opinions are equally valid 
and none is better than another. When the individual starts to recognize that some 
opinions are more defendable than others and that contextualized knowledge can be 
measured against some established standards for evaluating claims, he/she transits to 
become a relativist. Relativists recognize the significance of providing justifications and 
come to understand the difference between an opinion and a well-supported one. When 
one adopts a specific set of standards for evaluating knowledge claims and begins to 
make  personal  stands  on  issues,  the  final  position  of  ‘commitment  to  relativism’  is  
reached, whereby one accepts responsibility for the judgments and decisions one makes 
based on his/her own understanding and experience in that issue. 
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Table 4-1. Developmental Models of Personal Epistemology  
 Perry’s  Scheme  of  
Intellectual Development  
King  &  Kitchener’s   
Reflective Judgment 
Model 
Chandler et al.’s  Model  of   
Epistemic Development 
Kuhn et al.’s  Model  of  
Epistemological 
Understanding 
1. Absolute view of knowledge 
as fully reflective of external 
observations. Sees external 
authorities as sufficient experts 
and transmitters of knowledge. 
Justification is not needed. 
Dualism Pre-reflective Thinking Realism Realist  
– assumes knowledge to be 
copies of external reality 
Defended Realism 
– Aesthetics and taste are 
subjective, but all other kinds of 
knowledge are factual and 
objective 
Absolutist  
– asserts that facts that can 
only be correct or incorrect 
2. Subjective and relative 
knowledge. All positions are 
equally valid whereby 
justification is context-specific 
and individualistic. 
Multiplist Quasi-reflective Thinking Dogmatism  
–  Human rationality cannot be 
trusted, must depend upon some 
authority  for  “knowledge” 
Multiplist 
Skepticism 
–  “Knowledge”  is  not  possible  in  
any sense, one cannot trust human 
rationality 
3. Constructive view of 
knowledge. Recognizes the value 
of justifications and evidence and 
that knowledge claims can be 
evaluated and weighed. Realizes 
difference between an opinion 
and a well-supported opinion 
Relativism Reflective Thinking Rationalism  
 
Evaluativist 
Commitment to Relativism   - 
Adopts a specific set of standards 
for evaluating knowledge claims 
and accepts responsibility for 
personal stands made on issues 
Unique features Nine stages subsumed under 
the above-mentioned four 
levels 
Seven qualitative stages 
subsumed under the 
above-mentioned three 
levels; uses ill-structured 
problems to elicit beliefs 
Stages  correspond  to  Piaget’s  
cognitive developmental levels 
Domain-specific beliefs 
occurring at different 
rates across five judgment 
domains 
Models 
Stages 
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Change is brought about through cognitive disequilibrium; individuals interact 
with the environment and respond to new experiences by either assimilating them to 
existing cognitive frameworks or by accommodating the framework itself. Perry did not 
conduct further work to explore his conceptualization of epistemological learning, but 
he did hypothesize that changes in the nature of knowledge and the role of authority 
may  lead  to  observable  changes  in  one’s  manner  of  due to altered modes of learning and 
cognition.  Perry’s  scheme  made  a  major  contribution  to  the  field  through  his  
characterization and articulation of the dualistic, multiplistic and relativistic 
perspectives that defined the epistemological outlook of his college sample.  
The  significance  of  Perry’s  work  can  be  seen  in  later models such as King and 
Kitchener’s  Reflective Judgment Model, Chandler et al.’s  Epistemic  Development  
Model and Kuhn et al.’s  Epistemological Understanding Model.  Perry’s  work  laid  the  
groundwork for the following decades of research, with these models tracing their 
origins back to his work (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Many later models based their work 
on his, and used his developmental stages as guidelines for their own 
conceptualizations. 
King and Kitchener (1994) studied epistemic assumptions that underlay 
reasoning to solve ill-structured problems of late adolescents and adults. They found 
that these epistemic assumptions were significant in the employment of different 
problem-solving strategies when faced with ill-defined dilemmas, such as the 
trustworthiness of news reporting and the safety of using nuclear power. The 
development of assumptions individuals have about knowledge such as what can or 
cannot be known (i.e., assumptions about knowledge and reality), how one knows 
something (e.g., source of authority, external observations) and the certainty that 
individuals have about what they know showed an influence on their reasoning 
sophistication (King & Kitchener, 1994). The higher the reflective thinking level, the 
more complex the thought process becomes and a higher variety of strategies for 
problem-solving  is  observed.    Similar  to  Perry’s stage model, individuals progress 
through three developmental stages of pre-reflective, quasi-reflective and reflective 
thinking with thinking being increasingly seen as self-constructed and the heightening 
awareness of the role that justification and evidence play.  
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King and Kitchener (2004) found that increasing age and higher educational 
attainment were predictive of higher levels of reflective judgment. Undergraduates were 
found to display similar levels of reasoning across various types of ill-structured 
problems but differential levels of reflective judgment were evidenced with graduate 
students (King & Kitchener, 2002).  King  and  Kitchener,  alike  to  Perry’s  findings  (1970) 
with college students, found that most first-year undergraduates displayed low-level 
epistemological thinking, with movement to the next level only seen in students’  senior  
year.  
However, Chandler  et  al.  (2002)  disagreed  with  Perry’s  (1990)  and  King  and  
Kitchener’s  (2004)  conclusions  that  individuals  at  the  start  of a university education 
were only capable of low-level epistemological thinking as these findings implied that 
children were incapable of having differential levels of epistemological thinking. Based 
on  children’s  theory  of  mind  literature,  Chandler  et  al.  (2002)  argued  that  even at young 
ages, children can differentiate  between  their  own  mental  states  and  others’  and  begin  to  
show developing metacognitive understanding. Theory of mind research with children 
reflects fundamental beliefs of epistemological understanding – the concept that beliefs 
can be inaccurate (i.e., false beliefs tasks) and that certain knowledge such as aesthetics 
is subjective, with different individuals having varying opinions. By age eleven to 
twelve, children begin to exhibit cognitive skills capable of understanding constructive 
thinking. Chandler et al. (2002) attributed previous results which found only graduate 
students capable of advanced epistemological thinking to the issue of domain 
generality, as previous models assigned positions to participants based on the lowest 
rating across several domains (King & Kitchner, 2004). They postulated that 
epistemological thinking varied by domains, differentiating between ill-structured 
domains such as aesthetics which are perceived as having little epistemic content 
because people rarely make knowledge claims in these domains, and well-structured 
domains such as hard sciences as consisting of a great deal of epistemic content as they 
are perceived as being composed of knowledge claims not subjected to human 
interpretation and are seen as fixed and unchanging (Hallett, Chandler & Krettenauer, 
2002).  Epistemic  content  is  situated  on  a  continuum,  with  children’s  epistemological  
thinking hypothesized to advance first in domains of low epistemic content and then in 
domains of high epistemic content. Using  Piaget’s  cognitive  development  theory  as  a  
basis, Chandler et al. predicted that the age at which development begins varies 
Personal Epistemology 
 
69 
  
according to the degree of epistemic content. Epistemological thinking in ill-structured 
domains is first advanced around the age of twelve while beliefs in well-structured 
domains begin to advance in adolescence.  
Chandler’s  model  of  epistemic  development  (Chandler  et  al.,  2002;;  Hallet  et  al.,  
2002) consists of four stages: realism, defended realism, dogmatism or skepticism, and 
rationalism.  Naïve  realists  are  similar  to  Perry’s  dualist  and  King  and  Kitchener’s  pre-
reflective thinkers, they believe that knowledge is a direct observation from experience, 
and that disagreements occur when people have access to different facts but this can be 
easily resolved by identification of the discrepancy and rectifying it with the same 
information. Children at this stage can understand false belief, but do not yet have an 
interpretative theory of mind. Defended realism is the beginning of an interpretative 
mind,  evidenced  by  a  child’s  acceptance  that  some  kinds  of  knowledge,  mostly  
aesthetics, are based solely upon opinions. The next stage occurs when knowledge 
beyond aesthetics is now recognized as subjective and constructed. Individuals can have 
two responses to this recognition, either they become dogmatic and heavily rely on 
authority figures for knowledge and truth or they become skeptics, arguing that there is 
no objective truth, only subjective opinions. Finally, the last stage of rationalism 
involves using standards as means of justifying knowledge. Some knowledge claims are 
evaluated to be more justified than others.   
Kuhn’s  model  of  epistemological  understanding  (Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 
2000) is similar to Chandler et al. (2002) as she views epistemological beliefs as 
domain-specific, but instead of well- versus ill-structured domains, she theorizes that 
epistemological belief development occurs across five judgment domains at different 
rates: (a) personal taste (e.g. music preference), (b) aesthetic judgment (e.g., art quality), 
(c) value judgment (e.g. families should be told how many children they may have), (d) 
facts about the social world (e.g. explanations of how children learn language), and (e) 
facts about the physical world (e.g. what atoms contain). These areas range from the 
very subjective, such as taste or aesthetics, to the seemingly more objective, such as 
physical facts (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002).  
Kuhn et al. (2000) conceptualized higher epistemological thinking as the careful 
balance between objectivity and subjectivity, with no one position overpowering the 
other. Similar to other developmental models, individuals are postulated to develop 
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from realist to evaluativist positions; the perception of knowledge advances from being 
fully objective to the recognition of subjective knowledge, then to the achievement of 
mature thinking when one sees the value of evaluating and discriminating between 
differing judgments in the seeking of objective truth in subjective knowledge. For 
subjective domains such as aesthetic and value judgments, the progression from 
absolutist to multiplist levels occurs earlier. In more objective domains such as social 
facts and physical facts, this development occurs later. Interestingly, development of the 
higher epistemological levels from a multiplist to evaluativist understanding occurs in 
the reverse direction, with objectivity first being reintegrated to more objective 
domains, then to the more subjective ones. The authors note though that beliefs of 
personal taste cannot be logically classified as evaluativist due to its idiosyncratic 
nature.  
In conclusion, the above-mentioned developmental models share similar 
characterization of epistemological beliefs, whereby beliefs are transformed from an 
absolutist perspective to higher-level perspectives recognizing the constructive and 
relative nature of knowledge. Movement through epistemological thinking positions 
may not be continuous. Cognitive disequilibrium, which occurs when one faces a new 
experience that clashes with current beliefs, facilitates movement from one position to 
another although individuals can resist or avoid growth at times (Perry, 1999). 
However, this avoidance will not cause a permanent halt to development but may just 
temporarily delay the progress of development. Development may also be recursive, 
conceived of as a spiral rather than a linear progression (Chandler et al., 2002).  
 
Multidimensional models 
In contrast to developmental models, multidimensional models postulate a 
system of beliefs in which each belief can develop asynchronously from the rest. The 
multidimensional models consist of (a) Schommer-Aikin’s  model  (Schommer,  1990), 
and (b)  Hofer  &  Pintrich’s  Epistemological  Theory  (Hofer  &  Pintrich,  1997). 
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Table 4-2. Multidimensional Models of Personal Epistemology 
Theory Categories Dimensions 
Schommer-Aikins  
(Schommer, 1990) 
Nature of Knowledge Certain Knowledge,  
Simple Knowledge,  
Omniscient Authority 
Nature of Learning Quick Learning,  
Innate Ability 
Hofer & Pintrich (1997) Nature of Knowledge Certainty of knowledge 
Simplicity of knowledge 
Nature of Knowing  Source of knowledge 
Justification of knowledge 
 
Schommer-Aikins radically changed the conceptualization in the field of 
personal epistemology when she theorized that epistemological beliefs should be 
viewed as a system of beliefs (Schommer, 1990), thus refuting the popular assumption 
at that time that beliefs changed at the same rate as modelled by the hierarchical 
developmental stage models. She proposed a belief system consisting of five 
dimensions that could vary asynchronously (Schommer, 1990; Schommer-Aikins, 
2004).  Based  on  Perry’s  (1970) work, she formulated three dimensions related to the 
nature of knowledge: (a) Certain knowledge – the stability of knowledge on a 
continuum ranging from unchanging to continually changing and context-dependent, (b) 
Simple knowledge – the structure of knowledge ranging from isolated unrelated pieces 
to interrelated integrated concepts, and (c) Omniscient Authority – the source of 
knowledge ranging from figures of authority to empirically-derived conclusions based 
on evidence and reasoning. Additionally, Schommer-Aikins noticed that beliefs about 
fixed intelligence and speed of knowledge acquisition showed an association with 
student performance and thus suggested that beliefs about the nature of learning should 
also be included in the construct (Schommer, 1990). She postulated two dimensions 
under the nature of learning: (a) Quick Learning – the speed of learning ranging from 
quick all-or-none to gradual acquisition, and (b) Innate ability – the ability to learn 
ranging from innately fixed at birth to being malleable and improvable over time and 
experience.   
Additionally, Schommer-Aikins constructed the first quantitative measure of 
epistemological beliefs in contrast to the previous time- and labour-intensive qualitative 
method of interviews. Her Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) about beliefs on 
knowledge and learning (Schommer, 1990) consists of items from her five postulated 
dimensions – Certain knowledge, Simple knowledge, Omniscient authority, Quick 
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learning and Innate ability – and has been used extensively on a range of populations - 
adults (Schommer, 1998), college students (Schommer, Crouse & Rhodes, 1992), high 
school students (Schommer, 1993) and middle school students (Schommer-Aikins, 
Brookhart, Hutter & Mau, 2000). However, the psychometric properties of the EQ have 
been questioned, as subsequent empirical work yielded four factors (Schommer, 1993; 
Schommer et al., 1992) or three factors (Schommer-Aikins et al., 2000) instead of the 
original five proposed. The inconsistent empirical results led to critiques of the 
reliability of the EQ, and some further questions concerning the validity of Schommer-
Aikin’s  theoretical assumptions (Clarebout et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2008).  
This debate led to other researchers modifying Schommer-Aikins’  theoretically  
proposed dimensions and also the EQ (cf. Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001). Jehng, 
Johnson and Anderson (1993) removed the simplicity of knowledge belief and added a 
rigid learning belief, which is the belief in orderly step-by-step instructional procedures 
useful for problem-solving but which has not been found to foster higher level beliefs in 
learning. Kardash and Wood (2000)  combined  the  EQ  and  Jehng  et  al.’s  (1993)  measure  
to form another questionnaire which assessed the speed of knowledge acquisition, 
structure of knowledge, knowledge construction and modification, characteristics of 
successful students and the attainability of truth. Schraw, Bendixen and Dunkle (1995) 
also attempted to improve Schommer-Aikin’s  questionnaire  through  the  construction  of  
the Epistemic Belief Inventory; it captured all five initial belief dimensions but with a 
considerably reduced set of items  (Schommer’s  63  versus  Schraw  et  al.’s  28  items).  
This instrument provides an alternative to assess Schommer-Aikin’s  five  dimensions 
and is easy to administer but a note of caution has been given to carefully examine the 
context of its items because some items have been found to differ considerably from 
that  of  Jehng  et  al’s  and  Schommer’s  (Duell  &  Schommer-Aikins, 2001).  
Additional to the criticisms on the psychometric properties of Schommer-
Aikin’s  EQ, scholars have questioned its assumption of domain-generality (Wood & 
Kardash, 2000).  Schommer-Aikin and colleagues have supported the notion of domain-
general beliefs; referring to domain-generality  as  “if  individuals  tend  to  believe  that  
knowledge is highly interrelated and that there are multiple answers to problems, then 
they  believe  this  to  be  true  of  most  domains”  (Schommer-Aikins, Duell & Barker, 2003, 
p.351).  College students were instructed to fill out the EQ twice; first contextualizing 
the items in the math domain and the next in the social science domain (Schommer & 
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Walker, 1995). Results showed that correlations between epistemological belief 
dimensions across domains were higher than cross-belief correlations. Schommer and 
Walker used these results as evidence of the domain independence of the model. In 
another study, Schommer-Aikins, Duell and Barker (2003) asked college students to fill 
out the questionnaire three times, once thinking about math, another about social 
science, and lastly about business. Results showed that epistemological beliefs between 
math and social sciences were highly correlated, as were beliefs between math and 
business. They used this to support their claim of domain generality in epistemological 
beliefs.  
However other researchers have challenged these findings. Hofer (2000) pointed 
out that despite instructing participants to think about different domains, many items in 
the EQ were unrelated to the academic domains. Buehl and colleagues (2002) used four 
of  Schommer’s  (1990)  dimensions  (omitting  omniscient  authority) and found that 
participants’  epistemological beliefs differed significantly across the domains of math 
and history, thus supporting domain-specificity as opposed to  Schommer’s  findings 
with the EQ.  
Interestingly, Buehl and Alexander (2005) additionally found that 
epistemological beliefs may be both domain-specific and domain-general. They used a 
variation  of  Hofer’s  (2000)  instrument  to  assess  whether  students  clustered  into  distinct  
groups based upon their epistemological beliefs and if these clusters differed across 
domains of history and math. Four distinct clusters were identified in each domain, but 
these clusters could not be compared across domains. However, when these clusters 
were categorized as either naïve or adaptive, a statistically significant correlation with a 
medium effect size emerged. Thus, Buehl and Alexander (2005) suggests that while 
domain-specific epistemological beliefs can vary, there may be an overarching general 
level of sophistication that restricts this variance.  
As briefly mentioned before, Schommer-Aikin’s  model  has  been  criticized  for  
its inclusion of nature of learning factors on the basis of its factorial validity (Clarebout 
et al., 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Hofer and Pintrich (1997) also emphasized that 
nature of learning factors do not explicitly relate to the philosophical conception of 
epistemology in the sense of the definition or justification of knowledge and knowing. 
They argued that the exclusion of these factors would bring greater conceptual clarity to 
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the construct. Schommer-Aikin’s  (2004)  has  responded  by  defending  these  factors  and  
has argued that learning beliefs reveal what students think about the source of 
knowledge and contribute to the understanding of how students made sense of 
knowledge and knowing. 
Nevertheless, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) formulated their Epistemological 
Theory with the exclusion of Schommer-Aikins’  nature  of  learning  factors  but  kept  
nature of knowledge factors and included a new category of nature of knowing factors. 
Two dimensions exist under nature of knowledge: (a) Certainty of knowledge – the 
degree to which one sees knowledge on a continuum from being fixed and concrete to a 
more fluid changing view dependent on context, and (b) Simplicity of knowledge – the 
degree to which one sees knowledge on a continuum from an accumulation of discrete 
facts to a highly interrelated conceptual view. Two dimensions also exist under nature 
of knowing: (c) Source of knowledge – the origin of knowledge as residing external to 
self such as in external authority figures or residing internally from self as knower and 
one’s  ability  to  construct  knowledge  and  make  meaning  through  interactions,  and  (d)  
Justification for knowing – the ways of determining what beliefs qualify as knowledge, 
moving from “a  continuum  of  dualistic  beliefs  to  the  multiplistic  acceptance  of  opinions  
to  reasoned  justification  for  beliefs”  (Hofer  &  Pintrich,  1997,  p.120). 
When  Hofer  and  Pintrich’s  (1997)  theory  was  first  formulated,  it  was  unclear  if  
these beliefs were viewed as domain-specific or domain-general, although they 
suggested that domain-specificity may be conceptualized as being specific to general 
academic  areas  such  as  math  or  history.  However,  Hofer’s  (2000)  study  provided  
support for the domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs through an empirical study 
which used the Discipline-Focused Questionnaire; a measure developed from their 
theory. Data was collected in the domains of psychology and science. Results showed 
that significant differences were found between the two domains. While moderate 
correlations were found between dimensions across domains, a multivariate analysis of 
variance  showed  that  students’  beliefs  differed  across  domains  for  each  dimension.  
Thus, Hofer (2000) argued that the evidence supported domain-specificity of 
epistemological beliefs. 
Hofer and Pintrich have been criticized for the vague elaboration of their 
justification for knowing dimension. Greene, Azevedo and Torney-Purta (2008) argued 
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that Hofer and Pintrich did not elaborate upon this dimension beyond a reprisal of 
Perry’s  three general positions whereby development occurs from a dualistic to 
multiplistic to a rationalist perspective and highlighted that most models of personal 
epistemology thus far have neglected the justification of knowledge aspect. They noted 
the irony in this as the field of philosophical epistemology where personal epistemology 
is formulated from, justification was and still is a central question. Justification can be 
made through different ways such as appealing to rationality, sense data, and the 
coherence of new claims with other claims already established as knowledge (Greene et 
al., 2008). In the Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Model formulated by Greene and 
his colleagues (Greene et al., 2008) reviewed in the next section, they expanded on this 
concept of justification and tried to quantitatively measure  individuals’  beliefs  in  two  
modes of justifying knowledge claims.  
 
Integrated Models 
Bendixen and Rule (2004) and Hofer (2004) have both indicated a need in the 
personal epistemology field for unifying terminology or unified models capable of clear 
articulation of the relationship between personal epistemology and how epistemological 
beliefs change and develop. Greene et al. (2008) pointed out that this lack may be one 
reason  why  numerous  debates  within  the  field  go  unresolved.  Since  Hofer  and  Pintrich’s  
(1997) definitive review of the field, the similarities and differences between various 
epistemological theories have been made known. Some of these issues debate over if 
epistemological thinking should be formulated in developmental stages or as 
independent dimensions, which dimensions are most indicative of the construct, and if 
beliefs are domain-general or domain-specific, or if they could be both. It is important 
to address these problematic issues to guide future research for development of more 
accurate self-report instruments and to clarify relations of epistemological beliefs with 
aspects of cognition and motivation (Schraw, 2001).  
In this section, we discuss two models which have attempted to integrate some 
differing perspectives of the field.  They  are  (1)  Muis,  Bendixen  &  Harle’s  Theory  of  
Integrated Domains in Epistemology (2006), and (2) Greene, Azevedo & Torney-
Purta’s  Epistemic  and  Ontological Cognition Model (2008).  
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1) Theory of Integrated Domains in Epistemology (Muis, Bendixen & Harle, 2006) 
Muis, Bendixen and Harle (2006) proposed their own integrated theory 
addressing the domain-specificity issue in the field, incorporating philosophical 
considerations and the multidimensional and developmental personal epistemology 
paradigms. They noted that on one hand, some researchers have empirically supported 
domain generality using correlational analyses of beliefs among various domains 
(Schommer & Walker, 1995; King & Kitchener, 2004), while on the other, others have 
supported domain specificity by showing significant differences between beliefs in 
various domains (Hofer, 2000). These disparities in beliefs can be evidently seen across 
well-structured and ill-structured domains. In between-subjects design studies, 
individuals who majored in well-structured domains tended to believe that knowledge 
was more structured and certain and were more likely to rely on experts as sources of 
knowledge and justifications for knowing. In contrast, majors of ill-structured domains 
tended to believe knowledge was less structured, choosing to place more trust in 
personal experience (King, Wood & Mines, 1990). These results were also replicated in 
within-subjects studies; individuals believed that well-structured domains such as 
mathematics or chemistry consisted of knowledge which was more structured and more 
certain and were more reliant on experts for knowledge and justifications in these 
domains than in ill-structured domains such as psychology or business (Hofer, 2000; 
Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003).  
Additionally, there is a third perspective that beliefs can be both general and 
specific with interactions between the two (c.f. Buehl et al., 2002; Buehl & Alexander, 
2001; Chandler et al., 2002). Using the EQ to measure beliefs in mathematics and 
history, Buehl et al. (2002) formulated structural models positing both domain-
generality and specificity and evaluated them empirically using confirmatory factor 
analysis. The model representing domain-specific belief factors was found to exhibit the 
best fit, but the significant correlations between the factors also suggested the existence 
of overarching domain-general beliefs. Buehl and Alexander (2005)’s  study  empirically 
supported this finding of superordinate domain-general epistemological beliefs. Using 
cluster analyses, epistemological beliefs of participants were grouped into interpretable 
profiles within the domains of history and mathematics. After evaluating the 
sophistication  of  these  epistemological  profiles,  participants’  profiles  were  found  to  be  
significantly correlated across domains. Students tended to possess similar levels of 
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epistemological thinking sophistication across history and mathematics. Chandler et al. 
(2002) have also supported the possibility that both domain-specific and general 
epistemological beliefs can work together.  
Muis et al. (2006) supported the third perspective that epistemological beliefs 
were both general and specific and proposed their multilayered Theory of Integrated 
Domain of Epistemology (TIDE); a framework which aimed to  “(1)  provide  a  
theoretical basis from which to understand and empirically assess domain-specificity 
and domain-generality and how the two are related, (2) establish a common language 
for describing domain-specific and general epistemic beliefs, (3) permit comparisons of 
data across paradigmatic approaches, and (4) provide a theoretical framework from 
which to discuss broader relations among epistemic beliefs and various facets of 
cognition, motivation and achievement”  (Muis  et  al.,  2006,  p.  30).  Epistemic  beliefs  
were considered in three different but related contexts – socio-cultural, academic and 
instructional – to achieve a more fine-grained understanding of how beliefs develop 
within each context.  
Figure 4-1. Theory of Integrated Domains in Epistemology (TIDE) 
 
Referring to Figure 4-1, Muis et al. (2006) suggested that the development of 
general epistemic beliefs has to be considered in the sociocultural context, beginning at 
birth and continuing in development until the end of life. These beliefs are defined as 
“beliefs  about  knowledge  and  knowing  that  develop  in  nonacademic  contexts”  (p.33)  
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such as the home environment, peer interactions, in work related environments and 
other nonacademic environments. This development aligns  itself  well  with  the  ‘theory  
of  mind’  literature  which  has  shown  that  children  at young ages are aware of mental 
states, able to provide justifications for their answers and have begun to develop naïve 
theories of knowledge before formal schooling.   
The  development  of  individuals’  academic  and  domain-specific epistemic 
beliefs, which are also socially constructed and context bound, begins when formal 
education begins. Academic epistemic  beliefs  are  “beliefs  about  knowledge  and  
knowing  that  begin  to  develop  once  individuals  enter  an  educational  system”  (p.  35).  
These beliefs are initially more reflective of general epistemic beliefs but become more 
distinct over time. Early on, students develop academic epistemic beliefs that generalize 
across domains. However, with increasing expertise and exposure over time, students 
begin to formulate specific beliefs about various domains and these domain-specific 
beliefs,  defined  as  “beliefs  about knowledge and knowing that can be articulated in 
reference  to  any  domain  to  which  students  have  been  exposed”  (p.  36),  become  more  
influential than general beliefs. These domain-specific beliefs are shaped by the 
instructional environment, which includes grading and school policies and practices. 
Domain-specific beliefs continually evolve over the course of life but primarily develop 
during the academic years.  
Reciprocity exists between general, academic and domain-specific epistemic 
beliefs. Initially, young  children’s  academic  epistemic  beliefs  are  more  influenced  by  
general epistemic beliefs. As individuals progress through higher levels of education, 
general epistemic beliefs become less dominant and domain-specific epistemic beliefs 
become more influential. The TIDE framework consists of various levels which are 
reciprocally influential. Developmental progression occurs in two directions – a 
horizontal moving from an absolutist to evaluativist perception across the course of 
lifetime and a vertical upwards fine-tuning of beliefs through life experiences and 
educational experiences accumulated over time. The looped arrow in Figure 3-1 
demonstrates the postulated recursive and spiral-like nature of epistemological 
development. Muis et al. (2006) theorized that changes in educational context may serve 
as impetus for recursion to occur as when exposed to unfamiliarity, individuals may 
choose to retreat to less sophisticated epistemological beliefs so as to protect their 
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security of the familiar. Intense initial scaffolding given by teachers is suggested to help 
students maintain levels of sophistication of their epistemological thinking.  
Therefore, the multilayered framework of TIDE formulates an integrated theory 
which suggests that epistemic beliefs can be both domain-specific and domain-general 
and attempts to explain the associations and development of these beliefs across various 
contexts. TIDE brings greater specificity to the definition of epistemological beliefs by 
differentiating between general, academic and domain-specific beliefs. In embedding 
these belief types in sociocultural, academic and instructional contexts, the theory also 
seeks to explain how these epistemic beliefs develop in relations to life development 
and situational changes and their relations to cognition, motivation and learning. 
 
2) Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development Model  
(Greene, Azevedo & Torney-Purta, 2008) 
The next integrated model of personal epistemology is that of Greene, Azevedo 
and Torney-Purta’s  (2008)  – the Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development 
Model (EOCM). The EOCM integrates the characteristics of both developmental and 
multidimensional models into one model and includes the covariate of educational level 
to hypothesize the occurrence of changes in epistemological thinking, as informed by 
past child developmental literature. The EOCM supports the domain-specificity of 
epistemic beliefs and makes the differentiation between ill-structured and well-
structured domains.  
Past literature has used the  terms  ‘epistemological  beliefs’  and  ‘epistemic  
beliefs’  interchangeably  as  they  fundamentally  refer  to  the  same  construct.  Greene et al. 
(2008) coined the  term  “Epistemic and Ontological Cognition (EOC)” as they argued 
that “personal  epistemology”  or  “epistemological  beliefs” are misnomers because 
“epistemology”  literally  means  “the  study  of  knowledge”  and  not  all  individuals  
consciously study knowledge as implied by this concept (cf. Kitchener, 2002). Instead, 
most individuals have beliefs about knowledge, thus  the  terminology  of  ‘epistemic  
belief’  is deemed as more accurate. Additionally, researchers studying epistemic beliefs 
also study the processes which form these beliefs and their consequent influence on 
learning.  Thus  ‘ontological  cognition’ is also included in the terminology of EOC as it 
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‘emphasizes  knowledge  and  the  processes  involved  in  its  definition,  acquisition  and  
use’  (Greene  et  al.,  2008,  p.143).  
Table 4-3. Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development Model (Taken from 
Greene et al., 2008) 
 
 
Ill-Structured Domains Well-Structured Domains 
Age Position SC JA PJ Position SC JA PJ 
4-12 Realism High High High Realism High High High 
12-Early 
College 
Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Realism High High High 
Mid to Late 
College 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Graduate 
Education 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid Rationalism Low Mid Mid 
SC = Simple and Certain Knowledge Dimension; JA = Justification by Authority Dimension;  
PJ = Personal Justification Dimension 
The EOCM measures individuals’  beliefs  along three dimensions: Simple and 
certain knowledge, Justification by authority, and Personal justification. The dimension 
of simple and certain knowledge was formulated by collapsing the separate and certain 
knowledge dimensions of Schommer-Aikin’s  (2004)  and  Hofer  and  Pintrich’s  (1997)  
into one dimension as empirical studies utilizing factor analyses have supported a single 
dimension rather than separate ones (Hofer, 2000). Greene et al. (2008) also theorized 
that someone who has a simple view of knowledge is unlikely to see it as uncertain and 
vice versa. The other two dimensions focused on the concept of justification, an aspect 
that Greene et al. (2008) have noted to be neglected in previous work in personal 
epistemology although it is central to the concept of epistemology. The justification 
dimensions attempt to measure  “the  degree  to  which  an  individual  feels  that  particular  
sources  are  sufficient  to  warrant  a  knowledge  claim”  (Greene  et  al,  2008, p. 237). The 
two dimensions are conceptualized on the theoretical basis that when faced with a 
disagreement of knowledge, individuals usually choose one of two paths to justification. 
They either decide that all claims are subjective and personal, thus warranting 
knowledge claims based on personal experience and logic (i.e., personal justification), 
or rely on some authority  figure  for  guidance  and  say  they  “know”  something  if  an  
expert, teacher or other reputable source said it (i.e., justification by authority). 
Differences in these dimensions are posited to be quantitative in nature and the extent of 
their belief in each dimension is quantified under terms of strong/moderate/weak 
agreement.  
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The EOCM uses quantitative differences in dimensional EOC beliefs to 
characterize individuals into qualitatively different positions. Similar to the levels of 
Chandler’s  Model  of  Epistemic  Development  (Chandler  et  al.,  2002;;  Hallett et al., 
2002), the EOCM is composed of four positions – realism, dogmatism, skepticism, 
rationalism. Each of these four positions suggests a distinct profile of the dimensional 
EOC beliefs. The first position in the model is realism, characterized by strong beliefs 
in all three dimensions. Individuals in this position see knowledge as objectively 
knowable, making almost any means of justification sufficient to warrant a knowledge 
claim. When individuals recognize that knowledge is not objectively knowable and 
become aware of the need to evaluate warrants to establish justification, they move into 
either dogmatism or skeptiscism. Dogmatists rely on authority figures to provide the 
justification necessary to warrant their knowledge claims while skepticists believe that 
their own personal experiences constitute sufficient justification. Because this 
experience is inherently subjective, it is not comparable across individuals. Finally, with 
experience and reflection, individuals develop into rationalists. They continue to believe 
that knowledge is complex and dynamic but take more nuanced positions toward means 
of justification. They see that justification is sometimes warranted by a figure of 
authority while at other times, justification with personal experience or reasoning may 
be sufficient. By using both authority-based and personal means of justification, mature 
individuals come to a rationalist view of knowledge.  
The EOCM postulates two developmental aspects. First, there is a progression 
between domains regarding when cognition matures, starting first with ill-structured 
domains followed after by well-structured domains. Maturity of cognition is indicated 
in the model with reference to age periods and educational level corresponding to 
changes in EOC. These occurrences of change are educated guesses informed by 
developmental psychology work on children’s  cognition  and  past  epistemological 
research such  as  that  of  King  and  Kitchener’s  (c.f.  Greene  et  al.,  2008).  Secondly,  alike  
to developmental theories, individuals move in a predictable progression through the 
four positions from realism to rationalism within each domain.  
In line with Muis et al. (2006) and Buehl and colleagues (Buehl & Alexander, 
2001, 2005),  Greene  et  al.  (2008)  agrees  that  individuals’  EOC varies across domains, 
although they hypothesize that EOC varies at a level somewhat between domain-
generality and specificity. More specifically, they suggest that these differences exist at 
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the level of well- versus ill-structured domains. Greene et al. (2010) created a 
quantitative instrument based on the EOCM, entitling it the Epistemic and Ontological 
Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ). The EOCQ consists of items in two domains: the ill-
structured domain of history and the well-structured domain of mathematics. Using 
confirmatory factor analyses and factor mixture modelling on data collected from 
middle school to graduate school participants, results confirmed the theoretical basis 
and provided some empirical support for domain-specificity. They hypothesized that 
domain-specific beliefs developed at differential rates, with beliefs first maturing in ill-
structured domains before well-structured domains. This was found to be true when 
beliefs in history were found to be at least or more sophisticated than beliefs in 
mathematics (Greene et al., 2010). Educational level and academic performance were 
also found to predict the EOC position of the individual, thus supporting the predictive 
validity of the model regarding these covariates.  
In conclusion, the EOCM integrates the developmental and multidimensional 
perspectives in the field and uses covariates of maturing cognition such as age and 
education to make predictions of the EOC positions that individuals are at. Individuals 
typically progress from the low-level position of realism to being dogmatics or 
skepticists, and lastly to high-level rationalist positions. These qualitatively different 
positions are characterized by quantitative differences across the three dimensions of 
simple and certain knowledge, personal justification and justification by authority. The 
model differentiates between ill-structured and well-structured domains, with some first 
empirical results supporting domain-specificity of epistemic and ontological cognition 
(Greene et al., 2010).   
 
4.3 Development of Personal Epistemology 
Muis, Bendixen & Haerle (2006) writes that “personal  epistemology  is  complex  
and socially constructed; that is, individuals actively construct or make meaning of their 
experiences,  and  development  occurs  as  a  function  of  one’s  interactions  with  the  social  
world”  (p.30).  The  child’s  world  mainly  consists of three basic influences - family, 
peers and teachers (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). These three spheres make up the core of 
the  child’s  social  world,  thus  playing  important  roles  in  the  manner  a  child  comes  to 
understand the nature, limits and certainty of knowledge. These representations of 
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knowledge and knowing are developing and changing over time and subsequently have 
an influence on the way children approach the process of learning (King & Kitchener, 
2002). 
The development of epistemological understanding has been postulated to be 
recursive, as opposed to linear development presumed by early studies whereby the 
process of epistemological understanding was suggested to mainly begin when students 
entered university as many first-year students were found to function at the lowest 
epistemological level of dualistic absolutist views of knowledge (Perry, 1970; Kitchener 
& King, 1994). Boyes and Chandler (1992) however found all four of the epistemic 
levels posited in their model in their sample of high school students. They subsequently 
theorized that previous studies showing low-level epistemic beliefs in first-year 
university students could suggest a spiral-like development of epistemological thinking, 
as students may retreat to safer, more established positions when exposed to new 
environments. The anxiety and negative affect one experiences when pre-held notions 
and ideas are challenged can bring confusion and may cause the individual to retreat for 
stability and security. This is supported by Muis et al. (2006), who suggested that 
transitions through the different levels of education can be particularly stressful and can 
cause individuals to return to lower levels of epistemological thinking.  
As mentioned before, in spite of various approaches and methodologies, the 
developmental trend of epistemological thinking is generally agreed to undergo 
transformations from a dualistic view of knowledge as being right or wrong, to a view 
of relativism where knowledge is self-constructed and open to different interpretations, 
and finally to an evaluativistic rationalism whereby individuals are able to make their 
own personal judgments and commitments in a relativistic context. There has been little 
empirical evidence for the precise factors that alter epistemological beliefs but it has 
been theorized this development may be caused by an interactionist disequilibrium 
mechanism from the Piagetian perspective. Cognitive disequilibrium acts as a trigger to 
assimilation or accommodation (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Change occurs when 
individuals become unsatisfied with existing beliefs, find new alternatives intelligible 
and useful, and see a way to integrate the new beliefs with earlier conceptions. Perry 
(1970) described the motivation for development as an interaction between internal 
motives toward autonomy and external environmental support and constraints.  
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Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock (2000) have also suggested that other than 
educational experiences, other experiential factors such as the intellectual climate and 
values of society can influence the development of epistemological understanding. 
Their empirical results showed that across a sample of various ages and educational 
levels, the transition from absolutist to multiplist level could be easily achieved by 
almost all individuals in each sub-sample. In contrast, the transition from the multiplist 
to evaluativistic level was achieved by less than half of the participants in each sub-
sample. They cited wider societal and cultural values to be a possible reason. The value 
of social tolerance and acceptance is a common characteristic of the modern western 
society in which every individual is entitled to have his/her own opinion and respect has 
to be accorded to all opinions. Kuhn et al. (2000) argued that this value of social 
tolerance and acceptance can produce a slippery slope and blurred boundaries 
concerning the belief of individual right to opinion and the belief that all opinions are 
equally right. Tolerance of multiple opinions can thus overshadow the significance of 
discriminating claims based on reasoned arguments.   
Similar to the reasoning field, there is more empirical literature on 
epistemological beliefs in school and classroom settings as compared to home settings. 
Given the sample populations of most studies, the environmental press for 
change often seems to come from educational encounters (c.f. Muis et al., 2006; Hofer 
& Pintrich, 1997). Schools shape and change epistemic beliefs through teacher 
modelling and act as a training ground for children to think, use and modify their views 
of knowing as they develop critical thinking skills (Shraw, 2001). Higher education 
with its highly rational, objective and intellectual process of knowledge seeking has 
been shown to consistently correspond with more sophisticated and mature 
epistemological understanding (Kuhn, 1991; King & Kitchener, 1994). However there 
remains a need to understand how motivational mechanisms and contextual factors in 
educational settings constrain or facilitate such changes as most research has examined 
epistemological beliefs in a relatively decontextualized manner. Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997) suggested that there should be more exploration on how beliefs are 
communicated in the classroom environment. Schommer-Aikins (Schommer, 1990) 
suggested  that  “teachers  can  inform  children  in  grade  school  that  knowledge  is  
integrated, that prior knowledge should be processed, and that many times there is more 
than one right answer” (p. 503-504).  
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This can be partially attributed to the predictive power of epistemological beliefs 
regarding numerous aspects of learning and performance, such as in comprehension of 
text (Schommer et al., 1992) and on their grade point average (Schommer, 1993). The 
role of schools and the wider society is undoubtedly significant to the development of 
epistemological thinking but the role of the home environment in this development has 
often been sidelined. Anderson (1984) has suggested that epistemological beliefs are a 
product  of  both  the  home  and  formal  education:  “…  children  not  only acquire 
experience, they acquire interpretations of experience. It stands to reason that the beliefs 
about knowledge that a child develops will be influenced by those of his parents. 
Parents’  beliefs  about  knowledge  will  be  conditioned  by  educational  and occupational 
status…  Later,  teachers  become  mediators  of  experience.”   (p.9). Anderson (1984) thus 
suggested that a  child’s  beliefs  about  knowledge  are  first  influenced  by  his  or  her  
parents.  Muis  et  al.’s  (2006) TIDE model supported  Anderson’s  view  by  postulating 
that domain-general epistemic beliefs begin to develop before the commencement of 
formal education. These beliefs originating from family influence are subsequently 
carried over to educational processes, which are further shaped by teachers, peers, 
classroom communication and schooling processes. 
Schommer-Aikins’  (2004)  embedded systemic model acknowledged the integral 
role of family, amongst other influences of peers and schools, on individual learners of 
personal epistemological beliefs. Families have their own system of cultural views, 
ways of knowing beliefs, epistemological beliefs and all these play a role in influencing 
the learner embedded in the family. However, there have been few studies that attest to 
the influence of family in the development of epistemological beliefs. Schraw (2001) 
wrote  that  “little  is  known  about  the  origin  and  development  of  individuals’  
epistemological  beliefs”  (p.457).  The  antecedents  of  epistemological  beliefs  have  been  
less explored in comparison to their consequences, which mainly revolve around their 
linkages with learning and academic performance. The few empirical studies that exist 
are by Schommer-Aikins who demonstrated the significance of the home environment 
to the development of epistemological beliefs (Schommer, 1990, 1993).  
In the first study, Schommer-Aikins (Schommer, 1990) tested the 
conceptualization of epistemological beliefs as a multidimensional construct by 
administering the EQ to junior college and university students. In her study, she also 
included some questions about home background and upbringing. These questions 
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included  various  aspects:  educational  atmosphere  and  opportunity  (e.g.,  parents’  higher  
education  and  parents’  occupational  prestige  score),  encouragement  towards  
independence (e.g., making decisions for oneself) and adherence to rules (e.g., 
enforcement of strict rules). Results found that two epistemological belief dimensions 
were found to significantly relate to three types of predictors. Simple knowledge was 
predicted by educational atmosphere and opportunity (high level of parental education), 
encouragement  towards  independence  (questioning  parents’  decisions)  and  adherence  to  
rules and guidelines (strictness of rules in the family). Quick learning was predicted by 
educational atmosphere  and  opportunity  (father’s  education),  and  of  encouragement  
towards independence (discussions). The remaining two belief dimensions, innate 
ability and certain knowledge, were not significantly predicted by any variable 
measured. Schommer-Aikins wrote that  “these  results  suggest  that  the  more  education  
parents have and the more they expect their children to take responsibilities in the home 
and in their own thinking, the more likely children will develop a sophisticated system 
of epistemological beliefs”  (Schommer,  1990,  p.503). 
In a later study, Schommer-Aikins (Schommer, 1993) questioned if possible 
differences in epistemological beliefs could be due to school type (junior college and 
university) and domain expertise (social sciences and technological sciences). Her 
results further found that some of these differences could be attributed to different 
students’  family  characteristics.  Schommer-Aikins found that parental education and 
encouragement towards independence predicted beliefs in simple knowledge. Parents 
with a higher level of education might give their children more encouragement to think 
independently. Consequently, these children as adults were less likely to believe in 
simple knowledge than children from less educated parents. Secondly, parental 
education, log of school year and gender predicted quick learning. The more education 
parents had and the further along in school participants were, the less likely these 
participants believed in quick all-or-none learning. 
Additionally, Cano & Cardelle-Elawar (2008) investigated if familial variables 
of  parents’  educational  level  and  family’s  intellectual  climate,  that  is,  the  family’s  
degree of interest in social, political, cultural and intellectual activities, could act as 
predictors of epistemological beliefs. In a sample of secondary school students ranging 
between 12-18 years of age, epistemological beliefs were measured by the EQ. Their 
results  showed  that  parents’  educational  level  and  family’s  intellectual  climate  both  
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significantly predicted epistemological beliefs in quick learning, that is, the speed and 
effort involved in learning. Similar to Schommer-Aikins’  results (Schommer, 1990; 
1993), the lower the educational levels of parents, the more likely children developed 
naïve beliefs about  quick,  effortless  learning.  Additionally,  the  better  the  family’s  
intellectual  climate,  the  more  sophisticated  the  child’s  beliefs  were  about  learning.  
Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri & Harrison (2004) additionally found that although family 
socio-economic status (SES) did  not  significantly  influence  elementary  students’  
epistemological beliefs over time, low SES students reported more naïve beliefs (e.g., 
certain knowledge and source of authority) than average SES students.  
Till now, the above-mentioned studies have dealt with how parental educational 
level  and  parenting  practices  can  shape  children’s  epistemological  beliefs.  Gerber 
(2004) tested  if  direct  relations  existed  between  parents’  and  children’s  epistemological  
beliefs. In testing for intergenerational transmission of beliefs, she developed scales 
largely  based  on  Schommer’s  (1990)  multidimensional  model  for  purposes  of  
measuring parental and child epistemological beliefs. Although significant correlations 
between beliefs of parents and child were found, these were not in the same dimensions.  
Kuhn (2005), however, found that when parents evidenced higher 
epistemological understanding and valued inquiry, their children were also more likely 
to show similar beliefs. Students in a best-practice middle school were more likely to 
espouse higher epistemological understanding and place higher value on inquiry and 
debate than students from struggling schools. Only parents from the best-practice school 
participated in her study and the results revealed that 82% of these parents functioned as 
evaluativists and 77% valued debate. Kuhn thus concluded that in the best-practice 
schools,  “these  middle-schoolers belong to a subculture in which such values are the 
norm and they are highly likely to come espouse them themselves”  (p.35).   
In sum, the results of these studies confirm that family life predisposes children 
to have certain epistemological beliefs, which have been shown to have subsequent 
impact on learning and academic performance. However, these empirical studies have 
evidenced some weak empirical links and inconsistent findings, which call for further 
research to verify and support these claims.  
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4.4 Parental Epistemological Understanding and Parental Practices 
The transmission of parental beliefs to children may also depend on the linkages 
between parental epistemological beliefs and their behaviours towards the child. 
Parental epistemological beliefs may shape and influence  parents’  choice of parenting 
strategies to be more authoritative. Conversely, they can also cause parents to adopt 
more controlling and restrictive practices. 
Gerber (2004) found that when parents had more relativistic perspectives on the 
complexity of knowledge, parents employed more autonomy-supportive practices. The 
more parents recognized that knowledge is dynamic, interrelated, and subjected to 
questioning and confirmation, the more they reported exhibiting behaviours which were 
supportive of children in the learning process such as using autonomy-supportive 
instructional processes. Interestingly, child-perceived autonomy-supportive behaviour 
was not associated with children’s level of epistemological thinking in the expected 
way.  
Bond and Burns (2006) showed that parents who displayed higher levels of 
epistemological beliefs had less categorical and more multi-faceted conceptions of child 
development. From interview data, these mothers perceived child behaviour as 
dynamic, multi-dimensional and context-oriented instead of single and static. In 
recognizing the multiple influences on child behaviour, these parents were more flexible 
and  responsive  to  children’s  behaviour.  A  greater  understanding  of  the  complexity  of  
child development is associated with higher social and cognitive competence in children 
(Sameroff & Seifer, 1983). In addition, mothers who had more advanced 
epistemological beliefs used less authoritarian and coercive communication strategies. 
As knowledge was seen as dynamic, subjected to manipulation and modification by 
human experience and interaction, and continually refined through analysis and 
evaluation, these mothers used more cognitively challenging strategies such as engaging 
their children in more active reasoning as well as self-directed problem-solving. In 
contrast, mothers who were found to have lower-level epistemological beliefs displayed 
more categorical and less perspectivistic conceptions of child development, and were 
more ready to endorse authoritarian, controlling and power-oriented communication 
strategies.  
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Furthermore, Ricco and Rodriguez (2006) found that mothers with more 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs employed an authoritative parenting style and 
preferred learning-oriented academic goals for their child. Measuring epistemological 
beliefs of 163 college mothers from primarily working class backgrounds with five 
dimensions of learning ability, speed of learning, structure of knowledge, knowledge 
construction and source of knowledge (Wood & Kardash, 2002; Hofer, 2000), 
correlational analyses revealed that authoritative parenting was exclusively associated 
with beliefs of active self-constructed knowledge and with learning being more effort-
based and within the control of the learner. Mothers who showed more complex 
epistemological beliefs preferred learning goals as opposed to performance goals, where 
improvement and effort in the process of learning is emphasized instead of performance 
outcomes. In contrast, beliefs that innate ability is fixed from birth and that knowledge 
pieces are separate and discreet were associated with authoritarian and permissive 
parenting. These parents tended to apply little critical thinking to sources of knowledge 
and were often fully trusting of words of experts or texts. They were more focused on 
performance goals, emphasizing ability level shown through outcome variables such as 
grades and rankings. Using stepwise regression analyses, parental epistemological 
beliefs  were  found  to  remain  as  significant  predictors  of  parents’  academic  goals  
(learning versus performance) even when parenting style was controlled for.  
In conclusion, empirical studies reveal that parental epistemological beliefs have 
an influence on their beliefs of child development, parenting styles and their academic 
goals for their children. Empirical research documenting parental epistemological 
beliefs per se is still scarce, although these beliefs seem significant for more effective 
parenting. It is thus important to further investigate the extent that parental 
epistemological beliefs affect parenting and if they do hold significant influence, there 
is the added question of what supports need to be set in place to aid and shape these 
parental beliefs for more effective parenting.   
   
4.5 Association of Reasoning and Personal Epistemology 
Empirical work has shown that skilled reasoning can be enhanced or constrained 
by epistemological beliefs, especially in the domain of scientific reasoning (Kuhn, 
Iordanou, Pease & Wirkala, 2008; Yang & Tsai, 2009). The representations of 
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knowledge and knowing that children bring to education and learning have been 
suggested to help or hinder their development. Education is a constructive process and 
educators  are  increasingly  being  made  aware  that  “one  of  these  quiet  but  powerful  
frameworks  is  the  epistemological  beliefs  that  students...  hold”  (Alexander,  Murphy,  
Guan & Murphy, 1998, p.97). Skilled argumentation in the scientific domain is 
associated with more mature understandings of the epistemological foundations of 
science; the recognition that scientific knowledge is constructed by humans rather than 
simply discovered in the world (Kuhn et al., 2008). Skilled reasoners employ a  “critical  
epistemology”,  in  which  both  sides  of  an  issue  are  examined;;  in  contrast,  less  skilled  
reasoners  employ  a  “make-sense  epistemology”  in  which  arguments  are  deemed  
acceptable if they make intuitive sense, that is, if they appear to be true (Perkins et al., 
1983). When dealing with ill-structured problems that have no single and definitive 
solution, assumptions about knowledge and knowing are often implied (King & 
Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991; Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995, Mason & Scirica, 
2006).  
Kuhn (1991) investigated argumentative thinking in a range of populations from 
teens till age 60s regarding complex issues reflective of everyday phenomena such as 
the causes for prisoners to return to crimes or children failing in schools. Argument 
skills  of  participants  were  measured  through  participants’  formulations of causal 
explanations for each of these phenomena, their provision of supporting evidence, their 
ability to generate a counterargument, to provide a rebuttal and to offer solutions to the 
problem. In the process of investigating how and why reasoning occurs through the 
generation, evaluation and justification of positions, Kuhn found that epistemological 
beliefs of individuals were simultaneously elicited. Her empirical results evidenced 
associations between evaluative epistemology and argumentative skill development. 
From interview data, Kuhn identified epistemological indicators which included 
questions regarding proof (e.g., could someone prove that you were wrong?), expertise 
(e.g., do experts know for sure what causes ________?), multiple viewpoints (e.g., 
could more than one point of view be right?), origins of theories (e.g., can you 
remember what it was that led you to believe that this is the case?) and certainty (e.g., 
how sure are you of your view compared to an expert?). Hofer and Pintrich (1997) 
noted that although multiple indicators of epistemological beliefs were identified, the 
development of epistemological categories was based only on questions regarding 
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expertise, and no specific information was provided about the procedure used. From her 
data, Kuhn found that participants could be categorized into three levels of 
epistemological understanding. She termed these levels absolutist, relativist and 
evaluativistic levels (refer to Section 4.2 for explanations). In examining relations of 
argument skills and epistemological beliefs, Kuhn found a positive relation between 
evaluativists and the display of higher argument skills, that is, the higher use of 
counterarguments and alternative theory generation. Individuals who held more 
sophisticated epistemological understanding may be more inclined to recognize the need 
to contemplate and evaluate alternative theories and evidence and see the value of 
argument. Kuhn thus concluded  that  “it  is  primarily  the  emergence  of  the  evaluative  
epistemology  that  is  related  to  argumentative  skill  development”  (Kuhn,  1991,  p.195).   
A later study by Kuhn (2005) also found the association of epistemological 
understanding with intellectual values of inquiry and debate in middle schoolers at a 
best-practice school. These intellectual values may build the foundation for good and 
effective reasoning. Kuhn (2005) administered measures of epistemological 
understanding (cf. Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 2000) and intellectual values to 
students from sixth to eighth grades in two school types: the struggling school and the 
best-practice  school.  Intellectual  inquiry  was  assessed  by  the  question:  “People usually 
have pretty good ideas about things. They can try to go out and get more information, 
but  they’ll  probably  find  out  that  the  ideas  they  started  out  with  were  the  best  ones.  Do  
you strongly agree, sort of agree, or disagree? If you disagree, what do  you  think?”  The  
intellectual value of argument and debate was measured by three open-ended questions 
on everyday phenomena such as social issues like death penalty and likes, on political 
candidates and on world peace. An example of the first issue is “Many  social  issues,  
like the death penalty, gun control, or medical care, are pretty much matters of personal 
opinion,  and  there  is  no  basis  for  saying  that  one  person’s  opinion  is  any  better  than  
another’s.  So  there’s  not  much  point  in  people  having  discussions about these kinds of 
issues. Do you strongly agree, sort of agree, or disagree? If you disagree, what do you 
think?”  Respondents’’  intellectual  values  could  not  be  judged  by  simply  agreeing  with  
the presented statements but rather, due to the statements being inverted, respondents 
had to disagree and to offer reasons for their disagreement. These reasons revealed the 
value they placed on discussion, inquiry and debate in enhancing individual or 
collective understanding, problem-solving and conflict resolution. The results showed 
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that best-practice school students were more likely to see inquiry or debate as valuable, 
and were more likely to have reached the evaluativist level of epistemological 
understanding whereby even in a relative context of knowledge claims, there remain 
answers which can be more justified than others.  
Mason & Scirica (2006) confirmed this association and further found that 
epistemological understanding acted as a significant predictor of argument skills on 
controversial topics.  Participants had to argue in favour of one view, and formulate 
arguments, counterarguments, rebuttals and justifications. In a sample of 62 eighth-
graders, participants were asked to read two information-rich texts, one on the topic of 
global warming and the other on genetically modified food. Kuhn, Cheney & 
Weinstock’s  (2000)  measure  of  epistemological understanding was used to measure 
epistemological beliefs. Additionally, measures of topic knowledge and interest 
concerning both topics were also given. For each topic, participants were asked a set of 
questions in which they had to formulate arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals, 
while providing justifications. The quality of argumentation was scored according to the 
number and content adequateness of the reasons given to support conclusions and 
measured for three main reasons: (1) no simple assertions were accepted but rather 
arguments supported by justifications; (2) only acceptability and relevance of 
justifications for supporting the conclusion were considered; and (3) arguments with a 
greater number of acceptable reasons were considered as stronger. Through multiple 
regression analyses, it was found that for the topic of global warming, only 
epistemological understanding but not topic interest or knowledge significantly 
predicted argument, counterargument and rebuttal generation. Using a further multiple 
analysis of variance, it was found that epistemological understanding levels (i.e., 
absolutist, multiplist and evaluativist) significantly differentiated argumentative skills, 
with participants at an overall evaluativist level outperforming those at multiplist level. 
In this study, no participants were coded as absolutists. For the topic of genetically 
modified food, epistemological understanding was again found to significantly predict 
the three components of argumentation. Additionally, topic knowledge was a significant 
predictor of rebuttal generation. Results revealed that epistemological understanding 
level significantly predicted argument skills, with participants at overall evaluativist 
level attaining higher scores than those at multiplist levels for all three components. The 
same pattern of results thus emerged for both socio-scientific topics. Epistemological 
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understanding contributed to the quality  of  participant’s  argumentative  skills,  with  
participants at the highest level of epistemological understanding (i.e., evaluativist) 
evidencing the highest generation of all three components of argumentation skills. Only 
for the topic of genetically modified food was the generation of rebuttals also related to 
prior knowledge about the question. This supported  Means  &  Voss’  (1996)  finding  that 
prior knowledge is significantly related to the number and types of reasons generated by 
arguing. Therefore, a clear outcome of this study is that the skill of generating a valid 
and effective argument on a controversial topic is associated with higher-level beliefs of 
knowledge and knowing. It highlights the importance of fostering students’  
epistemological thinking: fostering epistemological thinking in an instructional context 
means teaching students to value thinking and judgment, and helping them acquire and 
refine the skills of producing and evaluating reasoned arguments.  
In everyday reasoning and judgment, epistemological understanding has been 
found to contribute to better reasoning skills and the overall production of arguments by 
prospective jurors (Weinstock & Cronin, 2003). Older high school learners who exhibit 
higher level epistemological beliefs are also more capable of identifying informal 
reasoning fallacies, although this ability to identify fallacies is also associated with 
grade level and cognitive ability (Weinstock, Neuman & Glassner, 2006).  
From these studies, epistemological understanding has been found to be 
significantly related to and predictive of reasoning skills. This relation may also be 
bidirectional, as the teaching and refinement of reasoning skills in instructional contexts 
though the presentation of controversial topics may also help students to not only 
acquire and practice skills of generating and evaluating reasoned arguments, but also 
foster epistemological thinking in the sense of teaching students to value thinking and 
judgment. Mason  &  Scirica  (2006)  noted  that  “there  could be a two-fold advantage in  
presenting students with controversial topics... understanding controversies requires 
epistemological thinking to deal with source, structure, and credibility of knowledge. At 
the same time having to deal with these aspects of the knowing process may stimulate 
and  sustain  the  refinement  of  epistemological  understanding”  (p.505).  Higher  
educational levels have been found to evoke higher level epistemological thinking. This 
can perhaps be partially attributable to the notion that more advanced levels of 
education tend to require higher skills of inquiry, reasoning and criticality, thus shaping 
more sophisticated epistemological beliefs in this process. However, it is important to 
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keep in mind that epistemological beliefs are mostly tacit, meaning that changes to these 
beliefs are often not directly observable and more significantly, empirically difficult to 
capture. However, changes in argumentative skills of reasoning are more concrete and 
measurable. Thus, changes in reasoning in relation to epistemological beliefs may be 
more empirically evidential than changes in beliefs in relation to reasoning. 
In conclusion, Sections 4.1 – 4.3 have sought to conceptualize and define 
personal epistemological beliefs, to highlight the ongoing problematic debates in this 
field, to provide a succinct comprehensive review of relevant models and theories – 
developmentally, multidimensional and integrated – to the current work and to discuss 
the development of epistemological thinking. Similar to the empirical literature of 
informal argumentative reasoning, the scarcity of family-based research was noted. 
Section 4.4 highlighted the few empirical studies which showed the significance of 
parental epistemological beliefs for better and more effective parenting practices. 
Finally, Section 4.5 discusses the recent studies indicating the significant relation of 
argumentative reasoning and personal epistemology. A positive relation is posited 
between these two constructs– argumentative reasoning skills are found to be enhanced 
by more sophisticated levels of epistemological understanding, with the latter variable 
found to be predictive of the former. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH MODEL 
 
5.1 Research Problems 
Three research problems were identified from the reviewed literature on the 
constructs of informal reasoning and personal epistemological beliefs:  
Firstly, in the field of reasoning, many empirical studies in psychology have 
been conducted in the scientific reasoning domain utilizing well-structured problems 
which typically involve one method of problem-solving and one fixed solution, often 
evoking formal reasoning processes. However, recent questions have been directed to 
the restrictiveness of such reasoning, and the importance of studying reasoning 
processes which can actually inform us about the reasoning individuals typically engage 
in during everyday lives. There is a need for children to have practicing opportunities 
for issues that may not be popular school material but holds high personal relevance in 
their everyday life. Informal reasoning is concerned with reasoning processes dealing 
with ill-structured problems that are more reflective of external reality. It is more 
dependent on background knowledge and experience instead of fixed premises 
constrained by the problem at hand. There may not be one right solution, and 
individuals often have to find them amidst conflicting, changing and sometimes missing 
information. More research is needed for a more informed understanding of how 
individuals reason informally through their construction and justification of arguments 
in the context of everyday situations. 
Secondly, skilled reasoning and more advanced epistemological beliefs have 
evidenced a consistent link in formal reasoning research, especially in the domain of 
scientific reasoning, but this association has to be further investigated within the 
informal reasoning domain. A more critical epistemology, in which knowledge is 
understood to be complex, evolving and interrelated, is related to more skilled 
reasoning. The intrinsic value of argument as a foundation for knowing only becomes 
obvious  when  “knowledge  is  seen  as  the  product  of  a  continuing  process  of  
examination, comparison, evaluation, and judgment of different, sometimes competing, 
explanations and perspectives”  (Kuhn,  1991,  p.202).    Therefore,  as  much  as  it  is  
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important to evaluate skills of argumentative reasoning, it is also necessary to examine 
the implicit cognitive schemas that occur behind these skills. A deeper understanding of 
the association between implicit epistemological beliefs and explicit reasoning skills 
gives a clearer insight into components of good, effective and sustained thinking which 
shape individuals to be inquiring, analytical and critical.   
Lastly, and possibly most importantly for the current dissertation, the scarcity of 
empirically-based research concerning the role of the family, as compared to research in 
schools, in the fostering of these cognitive skills and beliefs was highlighted in both sets 
of literature. Family is established  as  a  primary  social  setting  for  children’s  initial  
cognitive socialization (Sigel, 2002) and parents are for most children the first main 
agents of socialization. They are the first models of beliefs, strategies and practices that 
children observe, learn and imitate from. From the parenting literature, it is clear to see 
that  parents’  choice  of  practices  and  communication  strategies  in  family  upbringing  
have direct and long-lasting  impact  on  children’s  development  in  a  variety  of  domains.  
Authoritative parenting, an overall parenting climate which is characterized by core 
components of high parental autonomy-support, high responsiveness, moderate 
structure and low intrusive control, has produced a remarkably consistent picture of the 
successful socialization of children. Understanding the role that parents play in 
children’s  acquisition of reasoning skills and higher-level epistemological beliefs not 
only expands the parenting literature in child development but more importantly, 
informs us on the significance of family in the fostering of thinking skills. In doing so, it 
allows educators and psychologists alike to identify, encourage and ensure appropriate 
conditions for the flourishing  of  children’s reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs.  
 
5.2 Research Questions 
In response to the research problems highlighted above, four research questions 
for the current work were conceptualized and specific hypotheses informed by previous 
literature were formulated. The rationales behind the choice of the measures for 
personal epistemology and the informal reasoning are first explained before the 
presentation of the four research questions.  
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Choice of Personal Epistemology Model and Instrument 
The literature review on personal epistemology has highlighted the need for 
integrated models which can combine differing perspectives that may not be exclusive 
to each other in order a clearer and more coherent understanding of this field and 
consequently, the development of better measures.  Greene  et  al.’s  (2008)  Epistemic and 
Ontological Cognition Development Model (EOCM) incorporates both developmental 
and multidimensional approaches with underpinnings from philosophy and 
developmental psychology. It is seen as most suitable for the current work due to a) its 
integrated theoretical background and relevance to child development literature and b) 
its  quantitative  measure  based  on  the  theory  and  the  measure’s  applicability  to  younger  
samples.  
Firstly, the integrated nature of the EOCM allows the current work to take on 
both developmental and multidimensional perspectives of personal epistemology to 
guide research hypotheses and interpretations. The EOCM determines the 
developmental positions (i.e. realist, skepticist, dogmatic, rationalist) of participants’  
Epistemic and Ontological Cognition (EOC) as well as the strength of their beliefs in 
the three individual dimensions (i.e. Simple and Certain knowledge: SC, Personal 
Justification: PJ, and Justification by Authority: JA). This provides not only an 
understanding of the relations of overall developmental positions to child outcomes, but 
also allows for further investigation of separate effects of the three dimensions on the 
outcome constructs. Secondly, the EOCM’s  incorporation  of  domain-specificity (i.e. ill-
structured and well-structured) may provide more accurate interpretations of the results 
found in the current work. Although Greene et al. (2008) formulated ill-structured 
versus well-structured domains in the sense of academic subjects (e.g. history versus 
mathematics), informal reasoning concerns ill-defined everyday problems with shifting 
uncertain premises and thus the development of EOC may be possibly characterized and 
interpreted under the ill-structured domain. Greene et al. (2008) use age and educational 
level as covariates for the EOCM. These covariates, which are informed by the 
developmental literature, provide a glimpse of the progression of individual EOC across 
the lifespan and may be useful for a prior understanding of where the young participants 
of the current study may be functioning at. Referring to Table 4-3 which appeared in 
Chapter 4, the relevant components of the EOCM for this dissertation are highlighted. 
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Table 4-3. Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development Model  
(Taken from Greene et al., 2008) 
 Ill-Structured Domains Well-Structured Domains 
Age Position SC JA PJ Position SC JA PJ 
4-12 Realism High High High Realism High High High 
12-Early 
College 
Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Realism High High High 
Mid to Late 
College 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Graduate 
Education 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid Rationalism Low Mid Mid 
SC = Simple and Certain Knowledge Dimension; JA = Justification by Authority Dimension;  
PJ = Personal Justification Dimension 
An additional reason for the choice of the EOCM is its accompanying 
quantitative measure. To validate the EOCM, Greene et al. (2010) developed the 
Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ). The EOCQ is a succinct 
13-items questionnaire which is easy to administer to large groups of participants and 
suitable for children as young as fifth-graders. The items fall under either one of the 
three EOC dimensions of SC, JA or PJ.  On a six-point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly agrees to strongly disagrees, each dimension is labeled in terms of strong, 
moderate or weak belief. The profile of the individual’s  beliefs  along  the  three  
dimensions will then identify the position an individual is at in the EOCM. Compared to 
other measures for children such  as  Kuhn’s  Epistemological  Understanding  
Questionnaire  and  Schommer’s  Epistemological  Questionnaire  (c.f.  Duell  and  
Schommer-Aikins, 2001), the EOCQ allows for both developmental and 
multidimensional perspectives to be employed rather than just siding with one 
approach.  Kuhn’s  questionnaire  (Kuhn  et  al.,  2000)  is  interesting  with  regards  to  the  
various broad judgment domains used, namely personal taste, aesthetic taste, value 
judgment, facts about the social world, and facts about the physical world, but the 
EOCQ’s  ill-structured domain seems more relevant for investigating informal reasoning 
skills as  compared  to  Kuhn’s  five judgment domains. Thus, due to its ease of use and 
validated psychometric properties (Greene et al., 2010), coupled with a sound 
theoretical basis, the EOCQ will be used as the measure of personal epistemological 
beliefs in the current study.  
In the current work, parental EOC beliefs will be measured alongside with the 
children’s so as to gain deeper insights into the associations of the personal 
Research Model 
 
99 
  
epistemology of parents and the parenting practices they use (i.e. parenting dimensions). 
Parental beliefs as predictors of children’s beliefs will also be tested.  
 
Choice of Reasoning Task 
Argument generation and evaluation with complex ill-structured problems form 
the core of informal reasoning. Empirical work in argumentative reasoning has utilized 
both verbal and written methods to measure reasoning. Responses are often coded into 
different components of arguments such as the number of reasons, counterarguments 
and rebuttals. These various components are then either analyzed in direct relations with 
other variables (e.g., demographics, cognitive or affect variables) or these components 
are collapsed into a single score for analyses. However, most of these methods for 
measuring argumentative reasoning are often time- and labor-intensive. In the current 
work, the data collection is part of a larger longitudinal project conducted in the German 
state of North-Rhine  Westphalia:  “The role of family support from parents for discourse 
and  written  competence  in  lower  secondary  schools”  (Die  Rolle  Familialer  
Unterstützung beim Erwerb von Diskurs- und Schreibfähigkeiten in der Sekundarstufe 
I). Due to the large sample size (29 schools) and the time constraints given by schools 
for data collection, the measure for argumentative reasoning has to be both time 
effective and easy to administer.  Ill-defined problems characteristic of informal 
reasoning are often difficult to be succinctly explicated and often involve lengthier 
argumentation in the process of finding solutions. This adds to the difficulty of finding 
an appropriate measure.  
A solution was found by adapting the methodology of Means and Voss (1996) 
by using certain components of their reasoning task and developing these components 
into a pen and paper task. Means and Voss used written story scenarios to illustrate an 
everyday problem (e.g., bullying). The child participant is asked to place himself/herself 
in the story and respond as one of its characters. In the original task, the child has to 
respond what he/she will do in the situation and provide the necessary justifications for 
his/her arguments. These arguments are then coded into different components of 
argumentation for analyses. As Means and Voss (1996) provided a useful ranking 
schema for evaluating the quality of reasons (i.e., from low-level vague reasons to high-
level abstract ones), the first adapted task of Reason Evaluation attempts to measure the 
ability of the child to evaluate reasons of different quality by ranking six given solutions 
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with their respective reasons in response to a story dilemma that they are asked to read. 
Additionally, Means and Voss (1996) noted that better arguments tended to be more 
elaborated as they made higher use of certain structural components of arguments (e.g., 
metastatements, qualifiers and counterarguments). Thus the second task of Structure 
Differentiation  attempts  to  measure  the  child’s  ability  to  differentiate  between  four  
given arguments which differed in their use of these structural strategies, once again 
utilizing a ranking method to select and rate given arguments from the best to the worst. 
These two tasks will be further elaborated on in the Method section.  
The next section states the four main research questions of the dissertation. In 
the context of familial socialization of parenting practices, epistemological beliefs and 
communication patterns, the first set of questions concerns the  fostering  of  children’s  
reasoning skills, the second concerns the  fostering  of  children’s  EOC  beliefs,  the  third  
investigates the relation between the two outcome outcomes and the last set considers 
the influence of socioeconomic status on the familial and outcome variables. The 
research questions are as follows:  
 
Research Question 1. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and family 
communication patterns influence children’s informal reasoning competence? 
1.1 Do parenting practices, in terms of the four dimensions of autonomy-support, 
control,  responsiveness  and  structure,  influence  children’s  informal  reasoning  
skills? 
The parenting literature illuminates an established set of dimensions which have 
often been used as measures of parenting – autonomy-support, control, responsiveness 
and structure (refer to Section 2.3). Autonomy-support refers  to  parents’  encouragement  
of children’s  self-initiated expression and action and parental provision of choices. In 
contrast, control refers to parental acts which are harsh, intrusive and manipulative with 
the sole goal of obtaining child compliance while maintaining adult authority. 
Responsiveness refers  to  parents’  dedication  of  time,  attention  and  resources  to  their  
children for maintaining interpersonal connection. Structure refers to the setting of clear 
expectations, rules and limits, and the following through of appropriate consequences 
when these are not met. The combination of high autonomy-support, responsiveness, 
appropriate structure and low control is similar to the style of authoritative parenting. 
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Authoritative parenting has been firmly established through many empirical studies to 
have an association with a variety of positive academic and psychosocial child 
outcomes (refer to Chapter 2.1). 
Figure 5-1. Hypotheses of parenting practices as  predictors  of  children’s reasoning 
skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that higher informal reasoning skills of children 
will be fostered by these four parenting dimensions in an authoritative manner – high 
autonomy-support, responsiveness and structure, and low control. From Figure 5-1, 
autonomy-support, responsiveness and structure are hypothesized to have positive 
associations  with  children’s informal reasoning skills while control will have a negative 
association. Autonomy-supportive parents acknowledge and consider the  child’s  
perspectives, opinions and emotions,  providing  many  opportunities  for  the  child’s  
participation in and contribution to family discussions.  There is a higher chance that in 
family decision-making processes and disagreements, the child is exposed to different 
argumentative strategies, and thus is able to observe and learn higher skills of defending 
his/her own stance in discussions and to evaluate differing points of view. High 
responsiveness socializes the child to be more open to his/her parents’  suggestions  and  
decisions and for children to view their parents as role models. Responsive parents are 
more  aware  of  their  children’s  needs  and  their  efforts  to  meet  them  provide the child 
with a secure environment for frequent interactions within the family. The child is more 
willing to  listen  to  parents’  arguments, rationales and explanations as parents are 
equally willing to take note of the  child’s need and perspectives. Structure provides the 
consistent and necessary contingent  boundaries  for  the  child  to  know  his/her  parents’  
expectations and when provided in an autonomy-supportive way, allows the child to 
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have a sense of predictability and a sense of personal efficacy to meet challenges. Faced 
with new arguments, the child is able to use previously acquired reasoning skills to 
respond effectively and his/her reasoning competence is also shaped with the guidance 
of parental feedback.  
In contrast, high control interferes with the fostering of reasoning as children’s  
opportunities for open and active participation in family discussions are limited, thus 
providing less learning opportunities for observations and imitations of argumentative 
strategies used by more expert adults. Controlling strategies are employed to gain child 
compliance and family interactions require the child  to  respect  parents’  wishes and 
conform to their views and opinions, with no room for negotiation or argument. 
1.2 Do family communication patterns partially mediate the relation between parenting 
practices and children’s informal reasoning skills? 
The current work also seeks to investigate if family communication patterns are 
significant mediators between parenting practices and reasoning skills. A mediating 
model can help to identify and explicate the mechanism that underlies an observed 
relationship between the predictor variables, which are parenting dimensions in this 
case, and the outcome variables of reasoning skills. Parenting practices may have direct 
influence on reasoning skills but part of this influence may be explained by family 
communication patterns which have been shown to influence reasoning and problem-
solving (c.f. Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). Communication has been regarded as the 
most instrumental agent of family socialization (Schrodt et al., 2009) and is a defining 
criteria that distinguishes authoritative from authoritarian parenting: the distinction 
resting  on  parents’  willingness  to  listen  and  to  be  responsive  to  their  children’s  needs  
and views, instead of merely promulgating their own (Baumrind, 1996). Lewis (1981) 
argued that it is this reciprocal communication characteristic of authoritative parenting 
that makes the most significant contribution to the positive development of children. 
Koerner & Fitzpatrick (2002) found that family communication is characterized 
by clearly discernable patterns and forms. Families are found to develop and sustain a 
variety of different communication patterns. They theorized and empirically confirmed 
two central dimensions of family communication – conversation-orientation and 
conformity-orientation – which have been shown to play a significant role in family 
functioning and form the template for a typology that is capable of predicting and 
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explaining a number of behavioral and psychosocial outcomes for families. 
Conversation-orientation refers  to  “the  degree  to  which  families  create  a  climate  in  
which all family members are encouraged to participate in unrestrained interaction 
about a wide array of topics”  (Koerner  &  Fitzpatrick,  2002, p. 85). A high score in this 
dimension indicates frequent family interactions in which there is active participation of 
every member in discussions over a wide range of topics including hopes and emotions. 
Decision-making in the family is a joint family effort. Conversely, a low score indicates 
a low frequency of family interactions with engagement in a small number of topics and 
rare exchange of thoughts, hopes or emotions. Conformity-orientation, on the other 
hand,  refers  to  “the  degree  to  which  family  communication  stresses a climate of 
homogeneity of attitudes, values, and beliefs”  (Koerner  &  Fitzpatrick,  2002, p. 85). A 
high score in this dimension indicates a focus on the uniformity of beliefs and attitudes 
within the family, with emphasis placed on obedience and compliance according to the 
traditional family hierarchy, the avoidance of conflict and the interdependency of family 
members. Conversely, a low score indicates a focus on heterogeneous attitudes and 
beliefs within the family, with emphasis on the individuality, independence and equality 
of each family member in intergenerational discussions. 
Figure 5-2. Hypothesized associations of mediation model with family communication  
patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen from Figure 5-2, it is hypothesized that parental provisions of 
autonomy-support, structure and responsiveness are positively associated with 
conversation-orientation, which is subsequently hypothesized to have a positive 
association  with  children’s reasoning skills. A family with a high score in conversation-
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Note: Direct links from predictor variables of parenting practices to outcome variable reasoning skills 
exist, but are not shown here. 
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orientation sees communication as a vital means of educating and socializing children 
and seeks to provide a highly stimulated environment for the child to give and respond 
to views on various topics. As members are encouraged to participate in frequent 
discussions, there are higher chances of children being able to observe and imitate the 
argumentative reasoning strategies of more expert members, to reflect on the 
effectiveness of these strategies in arguments, and to practice them in a variety of topics 
as they filter out higher-level reasoning skills from lower-level ones. In contrast, control 
is hypothesized to be positively associated with conformity-orientation which has a 
subsequent  negative  association  with  children’s reasoning skills. A family with a high 
score in conformity-orientation emphasizes homogenous values and attitudes and thus 
gives little space for divergent opinions. Child compliance is gained through focusing 
on obedience and submission regardless of the soundness of reasons given for the 
family decisions made. Argument skills such as the discrimination of good and bad 
reasons and evaluation of supporting evidence and justifications are unlikely to be 
improved when family discussions do not display logical reasoning or use good 
arguments.  
It is important to note that every family has characteristics of both 
communication dimensions. The more significant question is the degree to which each 
family  exhibits  these  characteristics.  In  the  context  of  Baumrind’s  work, authoritative 
parents may require a moderate degree of conformity in order for joint decisions to be 
reached whereby all members of the family are agreeable to. Authoritarian parents are 
seen as requiring the most conformity from their children, authoritative parents require 
less conformity and permissive parents require the least conformity (Koerner & 
Fitzpatrick, 2002).  However in SDT, it can be argued that authoritative parenting may 
exhibit conformity within the family for a different reason. The homogeneity of beliefs, 
attitudes and values within the family can also be a result of children having voluntarily 
internalized  their  parents’  beliefs,  attitudes  and  values,  thus  resulting  in  committed  
compliance,  that  is,  a  genuine  adoption  of  parents’  agenda  which  remains  the  same  
across situations (cf. Kochanska et al., 2001). These two different perspectives can be 
clarified by observing the correlations of conformity-orientation and the parenting 
dimension of control.  In  the  context  of  Baumrind’s  work,  control  should  be  positively  
correlated with conformity-orientation but if in the context of SDT, it should not be as 
its interpretation indicates volitional conformity from children. 
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Research Question 2. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and parental 
EOC beliefs influence children’s  EOC beliefs? 
2.1 What are the associations between parental EOC beliefs and parenting practices? 
First, the association between parental EOC and the four parenting practices will 
be investigated in order to gain a deeper knowledge of the relations between parental 
beliefs and their choice of parenting practices. There have been associations of 
authoritative parenting with higher-level epistemological beliefs, that is, knowledge as 
being self-constructed, active and prone to changes (c.f. Ricco & Rodriguez, 2006). 
From  the  EOCM,  an  individual’s EOC can be analyzed in two ways: with separate 
dimensions or/and with developmental positions from the profile of these dimensions.  
The relations of the three EOC dimensions of SC, PJ and JA with parenting 
practices are first analyzed. The dimensions of SC and JA are hypothesized to have 
negative associations with autonomy-support, structure and responsiveness but a 
positive association with control. Parents who view knowledge as being concrete and 
unchanging and justify the credibility of knowledge solely through authority figures 
often do not recognize the complexity and subjectivity of knowledge. This fixed view of 
knowledge may cause parents to be more reliant on authoritarian practices through the 
exercise of intrusive controlling strategies. Parents who understand the complex 
evolving nature of knowledge and the value of justification are more open and willing 
to  listen  to  their  children’s  views  and  arguments,  and  are  thus  more  contingently  
responsive to the needs of their children without a need to rely on controlling strategies. 
They may therefore be more inclined to use autonomy-supportive strategies in their 
parenting. 
However, PJ is hypothesized to be positively associated with autonomy-support, 
structure and responsiveness but negatively associated with control. Having the 
understanding that individuals can have different views may help parents to recognize 
that apart from their views, there are also others that are equally valid. Although the 
views of children may not always be sensible or appropriate, but parents who see the 
subjectivity of knowledge may be more aware that different individuals can hold 
differing perspectives regarding the same matters. This can lead them to use more 
autonomy-supportive strategies to acknowledge and recognize differing perspectives 
that their children may have and to dedicate more time and resources to the needs of the 
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child, in contrast to the use of harsh controlling strategies to silence the individual 
voices of children to gain compliance.  
Lastly, the current work hypothesizes that the higher the EOC developmental 
position of parents, as indicated by the four positions in the EOCM (i.e. realism, 
dogmatism, scepticism, rationalism), the more authoritative their parenting practices 
will be. Higher-level developmental positions will have positive associations with more 
positive parenting practices of providing autonomy-support, responsiveness and 
structure. Conversely, higher EOC developmental positions will have a negative 
association with harsh parental control.  
 
2.2 Do parenting practices and  parents’  EOC belief  dimensions  influence  children’s  
EOC belief dimensions? 
Parents are, as mentioned before, the first role models for children to observe 
and imitate from. Even though parents may not verbalize or even consciously reflect on 
their own beliefs, these implicit beliefs of knowledge and knowing can be expressed in 
parenting practices, parent-child interactions and conflicts and may become internalized 
via implicit learning processes by the child. The individual belief dimensions of 
children’s  EOC  (e.g.,  JA,  PJ  and  SC)  will  be  first  considered,  followed  by  the  overall  
developmental positions. The hypotheses are graphically represented in Figure 4-3. 
With regards to parenting practices, parental provision of autonomy-support is 
positively associated to stronger beliefs of children in PJ while weaker beliefs in SC and 
JA. When parents support the autonomy of a child by considering and encouraging 
his/her thoughts and opinions, the child realizes that opinions can differ and that each 
opinion may have their own merits. The constructive nature of knowledge can be 
observed from the differences in opinions between parent and child on the same matter. 
Additionally, the provision of rationales and explanations as part of autonomy-support 
can enable the child to realise that some opinions can be more justified than others, and 
possibly help him/her to find his/her personal commitments within a relativistic context. 
Autonomy-support allows children to safely explore differences in perspectives and 
does not restrict their knowledge views to absolute shades of black or white. The latter 
viewpoint may be a possible consequence of harsh parental standards which are to be 
obeyed at all costs.  
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In contrast, parental use of intrusive control is hypothesized to be associated 
with stronger beliefs in SC and JA, but weaker beliefs in PJ. When parents use harsh 
control-oriented methods to obtain immediate compliance, the child is unable to observe 
that it is acceptable to have varying perspectives. Without the space to question or 
doubt, knowledge is often passed down as being fixed, certain and unchanging and 
justifiable only through authority figures. The use of controlling strategies often occurs 
in authoritarian families who place strong emphasis on the traditional hierarchical 
family structure. This hierarchical structure may provide the child with the false belief 
that authority figures are always accurate sources of knowledge.  
Structure, the consistent provision of clear expectations and guidelines, is 
hypothesized to be associated with weaker beliefs in SC and JA, but stronger beliefs in 
PJ. Structure provides children with a sense of predictability and self-efficacy. With a 
higher sense of agency and self-efficacy, children are more able to understand that they 
are causal agents and constructors of knowledge, and that the knowledge claims of 
adults are not always accurate even with their status of authority. Children are made 
aware of the notion that different individuals can have different beliefs and actions 
which can contribute to different outcomes. Structure also protects children from too 
much complexity and gives adequate support to help children realize their own limits 
and potentials. With growing competence and mastery, the genuine complexity of 
knowledge is gradually revealed as the child attempts to understand the nature of 
knowledge and knowing, debunking ideas that knowledge is easily graspable and static.   
 Responsiveness is hypothesized to be associated with weaker beliefs in SC and 
JA, but stronger beliefs in PJ.  Responsiveness,  the  dedication  of  parents’  time  and  
resources to the child, ensures that parents are active and  involved  in  their  child’s  life  
and increases the possibility that parental behaviors are attuned  to  the  child’s  needs.  
This  parental  warmth,  acceptance  and  involvement  increases  the  child’s  willingness  and  
security to explore his/her environment, to discover the constructive, contextual and 
evolving nature of knowledge and to have his/her voice heard. 
Lastly, parental EOC belief dimensions are also investigated in relations to child 
EOC belief dimensions. Gerber (2004) found some significant correlations between 
parent and child epistemological beliefs but these were not in line with theoretical 
assumptions. Therefore, this current study seeks to investigate if or under what 
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circumstances intergenerational transmission of beliefs can occur. Although 
interrelations between these dimensions exist and the transmission of beliefs in one 
dimension may possibly have influence on another (e.g. JA beliefs has positive relations 
with SC), only one direct link is postulated from parent to child in each dimension for 
the parsimony of the model. It is hypothesized that there will be positive transmissions 
of parental beliefs to  children’s  beliefs within each dimension. For example, stronger 
beliefs in SC for parents will be associated with stronger beliefs of SC for children, and 
likewise for the other two dimensions.  
Figure 5-3. Hypotheses of parenting practices and parental EOC belief dimensions as 
predictors of child EOC belief dimensions 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3  Is  there  a  positive  relation  between  parents’  developmental  positions  and  children’s  
developmental positions in the EOCM? 
This next part considers the developmental positions of children and their 
parents in the EOCM, as defined by the four positions of realists, skepticists, dogmatists 
and  rationalists.  The  individual’s  developmental  position  is  defined  by  the  profile of 
his/her beliefs across the three EOC belief dimensions of SC, JA and PJ (see Table 4-3). 
As postulated in the EOCM, the progression of developmental positions move from the 
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position of realism where one sees knowledge as objectively knowable and directly 
reflective of external observations to being more subjective, as reflected in positions of 
dogmatism or skepticism. As individuals recognize that knowledge can be relative and 
contextual, they either become more reliant on sources of authority for ‘right  and  
accurate’  knowledge  (i.e.  dogmatism)  or  they  justify  knowledge  claims  based  on  their  
own personal experiences and perceive that due to the relativity of opinions, no one 
claim can be better than another (i.e. skepticism). The highest position of rationalism is 
achieved when one learns to balance means of justification between figures of authority 
and personal experience, and apply one’s  own  thinking  and reasoning in this process. 
Thus, they come to realize that at times, justification of knowledge claims is warranted 
by authority figures while at other times, personal experience would suffice. When 
faced with differing perspectives, individuals can evaluate claims by different means 
and can choose to make their own personal commitments to the conclusions they arrive 
at. 
It  is  hypothesized  that  a  positive  association  will  be  found  between  parents’  
overall  developmental  positions  and  children’s  overall  developmental positions. 
Parents’  developmental  positions are hypothesized to be a significant predictor of 
children’s  developmental  positions  as  parents  who  have  more  advanced  beliefs  are  
highly likely to demonstrate these beliefs in their interactions with their children. 
Parents who recognize the fallibility and complexity of knowledge may foster these 
beliefs in their children through the use of higher-level cognitive socialization efforts 
and communication. They will not solely base their knowledge on what authorities give 
but will also find other means to verify them. Hence, their children may be quicker to 
realize that knowledge is self-constructed and subjective. Parents who hold the highest 
position of rationalist will understand that amidst differing opinions, one can still make 
a committed personal stance. Therefore, children are not left to see knowledge as overly 
complicated and out of their understanding, but are also guided to various means of 
evaluating and justifying knowledge, as modeled by their parents, and may come to 
learn these strategies for their own evaluation of knowledge claims. 
However, it is noteworthy that although parents may have more advanced 
developmental positions in the EOCM, they need to be careful to not overburden their 
children as the insecurity and uncertainty of knowledge and knowing may cause 
children to retreat back to lower levels of epistemological thinking instead of propelling 
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them forward to have more advanced epistemological perspectives. Children need 
appropriate parental support and guidance, and these levels of support are highly likely 
to change through different developmental stages and age periods in order for them to 
successfully internalize  their  parents’ beliefs into their own age-appropriate schemas.  
The degree of successful transmission of parent to child beliefs is thus moderated by the 
use of appropriate and effective parenting practices. 
 
Research Question 3. Are dimensions and developmental positions of children’s  EOC 
beliefs significant predictors of their reasoning skills? 
Some empirical literature have shown that individuals who hold more 
sophisticated epistemological understanding are more likely to recognize the need to 
contemplate and evaluate alternative theories and evidence and see the value of 
argument in debatable problem material of everyday nature (c.f. Kuhn, 1991; Mason & 
Scirica, 2006). Reasoning skills can be enhanced or constrained by epistemological 
beliefs, in which skilled reasoners are more likely to recognize that knowledge is self-
constructed, subjective and complex, and thus are more critical when examining 
arguments.  
 Informal reasoning in the current dissertation is measured by two tasks: a) 
Reasons evaluation – participants are asked to rank reasons of arguments from the best 
quality to the worst, and b) Structure differentiation – participants are asked to rank four 
arguments which differ in their use of argument components such as qualifiers and 
counterarguments. As shown in Figure 5-4, it is hypothesized that the EOC belief 
dimensions of SC and JA will be negatively associated with the reasoning tasks of 
reasons evaluation and structure differentiation. The more an individual believes that 
knowledge is simple and certain; made up of fixed, concrete and discrete pieces, the less 
he/she recognizes the value of critical thinking and reasoning skills are less used and 
practiced. Similarly, when an individual believes that experts are the ultimate sources of 
authority is strong, the individual may rarely apply reasoning on knowledge claims 
given by these sources. In both cases, individuals who have a more concrete view of 
knowledge  as  fixed  and  certain  and  determined  by  ‘experts’  will  not  realize  the  value  of  
reasoning in everyday matters and thus their exercise of reasoning skills will be less. 
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They may therefore be less able to pinpoint good quality reasons from those of poorer 
quality, and in general to differentiate between better and worse arguments.  
Figure 5-4. Hypotheses of child EOC beliefs as predictors of reasoning skills  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, it is hypothesized that PJ may have a positive relation to 
reasoning skills. The recognition that knowledge is subjective and that individuals have 
varying  views  may  increase  the  individual’s  willingness  to  listen  to  other  perspectives  
instead of having an absolutist mindset of knowledge. The recognition and 
acknowledgement of subjectivity in knowledge construction is vital and necessary for 
further epistemic growth. The transition from a realist to a relativistic perspective of 
knowledge is needed for individuals to progress to higher-level beliefs, whereby after 
recognizing the relativity of knowledge, individuals can come to realize that even in the 
midst of relative opinions, some opinions may be more valid than others through means 
of reason, evaluation and justification. Evidence has to be evaluated in order to arrive at 
a justified conclusion. However, caution has to be noted regarding this dimension in that 
too high a belief in PJ can inhibit the developmental trajectory of epistemological 
thinking and be detrimental to reasoning. When an individual never progresses beyond 
the notion that knowledge is subjective and relative and thus all opinions are equally 
valid, he/she never reaches the realization that there are different means to evaluate and 
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weigh knowledge claims and to draw a valid justified conclusion amongst differing 
viewpoints.  
Additionally, as seen from Figure 5-4, it is hypothesized that higher-level 
developmental positions of children in the EOCM, as characterized by weaker beliefs in 
SC and a balance between evaluating and justifying knowledge claims through authority 
sources and personal experience, are positively associated with more competent 
evaluative informal reasoning skills, that is, higher competence in evaluating quality 
reasons and of overall arguments. 
 
Effects of Socioeconomic Status 
Lastly, socioeconomic status (SES) has been shown to exert strong influence on 
parenting and child development (c.f. Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Jeynes, 2002; 
Rothman, 2003). Typically measured in terms of education, income and occupational 
status, it reflects the kinds of capital a family has access to, which is directly connected 
to their well-being. Three kinds of capital exist: a) financial capital which represents 
tangible material resources, b) human capital which represents non-tangible resources 
such as education, and c) social capital which represents resources achieved through 
social connections.  
Each indicator of SES (i.e., education, income and occupational status) has been 
associated with better parenting (DeGarmo et al., 1999; Parcel & Menaghan, 1990). 
Families of higher SES have been described as being warmer, more accepting and 
equitable, while parents of lower SES tend to be more centered on authoritarian 
parenting practices which are more focused on inculcating obedience and conformity 
(Hoff-Ginsberg & Tardif, 1995). Additionally, higher SES families have better quality 
of mother-child interactions: parents engage children in richer conversations with more 
teaching efforts, read to them more, and elicit more child speech in communication 
(Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000; Hoff-Ginsberg & Tardif, 1995). Bradley and Corwyn 
(2001) found that these effects of SES applied to children from infancy through 
adolescence and generally hold for children from diverse ethnic backgrounds. SES has 
also been associated with higher cognitive functioning and in the domain of 
epistemological beliefs, children from low SES families were found to display more 
naïve beliefs as compared to those from average SES families (Conley et al., 2004). 
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Differences in parenting practices are strongly implicated in the relation between SES 
and  children’s  intellectual  and  academic  performance  (Hoff-Ginsberg & Tardif, 1995), 
with SES acting as a proxy variable for factors of intelligence and conceptual 
understanding. However, one must be careful regarding the categorization of SES 
family  interaction  patterns  as  “good”  or  “bad”  as  these  relations  are  complex  and  the  
adaptiveness of parent-child interactions can vary across SES contexts (Chen and 
Berdan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that children of high SES families are 
provided with higher chances of healthy development as their parents have more 
financial, human and social capital to provide more stimulating and positive 
environments for their children to develop in. Hence in the current dissertation, SES 
will be taken into account as a control factor within the empirical models consisting of 
familial variables subjected to statistical analyses. 
Additionally, the topic of SES often evokes issues of social justice and equality - 
while high SES parents are able to provide for their children with a variety of resources, 
social networks, services and parental actions, a concern remains for low SES children 
who have limited access to such environments, thus putting them at risk for more 
developmental problems. SES inequalities stem from varying levels of capabilities and 
opportunities available to children from different social backgrounds but can more 
effective parenting help to narrow the effects of differing SES? A meta-analysis of 19 
studies on the effectiveness of early intervention programs found that the enhancement 
of parental skills had a positive relation to cognitive outcomes (Blok et al., 2005, in 
Kagitcibasi, 2009). In a longitudinal study conducted in Europe with low SES mothers, 
Kagitcibasi  and  colleagues  (2009)  showed  that  mother  training  predicted  children’s  
school attainment and social adjustment 19 years later. Mother training consisted of 
building better communication skills and parenting skills. Mothers were taught to 
encourage and promote their child's cognitive functioning through structured cognitive 
activities with their child and participation in group discussions with other mothers 
which covered a range of child developmental topics designed to sensitize the mothers 
to the needs of their children as well as to their own needs. In addition to having higher 
school attainment and social adjustment, children of mothers who received parental 
training also exhibited higher occupational status, and were more likely to own a credit 
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card which was perceived as a sign of greater integration into modern urban life. 
 
Research Question 4. Can familial variables be significant mediators of the direct 
relationship of SES on children’s  reasoning  skills  and  EOC  beliefs? 
Thus, the current work is also interested to see if familial variables such as 
parenting practices and family communication patterns can also act as a compensatory 
mechanism for the direct effects of SES on children’s reasoning and EOC beliefs. Can 
the provisions of more flexible and competent parenting support help to reduce the 
direct effect of low SES? This is particularly important for low SES groups as familial 
variables may compensate to help children achieve higher functioning.  Mediating 
models will test if familial variables can be significant mediators in reducing the direct 
effects of SES on the two child outcomes. Although parental interventions on their own 
are limited in scope and inadequate to compensate for all missing opportunities derived 
from SES, it is nevertheless important to investigate their significance in narrowing the 
gap between different classes. Even if only partial mediation occurs, successful 
mediation is empirical evidence that familial practices are significant and that parenting 
interventions should be supported in order to enable parents to become more successful 
facilitators of  their  child’s  development.   
 
5.3 Research Aims 
In conclusion, there are two research aims for this dissertation:  
1. To formulate theoretical models informed by the current literature  
a. for the fostering of higher informal reasoning skills and higher-level 
EOC beliefs of children in the familial context of parenting practices, 
parental epistemological beliefs and family communication patterns,  
b. to investigate if children’s  EOC beliefs can act as significant predictors 
of their informal reasoning skills, and 
c. to test if familial variables can be significant mediators of the direct 
effects of SES on child outcomes.  
2. To test these models empirically using path analyses and quantitative data 
analyses.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Participants 
1994  participants’  data  were  analyzed:  997  fifth-graders (mean age - 10.86; 
45.1% girls; 54.8% boys) from 29 secondary schools in the state of North-Rhine 
Westphalia, Germany, and their respective parents (65.7% mothers, 8.7% fathers, 
22.7%  who  did  it  together  and  0.4%  child’s  other  caretaker).  Fifth-grade was chosen as 
it is most commonly a transitional stage from elementary to secondary school. This 
transition from childhood into adolescence is marked by a trading of dependency on 
parents for dependency on peers (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). Thus as the role of 
parents is the focus of the current study, fifth-graders were deemed to be most suitable 
for the sample population as compared to older adolescents.  
Germany has a three level secondary school system, consisting of a higher track 
(Gymnasium), a middle track (Realschule) and a lower track (Hauptschule). SES and 
school success has consistently shown a strong association with school track, with a 
disproportionately large number of young people from lower social backgrounds 
enrolled in the lower track school as compared to other tracks (Rosebrock, 2006). Thus 
in order to get a socially stratified sample, data was collected from the higher and lower 
school tracks (69.9% from Gymnasium, 30.1% from Hauptschule).   
The parent-child data was matched using unique codes protecting anonymity 
which consisted of the name initials of both child and parent and the birth date of the 
child. Only matched data in the project FUnDuS (elaborated in Section 6.3 below), with 
information from both parents and children, was used in the current dissertation.   
 
6.2 Measures 
Parenting Dimensions 
A multidimensional conceptualization of parenting was taken from Wild (1999). 
This was partially  adapted  from  the  Children’s  Perceptions of Parents Scale (Gronick, 
Ryan & Deci, 1991; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989) and based on four theoretically derived 
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dimensions of parental involvement from SDT, namely autonomy-support, 
responsiveness, control and structure. Responses were made on a four-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). In total, there were 34 
items: a) Autonomy-support consisted of 11 items, b) Responsiveness 6 items, c) 
Control 6 items, and d) Structure 11 items (refer to Appendix Scale 1).  
a) Autonomy-Support 
Autonomy-support refers to parental acknowledgement of the child’s  view,  the  
encouragement of child-initiated activities and the provision of choice. The 
items are concerned with how decisions are made and discussed at home (e.g. 
“When  we  discuss  at  home  about what to do on weekends or vacations, my 
parents  use  my  suggestion”)  and  the  degree  of  autonomy  given  by  parents  for 
the child to make decisions in various domains (e.g.  “My  parents  encourage  me  
to  think  about  what  I  want  to  see  on  television”).  The internal consistency of this 
scale  was  measured  at  α=0.78.                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
b) Responsiveness 
Responsiveness refers to the parental provision of time, warmth and emotional 
support for the needs of their child. Some items are “My parents make time for 
me when I want to  talk  to  them  about  something”  and  “My parents often know 
what I think and how I feel”.  The internal consistency of this scale was 
measured  at  α=0.81. 
 
c) Control  
Control refers to the strictness of parents in obtaining child compliance. The 
items are concerned with the extent to which parents demand conformity from 
their  children  (e.g.  “My  parents  want  me  to  obey  them  immediately”)  and  the  
consequences  when  the  child  refuses  (e.g.  “When  I  do  not  immediately  do  what  
my parents say, huge  arguments  occur”). The internal consistency of this scale 
was  measured  at  α=0.75. 
 
d) Structure  
Structure  refers  to  the  parent’s  organization  of  child  environment  so  as  to  
provide clear and consistent expectations, guidelines and rules. The items are 
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concerned  with  children’s perception of the clear expectations and guidelines 
within their  family  (e.g.  “With us, everyone knows who, when and what things 
to do”)  and  their  parents’  consistency  in  applying these rules (e.g. “When  my  
parents do not allow something, they cannot be won over in any way”). The 
internal  consistency  of  this  scale  was  measured  at  α=0.67. 
Socioeconomic status (SES) 
SES was measured using the Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in 
Industrial Nations (CASMIN) classification grid, which was designed for international 
comparisons (Brauns and Steinmann, 1999). It is based upon two primary classification 
criteria: 1) the differentiation of a hierarchy of educational levels, both in terms of the 
length of educational experience as well as the required intellectual abilities and 
corresponding  curricular  contents,  and  2)  the  differentiation  between  ‘general’  and  
‘vocationally-oriented’  education.  Parents  were  asked  to  provide  their  educational  levels  
and vocational qualifications (Refer to Appendix 4a). Their education levels were then 
coded into four levels: a) Incomplete elementary education, b) Elementary school 
education, c) Secondary school education, and d) Secondary school leaving certificate 
and Tertiary education. Similarly, their vocational qualifications were also first coded 
into four levels: a) No vocational qualification, b) Vocational qualification, c) Technical 
College, and d) University. A CASMIN score for each parent was then calculated based 
on combinations of their educational level and vocational qualification. This resulted in 
nine levels of combinations (see Table 6-1).  
Table 6-1. CASMIN classification 
Levels Educational and Vocational description Composition of sample 
(N=997) 
1a Inadequately completed general education 2.2% 
1b General elementary school education 3.1% 
1c General elementary school education with vocational training 10.0% 
2a Secondary school education without vocational training 25.9% 
2b Secondary school education with vocational training 1.5% 
2c_gen Secondary school leaving certificate without vocational training 0.9% 
2c_voc     Secondary school leaving certificate with vocational training 19.0% 
3a Lower tertiary education (Technical colleges) 12.0% 
3b Higher tertiary education (University) 23.1% 
For individuals familiar with the German school system and its terminologies, please 
refer to Appendix 4b for the CASMIN classification in the German language. Lastly, 
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the higher CASMIN score of either the mother or father of each participant was taken as 
the representative SES of the family. 
Generally in the sample of 997 parent participants: 2.2% did not complete 
elementary education; 13.1% completed general elementary school education; 27.4% 
completed secondary school education; 19.9% achieved the secondary school leaving 
certificate (i.e. Arbitur); and 35.1% finished tertiary education.  
Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ) 
The EOCQ is the measure of personal epistemological beliefs. It was formulated 
by Greene et al. (2010) in a domain-specific context of ill-structured versus well-
structured academic subjects, namely in the respective subjects of history and 
mathematics. In each domain, there are 13 items designed to measure three belief 
dimensions: Simple and certain knowledge, Justification by authority and Personal 
justification (Refer to Appendix Scale 2a). 
As the current study did not seek to measure EOC in an academic domain but 
more generally as an overarching set of beliefs, the EOCQ was adapted into a domain-
general version (R-EOCQ; refer to Appendix Scale 2b). Additionally, the items had to 
undergo slight changes for the adult sample of parents as certain items were formulated 
with regards to an educational setting and individuals who were no longer participating 
in educational courses may find these items difficult to relate to (Refer to Appendix 
Scale 2c). For  example,  whereas  an  item  in  the  child’s  R-EOCQ was worded as “If  a  
teacher says something is a fact, I believe it”,  the  parent’s  version  had  it  as  “If  I  am  
taught something and my teacher says something is a fact, I believe it”. The original 
three belief dimensions remained unchanged in the R-EOCQ, which consisted similarly 
of 13 items.  
a) Simple and certain knowledge (SC) 
This dimension refers to the degree to which an individual sees knowledge as 
concrete, fixed, separate pieces of information which are static. There are 5 
items  measuring  this  dimension  (e.g.  “What  is  a  fact  today  will  be  a  fact  
tomorrow.”) 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
119 
  
b) Justification by Authority (JA) 
This dimension refers to the degree to which an individual feels that particular 
sources are sufficient to warrant a knowledge claim. Individuals who have 
strong  belief  in  justification  by  authority  would  claim  to  “know”  something  if  an  
expert, teacher, or other reputable source said it. There are 4 items measuring 
this dimension (e.g.  “If  an  expert  says  something  is  a  fact,  I  believe  it.”). 
 
c) Personal Justification (PJ) 
This dimension refers to the degree to which an individual feels that personal 
experiences or logic are sufficient to warrant a knowledge claim. Individuals 
who have strong belief in personal justification view knowledge claims as 
subjective to individual experiences, thus all claims are equally valid. There are 
4  items  measuring  this  dimension  (e.g.  “Everyone’s  knowledge  can  be  different  
because there is no one absolutely  right  answer.”).   
As the original and revised items were formulated in English language but the 
sample for the current dissertation consisted of children who had German as first 
language, the items were translated into German language first through the joint effort 
of a native English speaker and a native German speaker. Subsequently, the version was 
then checked by an additional native German speaker. Similar to the original EOCQ, 
responses were made on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree). 
After data collection with the R-EOCQ, separate confirmatory factor analyses 
(CFA) were  carried  out  on  both  children  and  parents’ data (N=997 in each sample) to 
validate the three-factor structure hypothesized by the EOCQ. The three factors were 
SC, JA and PJ. Results showed that both CFAs did not pass the chi-square test (p<.05) 
and had large chi-square values indicating that the proposed theoretical dimensions 
were not confirmed by the empirical data. A possible reason for this failure could be 
attributed to the wording changes made to the EOCQ to adapt it from a domain-specific 
into a domain-general instrument. Without domain-specificity, the clarity of some items 
was diminished and as these items could be interpreted in different ways, the result was 
that items could load significantly on two factors, instead of one, due to inter-
correlations  between  the  three  factors.  An  example  was  Item  1  “The  truth  means  
different  things  to  different  people”.  It  was  conceptualized  under  the factor of SC, in 
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which  the  notion  of  ‘truth’  is  complex  and  uncertain,  but  it  could  also  reflect  the  factor  
of PJ,  that  is,  ‘truth’  is  subjective  and  self-constructed. 
Additionally, despite the translation checks, a mistake was found with the 
translation  of  item  2,  in  which  the  word  “memorize”  in  English  had  been  changed  to  the  
word  “know”  in  the  German  version  (“wissen”).  This  error  occurred in the good 
intentions of one translator to make the questionnaire more understandable for the 
German children (as the R-EOCQ items were complex and made more difficult to 
understand without a subject context) but in doing so, negated the validity of this item 
as it could no longer act as an accurate measure of belief in the simplicity and certainty 
of knowledge. As a result, this item was eliminated from all analyses. 
As the CFA failed to support the hypothesized three-factor structure of the 
EOCQ, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was carried out to find a solution for 
structuring the  individual’s EOC beliefs. 33% (N=332) of both the parent and child 
samples were taken out to conduct the EFA.   
Parent Version:  
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 12 items with 
orthogonal rotation (varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling 
adequacy  for  the  analysis,  KMO=.79  (‘good’  according  to  Field,  2009).  Bartlett’s  test  of  
sphericity X² (66, N=332) = 836.25, p<.001, indicated that correlations between items 
were sufficiently large for PCA. The analysis showed that three components had 
eigenvalues  over  Kaiser’s  criterion  of  1  and  in  combination  explained  52.97%  of  the  
variance. Table 6-2 contains the factor loadings of the items. The clustering of items 
resembled that of the original three factors of the EOCQ, such that factor 1 represents 
Justification by authority (JA), factor 2 Personal Justification (PJ), and factor 3 Simple 
and Certain knowledge (SC). JA replicated the exact items as intended by the R-EOCQ 
for this dimension (Items 6-9). However, the items formulated for SC and PJ did not 
load entirely on their own factors but some of SC loaded on PJ and vice versa. 
As can be seen from Table 6-2, item 13 revealed low loadings on all three 
factors. This item made more sense when put in a domain-specific  context  such  as  “In  
history/math, knowledge consists of facts and not of opinions”  but  when  the  context  
was removed, participants might have found it difficult to define “knowledge”  and  to  
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differentiate between what constituted “facts”  and  “opinions”. In pure sciences like 
physics and chemistry, a fact is often an objective and verifiable observation having 
been subjected to rigorous empirical investigations. However, in social sciences or 
humanities like history, the case for a fact can be much more complex as the 
composition of history is inevitably made up of a compilation of subjective accounts 
and different bias of fact finding. Historical facts can change over time and reflect only 
the present consensus. Due to its low loading on all three factors, item 13 was 
eliminated. 
Table 6-2. EFA of Parental EOC (N=332) 
 
Item 
Factors 
JA PJ SC 
6. If an expert says something is a fact, I have no problem in 
believing it. 
.69 .25 .03 
7. Things written in textbooks are true. .81 .19 -.03 
8. If I am taught something, I do not doubt what I learn. .81 .14 .05 
9. If I am taught something and my teacher says something is a 
fact, I believe it. 
.77 .26 .12 
1. The truth means different things to different people. -.05 .63 -.19 
5. Fields of knowledge are so complex that man will never 
really understand it. 
.10 .63 .00 
10.  Everybody’s  knowledge  can  be  different  because  there  is  no  
one absolutely right answer. 
-.09 .71 .06 
12. What is a  fact  depends  upon  a  person’s  opinion. -.03 .50 -.45 
3. What is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. .20 -.23 .66 
4.  An  expert’s  factual  knowledge  does  not  change .32 .01 .68 
11. If I believe something is right, no one can prove the 
contrary. 
.08 .11 .80 
13. Knowledge consists of facts and not opinions. .40 -.12 -.05 
Eigenvalues 2.71 1.68 1.97 
% of variance 22.58 13.96 16.44 
Note: JA – Justification by Authority, PJ – Personal Justification, SC – Simple and Certain Knowledge 
The EFA thus displayed a satisfactory three-factor structure, with items 6-9 
loading on JA, items 1, 5, 10 and 12 loading on PJ and items 3, 4 and 11 loading on SC. 
All factor loadings were .5 and higher.  
A CFA was then carried out with the separate sample (N=665) excluded from 
the EFA to check if this three-factor structure was replicated. Mplus 6.0 was used with 
Maximum Likelihood estimation. The three-factor structure appeared to be a good fit to 
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the  data  as  seen  from  the  fit  indices:  χ2 =75.12, df=38, p<.01, CFI=.98, RMSEA=.04, 
SRMR=.04 (Refer to Kline, 2011). Table 6-3 provides the standardized parameter 
estimates of all items. All estimates were significant.  
Table 6-3. CFA of Parent EOC (N=665) 
Factor α Items Β SE 
Justification by 
Authority 
.85 6 .62 .03 
 7 .79 .02 
 8 .78 .03 
 9 .81 .02 
Personal 
Justification 
.42 1 .37 .06 
5 .22 .05 
10 .82 .11 
12 .28 .06 
Simple and Certain 
Knowledge 
.65 3 .65 .03 
4 .72 .03 
11 .50 .04 
Note: All items loaded significantly on the factors (p<.01). 
The  internal  consistencies  (α)  of  each  scale  were  also  calculated.  The JA scale 
had an alpha coefficient of .85 while the SC scale had an alpha of .65. However, the PJ 
scale evidenced a low alpha coefficient of .42. 
Child Version:  
Similar to the parent’s  data,  a  PCA  with  orthogonal  rotation  was  first executed. 
However results showed a four-factor structure. It was difficult though to interpret these 
four factors as two of these factors only consisted of two items each, thus limiting the 
interpretations that could be made. It was observed that the R-EOCQ might have been 
difficult for the children sample aged 10-11 years of age. During testing sessions, 
children had questions regarding words used in the R-EOCQ and took a slightly longer 
time to respond in comparison to other questionnaires used. Coupled with difficulty in 
interpreting a four-factor structure from the PCA, a three-factor structure, similar to the 
structure of the parent version, was tested. The results of a three factor structure seemed 
more reliable and interpretable.  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the 
analysis,  KMO=.696  (‘mediocre’  according  to  Field,  2009).  Bartlett’s  test  of  sphericity  
χ2(66, N=332) = 441.64, p<.001, indicated that correlations between items were 
sufficiently large for PCA. The analysis showed that the three-factor structure explained 
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46.10% of the variance. Table 6-4 contains the factor loadings after rotation. The same 
dimensions as the parent version can be inferred from the factor loadings – Justification 
by authority (JA), Personal justification (PJ) and Simple and certain knowledge (SC).  
Table 6-4. EFA of Child EOC (N=332) 
 
Item 
Factors 
JA PJ SC 
6. If an expert says something is a fact, I have no problem in 
believing it. 
.53 -.13 .34 
7. Things written in my school books are true. .73 -.14 .15 
8. I do not doubt what I learn in class. .73 .29 -.10 
9. If my teacher says something is a fact, I believe it. .75 .16 .02 
3. What is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. .48 .18 -.03 
1. The truth means different things to different people. .20 .56 .00 
10.  Everybody’s  knowledge  can  be  different  because  there  is  no  
one absolutely right answer. 
-.01 .51 .35 
12. What is  a  fact  depends  upon  a  person’s  opinion. .08 .79 .08 
4.  An  expert’s  factual  knowledge  does  not  change .24 -.13 .70 
5. Fields of knowledge are so complex that man will never 
really understand it. 
.00 .16 .63 
11. If I believe something is right, no one can prove the 
contrary. 
-.02 .17 .65 
13. Knowledge consists of facts and not opinions. -.01 .35 .37 
Eigenvalues 2.24 1.57 1.72 
% of variance 18.63 13.12 14.35 
Note: JA – Justification by Authority, PJ – Personal Justification, SC – Simple and Certain Knowledge 
Item 13, similar to the parent version, showed poor loadings on all 3 factors and 
thus was also eliminated from the child version (reason mentioned in the parent 
section). Items 6-9 clearly defined the first factor as  ‘Justification  by  Authority’.  
Surprisingly, item 3 also loaded on this factor, though the loading is not considered high 
(β=.48). Children seemed to perceive item 3 as an indicator of authority, perhaps 
because adults who are more control-oriented tend to endorse the statement that what is 
today will be the same tomorrow, therefore leaving no space for questioning or 
negotiation. However, to  keep  the  factor  of  JA  similar  to  the  parent’s  version  for  
comparison of this dimension, coupled with the observation that the loading of item 3on 
this factor was not high, it was removed from the JA factor in subsequent analyses.  
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The EFA thus displayed a satisfactory three-factor structure, with items 6-9 
loading on JA, items 1, 10 and 12 loading on PJ and items 4, 5 and 11 loading on SC. 
All factor loadings were .5 and higher.  
Similar to the parent questionnaire, a CFA was then carried out on the separate 
sample (N=665) to check if this three-factor structure was replicated. Mplus 6.0 was 
used with Maximum Likelihood estimation. The three-factor structure appeared to be a 
good fit to the data as  seen  from  the  fit  indices:  χ2=52.31, df=30, p<.05, CFI=.97, 
RMSEA=.03, SRMR=.03 (Refer to Kline, 2011). Table 6-5 provides the standardized 
parameter estimates of all items. All estimates were significant.  
Table 6-5. CFA of Child EOC (N=665) 
Factor α Items Β SE 
Justification by 
Authority 
.66 6 .47 .04 
 7 .51 .05 
 8 .63 .04 
 9 .62 .04 
Personal 
Justification 
.39 1 .37 .06 
10 .42 .06 
12 .46 .06 
Simple and Certain 
Knowledge 
.60 4 .66 .05 
5 .51 .05 
11 .57 .05 
Note: All items loaded significantly on the factors (p<.01). 
Differences in Parent and Child EOC factors: 
 Overall, the item loadings for the dimension of JA for parents and children 
included the same items (Item 6-9). This confirmed the validity of this scale as the four 
items were intentionally constructed to measure JA beliefs in the original R-EOCQ. The 
internal consistencies for this scale for both samples were also satisfactory. 
However, the PJ dimensions showed low internal consistencies for both parent 
(α=.42)  and  child  (α=.39)  questionnaires.  Thus,  this  dimension  was  deemed  as  
The  internal  consistencies  (α)  of  each  scale  revealed  the JA scale had an alpha 
coefficient of .66 while the SC scale had an alpha of .60. Once again, similar to the 
same dimension in Parental EOC beliefs, the PJ scale also evidenced a low alpha 
coefficient of .39. 
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unreliable and was excluded from later analyses to avoid misinterpretations of results 
generated by this scale. 
For the SC dimension, both scales of parents and children consisted of three 
items but there was a difference in one item between the parent and children scales 
(Refer to Table 6-6). 
Table 6-6. Simple and Certain Knowledge dimension (Parent and Child version) 
Parent Scale Child Scale 
3. What is a fact today will be a fact 
tomorrow. 
5. Fields of knowledge are so complex that 
man will never really understand it. 
4.  An  expert’s  factual  knowledge  does  
not change 
4.  An  expert’s  factual  knowledge  does  not  
change 
11. If I believe something is right, no one 
can prove the contrary. 
11. If I believe something is right, no one 
can prove the contrary. 
 It is interesting to note that in the original conceptualization in EOCQ, both 
items 3 and 5 were indicators of the factor of SC, that is, Greene et al. (2010) 
formulated these items to be representative of beliefs in knowledge being concrete, 
separate pieces of information which are unchanging in nature. Thus, although the EFA 
results of  parents’  R-EOCQ revealed that the SC dimension consisted of item 3 while 
children’s  SC  dimension  consisted  of  item  5, both of these items were indicative of 
knowledge being simple and certain. For  the  parent,  “What  is  a  fact  today  will  be  a  fact  
tomorrow”  was  interpreted  as  the  fixed unchanging nature of knowledge. Knowledge 
that had been established today should remain the same in future, thus supporting the 
certainty of knowledge. While for children, the item “Fields  of  knowledge  are  so  
complex  that  man  will  never  really  understand  it”  was interpreted to be an inverse 
measure  of  knowledge  being  within  man’s  grasp,  that  it  could  be  understood,  attributing  
to its nature of being relatively simple. Therefore, the differences in the composition of 
the  SC  factor  could  be  due  to  differences  in  children’s  and  parent’s  perceptions  which  
led to different item loadings for SC. However, this could be interpreted as a difference 
in perception and not that SC was defined differently in each sample. This was 
confirmed by the significant positive correlation of the SC dimension of parents and 
children (r = .26, p < .05). The internal consistencies of the SC dimension for both 
parent and child questionnaires were also deemed satisfactory for later analyses.  
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Family Communication Patterns Questionnaire 
The Family Communication Patterns Questionnaire took its core concepts from the 
Revised Family Communication Patterns measure (RFCP; Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 
2002). There were two main dimensions:  
a) Conversation-orientation  
This is the degree to which families create a climate in which all family 
members are encouraged to participate in unrestrained interactions over a wide 
array of topics. A high score in this dimension indicates frequent family 
interactions in which there is active participation of every member in discussions 
across a wide range of issues. Decision-making is seen as a joint family effort. 
Conversely, a low score indicates a low frequency of family interactions with 
engagement in a small number of subjects and rare exchanges of thoughts, hopes 
or emotions. 
 
b) Conformity-orientation  
This is the degree to which family communication stresses a climate of 
homogeneity of attitudes, values and beliefs. A high score in this dimension 
emphasizes uniformity of beliefs and attitudes, with emphasis on obedience and 
compliance according to the family hierarchy, the avoidance of conflict and the 
interdependence of family members. Conversely, a low score indicates a focus 
on heterogeneous attitudes and beliefs within the family, with emphasis on the 
individuality, independence and equality of each family member in 
intergenerational discussions. 
As the longitudinal project FUnDuS, from which the data of the current 
dissertation was taken from, was an interdisciplinary project, it used a communication 
scale adapted from various measures which took into account communicative aspects 
from both fields of psychology and linguistics. Responses were made on a four-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).  A total of 13 
items were identified to be in relation  to  the  RFCP’s  two  dimensions,  with  
conversation-orientation consisting of 9 items, while conformity-orientation had 4 items 
(Refer to Appendix Scale 3).  
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Firstly, an EFA was conducted on the selected 13 items to check the factor 
structure. Similar to the sample group for the EFA of the R-EOCQ, the same 33% of the 
main sample (N=332) was used for this analysis. A principal component analysis (PCA) 
was conducted with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=.81  (‘great’  by  Fields,  2009).  
Bartlett’s  test  of  sphericity  was  X²  (78)  =  1304.77,  p<.001. The extraction of 2 
components accounted for 47.82% of the variance. Table 6-7 contains the factor 
loadings after rotation (varimax). 
Table 6-7. EFA of Communication Scale 
 
 
Item 
Factors 
Conversation- 
orientation 
Conformity- 
orientation 
1. My parents ask for my opinion before family 
decisions are made. 
.51 -.25 
2. With us decisions are made after we have spoken 
about it. 
.54 -.14 
3. I like to speak with my parents about my 
experiences.  
.72 .09 
4. I can tell my parents almost everything. .79 -.13 
5. I frequently tell my parents what I did and 
experienced in the day.  
.72 .16 
6. My parents justify their opinions in conversations 
with me.  
.52 -.24 
7. It is easy for me to speak with my parents about 
what is going on within me.  
.73 .03 
8. It is easy for me to speak with my parents about 
my feelings. 
.73 -.09 
9. We speak often about emotions in our family. .55 -.08 
10. My parents expect that children should not have 
conflicts with adults. 
.03 .80 
11. My parents expect that children should not enter 
into discussions with adults. 
.07 .83 
12. When I talk with my parents, I do not like to talk 
about things that concern me. 
-.19 .53 
13. My parents are not interested in my opinions 
when it does not agree with theirs.  
-.53 .46 
Eigenvalues 4.18 2.04 
% of variance 32.14 15.68 
Α .83 .65 
As seen from Table 6-7, the loadings of all the items ranged between 0.5 - 0.9, 
with the exception of item 13 having a loading of .46 on the conformity-orientation 
component. Despite this, the internal consistency of the conformity-orientation scale 
Research Methodology 
 
128 
  
was acceptable at .65, thus item 13 was retained in the scale. For the conversation-
orientation scale, the internal consistency was good at .83.   
A CFA was then carried out on the separate sample (N=665) to check if this 
two-factor structure was replicated. Mplus 6.0 was used with Maximum Likelihood 
estimation. The two-factor structure appeared to be a good fit to the data as seen from 
the fit indices: x²=62.39, df=51, p=.13 (>.05), CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.02, SRMR=.03 
(Refer to Kline, 2011). Table 6-8 provides the standardized parameter estimates of all 
items. All estimates were significant.  
Table 6-8. CFA of Communication scale 
Factor Items β SE 
Conversation-orientation 1 .40 .04 
2 .42 .04 
3 .56 .03 
4 .70 .03 
5 .51 .03 
6 .59 .04 
7 .56 .03 
8 .65 .03 
9 .55 .04 
Conformity-orientation 10 .38 .05 
11 .35 .04 
12 .71 .06 
13 .59 .06 
Note: All items loaded significantly on the factors (p<.01). 
 
 
Informal Reasoning Tasks 
The informal reasoning tasks were adapted from the study of Means & Voss 
(1996) as these tasks had been used with fifth-graders and were deemed appropriate and 
comprehensible for them. Additionally, these adapted tasks were a time-efficient 
method of approximating evaluative skills of informal argumentative reasoning using 
ill-structured problems which were reflective of everyday life. There were two measures 
of evaluative reasoning competence used: a) Reasons Evaluation, and b) Structure 
Differentiation.  
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Before the two reasoning measures were presented, a story scenario was first 
given to the participants where they were informed about a dilemma faced by two lead 
characters:  
Now imagine the following situation: Marie, a girl from the 5th grade, won a school 
painting competition. However in reality it was her older sister who did the painting. 
She tells her classmate Tom at recess that she cheated. Another girl had made a 
beautiful painting by herself but she only won the second place. Tom wants her to 
confess everything. 
This story scenario was then followed with the instructions and content of the two 
measures: 
a) Reasons Evaluation  
This was  designed  as  a  measure  of  the  participant’s  ability  to  evaluate  the  quality  
of reasons. Continuing on with the story above, the character Tom consults with 
his friends over the dilemma and these friends produce different reasons for why 
Marie should confess her dishonesty. Six reasons were given to the participant 
and he/she was asked to rank the reasons from the best to the worst (Refer to 
Appendix 5a). 
Table 6-9. Ranking of Reasons (Means & Voss, 1996) 
Ranking of reasons Description 
1. Abstract Logical in form in which a reason is classified as a member 
of a general or similar class and the participant reasons from 
this class 
2. Consequential Statements in which a direct consequence is always stated as 
an outcome of a particular action. 
3. Rule-based Generally accepted beliefs or truisms 
4. Authority Involve appeal to an authority 
5. Personal Based on personal experience 
6. Vague Imprecise statements 
*Quality of reason is presumed to decrease over the categories in order of category presentation, 
although rule-based, authority, and personal reasons are presumed to differ little in quality 
According to Means and Voss (1996), reasons in arguments can be classified 
based on their quality. Table 6-9 shows this classification of quality of reasons 
into 6 levels. Participants were thus evaluated on their ability to identify which 
reasons were better or worse based on the rankings they give to each reason.  
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b) Structure Differentiation  
The second task was a measure of the participant’s  ability  to  analyze  arguments 
which differed in structural components. Using the same story, Marie now 
confesses to the teacher about this matter and a class assignment is set by the 
teacher in the form of a letter-writing activity, which instructs students to write a 
letter to Marie under the circumstances that she had not confessed. Four 
arguments, represented by the written letters of four students, were then given to 
participants. The arguments were different in terms of use of higher-level 
components of argumentative structure, that is, the use of qualifiers and 
metastatements  (“if/it  depends/maybe”)  and  counterarguments  (“but”). Means and 
Voss (1996) found that children with higher informal reasoning skills 
demonstrated a more elaborated argument structure that made greater use of 
qualifiers, metastatements and counterarguments. Participants were asked to 
analyze the quality of the four arguments given and to rank them from the best to 
the worst (Refer to Appendix 5b).  
 
6.3 Procedure 
Data was collected as part of an interdisciplinary longitudinal 3-years project 
entitled  “The role of familial support from parents for discourse and written competence 
in lower secondary schools”  (Die  Rolle  Familialer  Unterstützung  beim  Erwerb von 
Diskurs- und Schreibfähigkeiten in der Sekundarstufe I - FUnDuS) by Professor Elke 
Wild from Bielefeld University and Professor Uta Quasthoff from Dortmund University, 
funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Schools in 
North-Rhine Westphalia were contacted for consent of participation in January-March 
2010. When school consent was obtained, parent consent forms were distributed to the 
schools before the testing sessions in order for parents to be informed about the project 
and  for  them  to  give  consent  for  their  children’s  participation.  At  the  beginning  of  each  
testing session, students were to hand in their parent consent forms and those who had 
signed consent participated in the study. For those whose parents did not give approval 
or did not wish to participate, they were led to a different room supervised by a teacher 
and provided with an activity during the test session: colouring of age-appropriate 
pictures.  
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Data was collected from March - April 2010. For each testing session, there 
were two instructors at minimum, with one acting as the lead instructor and the other as 
an assistant in case of questions. There was a prepared script with standardized 
instructions for the lead instructor to follow at each testing session. At the start of each 
session, the code box which consisted of the name initials of the child and his/her parent 
(both mother and father) and his/her date of birth were explained. These unique codes 
were important for the later identification of parent-child dyads, while ensuring 
anonymity of participants. All instructions, items and their respective options on the 
questionnaires were verbally read out by the lead instructor. This ensured that 
participants were not disadvantaged by reading ability. Children were then given some 
time to answer each question after it was read out.  Each testing session lasted on 
average slightly more than an hour, with a five minutes break in between.  
For data collected from the parents, children were asked to bring home an 
envelope of questionnaires and written instructions after the testing sessions held at 
their schools. After parents had completed these questionnaires, they had to send these 
questionnaires via post back to Bielefeld University. For every returned questionnaire, 
the parent-child dyad was rewarded with a choice of a 15-Euros voucher from either of 
two retailers - Amazon or Media Markt.   
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS 
 
7.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses were conducted using the program SPSS. 33% (N=332) of 
both parent and child samples (N=997 each) were taken out to conduct EFA of the 
scales, thus the remaining 67% of both samples (N=665) were used for the remaining 
main analyses.  
In order to get a first overview of the data, descriptive statistics consisting of the 
means, standard deviations and correlations of the twelve variables were examined. 
Table 7-1 provides this information, and the internal consistencies for each variable 
measured through questionnaire items.  
With regards to the four parenting dimensions of Autonomy-support, 
Responsiveness, Structure and Control, all dimensions correlated significantly with each 
other except for the relation between Autonomy-support and Structure (r=.03, p>.05). 
The highest correlation existed between Autonomy-support and Responsiveness (r=.57, 
p<.01), demonstrating that the more parents provided autonomy, the more responsive 
they were towards their children. Autonomy-support and Responsiveness were, 
however, negatively correlated with Control (r=-.26, p<.01, and r= -.38, p<.01, 
respectively) but Structure showed a positive relation with Control (r=.11, p<.01).  
The four dimensions of parenting also showed significant correlations with the 
family communication patterns of Communication-orientation and Conformity 
orientation, with the only non-significant exception being the correlation between 
Structure and Conformity-orientation (r=-.01, p>.05). Autonomy-support, 
Responsiveness and Structure showed positive correlations (r=.58, p<.01, r= .63, p<.01 
and r=.15, p<.05 respectively) with Conversation-orientation while Control had a 
negative correlation (r=-.32, p<.01). In contrast, Autonomy-support and 
Responsiveness had negative correlations (r=-.37, p<.01 and r= -.39, p<.01 
respectively) with Conformity-orientation while Control had a moderate positive 
correlation (r=.57, p<.01). 
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Table 7-1. 
Scale means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations of all variables 
 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 α Mean (SD) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SES (1) - 5.07 (2.40) 1            
Autonomy-support (2) .78 3.10 (.50) .10* 1           
Responsiveness (3) .81 3.43 (.56) .09* .57** 1          
Structure (4) .67 2.51 (.45) .09* .03 .09* 1         
Control (5) .75 2.28 (.69) -.22** -.26** -.38** .11** 1        
Conversation-orientation (6) .83 2.81 (.53) .07 .58** .63** .15* -.32** 1       
Conformity-orientation (7) .65 2.22 (.63) -.28** -.37** -.39** -.01 .57** -.40** 1      
Child Justification by authority (8) .66 4.41 (.97) -.01 .18** .22** .08* .00 .22** .03 1     
Child Simple and certain knowledge (9) .60 2.51 (.92) -.23** .-.10* -.07 -.02 .34** -.08 .34** .21** 1    
Parent Justification by authority (10) .85 3.78 (.91) -.28** .00 -.01 -.08* .11** -.01 .16** .15** .14** 1   
Parent Simple and certain knowledge (11) .65 3.27 (1.03) -.35** -.10* -.09* -.05 .18** -.08 .26** .10* .24** .54** 1  
Reasons Evaluation Task  (12) - 13.33 (3.55) .17** .10* .05 .06 -.09* .09* -.15** -.01 -.23** -.13** -.16** 1 
Structure Differentiation Task (13) - 6.68 (2.31) .10** .06 .02 .07 .05 .01 -.01 -.09* -.11* -.02 -.07 .20** 
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With regards to the EOC belief dimensions of SC, JA and PJ of parents and 
children, significant correlations were seen between the two dimensions at both parent 
and child levels. Child SC belief was positively correlated to Child JA belief (r=.21, 
p<.01). Similarly, Parent SC belief was positively correlated to Parent JA belief (r=.54, 
p<.01). Thus, the more the individual believed that knowledge was simple and certain, 
the more he/she also believed that authority figures were reliable sources which could 
act as sufficient justification for knowledge. 
Additionally, correlations remained significant and positive across the parent 
and child levels. Child SC belief was positively correlated with Parent SC belief (r=.24, 
p<.01) and Parent JA (r=.14, p<.01), and Child JA was positively correlated with Parent 
SC (r=.10, p<.05) and with Parent JA (r=.15, p<.01). Thus, the stronger parental beliefs 
were in JA and SC, the stronger children beliefs in JA and SC were too.  
With regards to the reasoning skills, the two reasoning tasks evidenced a 
significant correlation (r=.20, p<.01). Therefore, the more able children were in 
successfully evaluating the quality of reasons in the first task, the more able they were 
too in the second reasoning task with regards to differentiating better arguments from 
poorer ones.  
Additionally, an independent t-test was carried out to analyze if participants 
from the higher track secondary schools (i.e. Gymnasium) performed better than 
participants from lower track schools (i.e. Hauptschule) in the measures of reasoning 
skills and EOC belief dimensions.   
From Table 7-2,  concerning  children’s skills in reasons evaluation, participants 
from higher track schools on average showed higher competence as compared to 
participants from lower track schools. This difference was significant t (657) = -9.09, 
p<.01. For skills in the structure differentiation task, participants from higher track 
schools also demonstrated higher competence as compared to participants from lower 
track schools. This difference was significant t (655) = -4.96, p<.01. For the EOC belief 
dimensions, higher track participants showed weaker beliefs in SC than lower track 
participants. This difference was significant t (595) = 9.73, p<.01. However, the 
difference between the means in JA beliefs of higher track participants and lower track 
participants was not significant t (603) = .65, p>.05. Therefore in general, participants 
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from higher track schools performed significantly better than those from the lower 
track, evidencing higher skills in both reasoning tasks and more advanced EOC through 
weaker belief in SC.  
Table 7-2. School Type on Children’s  reasoning  skills  and  EOC  belief  dimensions 
 School Type N Mean SD 
Reasons Evaluation Lower track 198 11.52 3.26 
Higher Track 461 14.11 3.39 
Structure 
Differentiation 
Lower track 198 6.01 2.25 
Higher track 459 6.96 2.28 
Child Simple and 
Certain Knowledge 
Lower track 169 3.06 .94 
Higher track 428 2.30 .82 
Child Justification by 
Authority 
Lower track 174 4.46 1.07 
Higher track 431 4.40 .93 
Note: Lower Track School – Hauptschule, Higher Track School - Gymnasium 
Lastly, to compare the parenting practices of different SES groups, participants 
were split into three classes based on the CASMIN classification (see Table 7-3). The 
low SES class consisted of parents who have only the completion of general elementary 
education. The middle SES class consisted of parents who have completed intermediate 
general education up to the level of receiving the general maturity certificate which 
enables one to enter into higher education. The high SES class consisted of those who 
have completed lower and higher tertiary education. 18 cases were missing. 
Table 7-3. Classification of low, middle and high SES classes of parents 
SES Educational and Vocational description N Percentage 
of sample 
Low Inadequately completed general education 99 14.9 
General elementary education 
General elementary education with vocational training 
Middle Intermediate general education without vocational training 333 50.1 
Intermediate general education with vocational training 
General maturity certificate without vocational training 
General maturity certificate with vocational training 
High Lower tertiary education (Technical colleges) 215 32.3 
Higher tertiary education (University)  
The means of familial variables, consisting of parenting practices and family 
communication patterns, of each SES group are given in Table 7-4. For positive 
parenting practices such as Autonomy-support, Structure and Responsiveness, there was 
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an increasing trend from low to high SES classes. However for the use of Control, low 
SES parents evidenced the highest mean followed by a decreasing trend with increasing 
SES. For family communication patterns, there was an increasing tendency for 
Conversation-orientation and a decreasing tendency for Conformity-orientation with 
increasing SES. High SES parents on average had higher scores in Conversation-
orientation and lower scores in Conformity-orientation. 
Table 7-4. Means of familial variables in low, middle and high SES classes 
 Autonomy
-support 
Control Structure Responsiveness Conversation-
orientation 
Conformity
-orientation 
Low 
SES 
Mean 3.01 2.56 2.42 3.39 2.69 2.57 
SD .49 .77 .45 .62 .54 .55 
Middle 
SES 
Mean 3.09 2.32 2.53 3.42 2.81 2.24 
SD .50 .67 .46 .54 .53 .60 
High 
SES 
Mean 3.15 2.11 2.52 3.48 2.84 2.02 
SD .50 .64 .42 .55 .52 .63 
One-way ANOVAs were then conducted to compare if the means of each 
familial variable were significantly different from each other across the three SES 
classes. No significant effects of SES between the three classes were found for 
Autonomy-support, F(2, 586)= 2.46, p>.05, for Structure, F(2, 633)= 2.49, p>.05, for 
Responsiveness, F(2, 636)= 1.14, p>.05, and for Conversation-orientation, F(2, 563)= 
2.56, p>.05. However, the use of Control differed significantly across the three SES 
classes, F(2, 641)= 15.69, p<.01. Conformity-orientation also differed significantly 
across the three SES classes, F(2, 609)= 26.52, p<.01. 
 
7.2 Path Analyses on Structural Models 
In accordance to the four broad research questions, path analyses were 
conducted to test the structural models pertaining to these questions. Path analysis was 
suitable as it allows the simultaneous study of direct and indirect effects with multiple 
independent and dependent variables (Stage, Carter & Nora, 2004). The analyses were 
performed using the program Mplus 6.0. Missing data was treated as completely 
missing at random, and full information likelihood estimation (FIML) was used. There 
are many benefits to utilizing FIML rather than casewise deletions, listwise deletion, or 
mean imputation, including more accurate and efficient estimates of parameters than 
other methods and the advantage of being able to include cases with partial missing data 
in the analysis (c.f. Enders & Bandalos, 2001).  
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There are four sets of results pertaining to the four main research questions. The 
first set of results reports the  analyses  of  the  structural  models  related  to  children’s  
reasoning skills with regards to parenting practices and family communication patterns. 
The second set of results reports the analyses of the structural models related to the 
EOC beliefs of both parents and children. In this section, the relations between parental 
dimensional and developmental EOC beliefs and the four parenting practices are first 
investigated. Next, parental EOC belief dimensions and parenting practices are analyzed 
as predictors of children’s  EOC  belief  dimensions.  The relations between parents and 
children’s  developmental positions in the EOCM are also examined via correlation and 
regression analyses. As previous empirical literature has established an association 
between familial variables and SES, SES was used as a control variable in all structural 
models in the first two sets of results. The third set of results reports the analyses 
concerning the testing of children’s  EOC  dimensional  beliefs  as  predictors  of  their  
reasoning skills.  In  a  separate  regression  analysis,  children’s  developmental  positions in 
the EOCM are also tested as a predictor of reasoning skills. Lastly, the fourth set of 
results reports the analyses of mediating models tested to see if familial variables can 
significantly mediate the strength of the direct effects of SES on the two child 
outcomes.  
In assessing the structural models, a review of goodness-of-fit indices can be 
found in Kline (2011). These indices provide an indication of how well a sample data fit 
the a priori model. The Chi-square  value  (χ²)  is  a  measure  of  evaluating  overall  model  
fit, and assesses the magnitude of discrepancy between the sample and fitted covariance 
matrices. A good model fit would provide an insignificant result at a .05 threshold. 
However, it is important to note that the chi-square statistic has been found to be 
sensitive to sample size, often rejecting models when large samples are used. The 
normed chi-square  (χ²/df)  is  also  used  to  measure  model  fit.  Recommendations  for  an  
acceptable normed chi-square  ration  range  from  as  high  as  ≤5.0  to  as  low  as  ≤2.0  
(Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) is another fit statistic which tells how well the model, with unknown but 
optimally  chosen  parameter  estimates,  would  fit  the  population’s  covariance  matrix.  It  
favors parsimony in that it will choose the model with the lesser number of parameters. 
An  RMSEA  score  of  <.05  indicates  a  good  fit  and  .05≤.RMSEA≤.08  indicates  an  
acceptable fit. A confidence interval can also be calculated. The Standardized Root 
Mean square Residual (SRMR) is another absolute fit statistic which is the square root 
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of the difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and the 
hypothesized covariance model. A SRMR of 0 indicates a perfect fit and the cutoff 
score is also at .05. Additional to the above-mentioned absolute fit indices, an 
incremental fit statistic will also be used. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) compares 
the sample covariance matrix with the null model and simultaneously takes into account 
sample size. A value of >.95 is presently recognized as indicative of good fit and 
.90<.CFI≤.95  indicates  an  acceptable  fit.  These  four  goodness-of-fit statistics will be 
used to evaluate the following structural models.  
Lastly, a brief mention is necessary regarding the sample size needed for path 
analysis. Path analysis holds the same assumptions as regression analysis.  The accuracy 
and stability of path analysis decreases with decreasing sample size as well as with an 
increasing number of variables. The recommended ratio is 20 cases per parameter (or 
variable measured) in the model (Stage, Carter & Nora, 2004). There are seven 
structural models which will be evaluated in this chapter. The largest model (see Figure 
7-4) consists of 9 variables, which requires a total of 180 participants. The current study 
has 665 child participants and their respective parents (Total N=1330), thus the sample 
size is more than sufficient for the following path analyses.  
 
Research Question 1. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and family 
communication patterns influence children’s  informal reasoning competence? 
1.1 Do parenting practices, in terms of the four dimensions of Autonomy-support, 
Control, Responsiveness and Structure, influence children’s  informal  reasoning  
skills? 
Figure 7-1 shows the significant parameters of the analysis conducted on the 
structural model postulating that the four parenting dimensions of Autonomy-support, 
Control, Responsiveness and Structure had direct effects on the two reasoning tasks. 
SES is controlled for in this model.  
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Figure 7-1. Structural model of parenting dimensions on children’s  reasoning  skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
Note: SES is a control variable in the structural model. *p<.05, **p<.01 
R²=.02 
R²=.03 
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Reasons Evaluation 
Reasoning Task 2: 
Structure Differentiation 
SES 
Although parenting dimensions in the structural model (see Figure 7-1) 
seemingly do not have any significant influence  on  children’s  Reasons  Evaluation skills, 
correlation analyses (see Table 7-1) showed two significant links for the task of Reasons 
Evaluation. Autonomy-support had a positive relation (r= .10, p<.05) while Control had 
a negative relation (r= -.09, p<.05) with this reasoning skill.  
When the structural model was tested without SES as a control variable, the 
dimension of Control initially showed a significant but negative effect on the reasoning 
task of Reasons Evaluation  (β=-.12, p<.05) but had no significant effect on the Structure 
Differentiation task. Control showed a different direct effect in structural models with 
and without SES. When SES was included in the analysis, SES accounted for the 
variance of the effect of Control on Reasons Evaluation but it exerted an indirect effect 
through  Control  on  the  reasoning  task  of  Structure  differentiation.  Due  to  SES’  
significant role in prompting a direct significant effect from Control to Structure 
differentiation skills, its relations to the different variables have also been shown in 
Figure 7-1. 
χ² = 14.44, df = 9, p = .11, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .03  
Fit indices were found to be good (χ² = 14.44, df = 9, p = .11, CFI = .99, RMSEA
 = .03, SRMR = .03), demonstrating that the empirical data had a good fit to the 
theoretical model. When SES was controlled for, only one significant parameter was 
observed. The parenting dimension of Control was found to have a direct effect on the 
reasoning  task  of  Structure  differentiation  (β=.09,  p<.05). The effect size was positive, 
but very small.   
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1.2 Do family communication patterns partially mediate the relation between parenting 
practices and children’s  informal reasoning skills? 
As only the parenting dimension of Control was found to exert a direct effect on 
child’s  reasoning  skills,  and  this  effect  is  low,  the  mediating  model  involving  family  
communication patterns was no longer applicable as a mediating model is only 
successful when independent variables first have a significant direct effect on the 
dependent variables. In light of these results, a simpler structural model was formulated 
to investigate the direct influence of the two dimensions of family communication 
patterns – Conversation-orientation and Conformity-orientation, on children’s reasoning 
skills (see Figure 7-2).  
Figure 7-2.  Structural  model  of  family  communication  patterns  on  children’s  reasoning  
skills 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 Note: SES is controlled for in the structural model. *p<.05 
Additionally, it was hypothesized that dimensions of parenting would be 
significant predictors of family communication patterns. Preliminary analyses had 
already revealed that many significant correlations existed between the parenting 
dimensions and family communication patterns, and these correlations were in the 
expected directions. A separate structural model was analyzed regarding the effects of 
-.13* 
Conversation-
orientation 
Reasoning Task 1: 
Reasons Evaluation 
Reasoning Task 2:  
Structure Differentiation 
 
Conformity-
orientation 
R²=.04 
χ² = .97, df = 3, p =  .81, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .01  
Fit indices were found to be good (χ² = .97, df = 3, p = .81, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA 
= .00, SRMR = .01). There was only one significant link demonstrating a negative 
direct effect of Conformity-orientation  on  the  Reasons  Evaluation  task  (β=  -.13, p<.05). 
Thus, the higher the family scored in conformity-orientation, that is, the emphasis on 
homogeneity of attitudes, values and attitudes in the family, the less able the child was 
in evaluating quality of reasons.  
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the four parenting dimensions on family communication patterns. Figure 7-3 shows the 
results of this structural model.  
 Figure 7-3. Structural model of parenting dimensions on family communication 
patterns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Note: SES is controlled for in the structural model. *p<.05, **p<.01 
Autonomy-support, Responsiveness and Structure were significant predictors 
with a direct positive effect on Conversation-orientation  (β=  .33,  p<.01,  β=  .40,  p<.01 
and  β=  .11,  p<.01  respectively),  while  Control  had  a  direct  negative  effect  (β=  -.09, 
p<.01). Thus, parents who provided more autonomy-support, who were more 
responsive  to  child’s  needs,    who  had  clear  expectations  and  guidelines  communicated  
to the child, and who used less intrusive methods of control, were more able to foster a 
conversation-oriented communication pattern in the family, as characterized by a high 
frequency of open discussions over a wide range of topics. On the other hand, 
Autonomy-support and Responsiveness were found to have a direct negative effect on 
Conformity-orientation  (β= -.19, p<.01  and  β=  -.09, p<.05 respectively), while Control 
had  a  positive  effect  (β=  .44,  p<.01). Thus, parents who provided less autonomy-support 
and responsiveness and who used more controlling parenting strategies fostered a more 
conformity-oriented communication climate within the family.  
Table 7-5 provides the unstandardized and standardized estimates, standard 
deviations and variances of significant parameters from structural models in Figures 7-
1, 7-2 and 7-3. According to Stage, Carter and Nora (2004), unstandardized estimates 
should be reported in path analyses studies as researchers can better compare previously 
calculated effect sizes between various studies. Standardized coefficients are sample-
-.19** 
.44** 
-.09* 
.11** 
.40** 
R²=.48 
-.09** 
.33** 
Autonomy-support 
Control 
Responsiveness 
Structure 
Conversation-
orientation 
Conformity-
orientation 
R²=.40 
 
χ² = 1.33, df = 1, p = .25, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .01 
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specific but unstandardized coefficients can be used to compare models across different 
samples. 
Table 7-5. Decomposition of significant effects from Structural Models in Figures 7-1, 
7-2 and 7-3 
Structural 
Model 
Effect Unstandardized 
coefficient 
SE Standardized 
coefficient 
SE R² 
Figure 7-1 Control on  
Structure Differentiation  
0.29 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.02 
Figure 7-2 Conformity orientation 
on Reasons Evaluation 
-0.72 0.23 -0.13 0.04 0.04 
Figure 7-3 Autonomy-support on 
Conversation-orientation 
0.34 0.04 0.33 0.04 0.48 
Control on  
Conversation-orientation 
-0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.03 
Responsiveness on  
Conversation-orientation 
0.38 0.04 0.40 0.04 
Structure on 
Conversation-orientation 
0.13 0.04 0.11 0.03 
Autonomy-support on 
Conformity-orientation 
-0.24 0.05 -0.19 0.04 0.40 
Control on  
Conformity-orientation 
0.40 0.03 0.44 0.03 
Responsiveness on  
Conformity orientation 
-0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.04 
 
Research Question 2. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and parental 
EOC beliefs influence children’s  EOC beliefs? 
2.1 What are the associations between parental EOC beliefs and parenting practices? 
In the EOCM model, the EOC beliefs of individuals can be analyzed in two 
ways: in terms of particular dimensions and also in terms of developmental positions 
formulated from the profile across these dimensions. Firstly, parental EOC beliefs in the 
dimensions of JA and SC were examined in relations to the four dimensions of 
parenting practices, namely Autonomy-support, Control, Structure and Responsiveness. 
For the dimension of parental JA, correlation analyses (see Table 7-1) showed 
that Structure and Control were significantly associated with this dimension. Structure 
was  found  to  correlate  negatively  (r=-.08, p<.05) with JA, which indicated that parents
 who justified knowledge less by authority figures tended to provide clearer and 
consistent structure in their parenting practices. Control, in contrast, showed a positive
 correlation  (r=  .11,  p<.01) with JA. Parents who had stronger beliefs in justifying 
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knowledge by authorities tended to use more strict and intrusive parenting strategies of 
control.  
Additionally, the developmental EOC positions of parents were determined by 
their profile across the two dimensions of JA and SC. Originally in the EOCM, these 
positions were differentiated by three dimensions, but in the current work, the 
dimension of Personal Justification was not included for analyses due to the scale 
displaying low internal consistency. However, with reference to Table 7-6, the 
developmental positions of realism, dogmatism, skepticism and rationalism can be 
differentiated in the ill-structured domain by just using the two dimensions of JA and 
SC.  
Table 7-6. EOCM in Ill-structured Domains (Greene et al., 2008) 
 
SC = Simple and Certain Knowledge Dimension; JA = Justification by Authority Dimension;  
PJ = Personal Justification Dimension 
Thus,  parents’  developmental positions were determined from their responses 
regarding the strength of beliefs in JA and SC. Parental beliefs in JA and SC were first 
coded into low, mid and high. Subsequently, if a parent had high scores in both 
dimensions, he/she was coded as a realist. A dogmatist had a low score in SC and a high 
Ill-Structured Domains 
Position SC JA PJ 
Realism High High High 
Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid 
For the dimension of parental SC, correlation analyses showed that the parenting 
dimensions of Autonomy-support, Responsiveness and Control were significantly 
associated with this dimension. Autonomy-support and Responsiveness demonstrated 
negative correlations (r =  -.10, p<.05 and  r =  -.09, p<.05  respectively) with SC, 
indicating that the more parents provided autonomy support and the more they were 
contingently responsive to the needs of their child, the less they were inclined to believe 
that knowledge was simple and certain in nature. In contrast, Control had a positive 
correlation  (r=  .18,  p<.01)  with  SC.  Thus,  the  stronger  parents’  belief  in  SC  was,  the  
more they tended to use strict intrusive control in their parenting practices. 
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score in JA, a skepticist had a low score in both SC and JA and a rationalist had a low 
score in SC and a mid score in JA. 
A total of 201 parents was found to fit into one of the four positions in the 
EOCM: 68.2% were realists, 7% were dogmatists, 8% were skepticists and 16.9% were 
rationalists. Although these positions are conceptualized as separate categories, there is 
a theoretical understanding that rationalists exhibit more sophisticated epistemological 
thinking than skepticists or dogmatists, and subsequently, these two positions are also 
more advanced than the first position of realism. Thus, these developmental positions 
could be viewed as a continuous variable whereby the four positions represented 
epistemological thinking ranging from less to more sophisticated. Correlations were 
then calculated between parental EOC developmental positions and the four parenting 
dimensions (See Table 7-7). 
Table 7-7. Correlations of parental EOC developmental positions and parenting 
dimensions 
 Autonomy-support Responsiveness Structure Control 
Parents’  developmental  
position in EOCQ 
.10 .08 .06 -.28** 
** p≤.01 
2.2 Do parenting practices and  parents’  EOC  belief  dimensions  influence  children’s  
EOC belief dimensions? 
 
 
Correlation analyses revealed only one highly significant link: the higher the 
developmental positions that parents had, the less they practiced control in their 
parenting  practices  (r=  -.28, p<.01). The other three parenting dimensions had 
insignificant  correlations  with  parents’  developmental  positions in the EOCQ. 
Figure 7-4 shows the results of the structural model consisting of the effects of 
parenting  dimensions  and  parental  EOC  belief  dimensions  on  children’s  EOC  belief  
dimensions. The fit indices were acceptable (χ² = 32.4, df = 16, p = .01, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .03). 
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Figure 7-4. Structural model of parenting dimensions and parental EOC belief 
dimensions  on  children’s  EOC  beliefs  dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: SES is controlled for in the structural model. *p<.05, **p<.01 
Firstly, with regards to the parenting dimensions: Autonomy-support, 
Responsiveness  and  Structure  had  positive  direct  effects  on  Child  beliefs  in  JA  (β=  .11,  
p<.05, β=  .14,  p<.05 and  β=  .09,  p<.05 respectively). This indicated that when parents 
provided more autonomy-support, were more responsive and provided greater structure, 
children demonstrated a stronger belief in the credibility of authority figures as 
justification for knowledge. Control, on the other hand, had a direct positive effect on 
Child beliefs  in  SC  (β=  .27,  p<.01). When parents practiced more control, children 
demonstrated a stronger belief in knowledge being simple, concrete, unchanging and 
certain.  
Additionally, with regards to the transmission of EOC belief dimensions from 
parents to children, significant dimension-specific transmissions were found. Parental 
beliefs in JA was found to have a positive direct effect on Child beliefs in  JA  (β=  .15,  
p<.01). Similarly, Parental beliefs in SC was found to have a positive direct effect on 
Child beliefs in  SC  (β=  .14,  p<.01). 
Table 7-8 provides the unstandardized and standardized estimates, standard 
deviations and variances of significant parameters from the structural model in Figure 7-
4, for the comparison of effect sizes within and across samples.   
.14** 
.15** 
.27** 
.09* 
.14* 
.11* 
Autonomy-support 
Control 
Responsiveness 
Structure 
 
R²=.08 
Parental Justification by 
Authority 
Parental Simple and 
Certain Knowledge 
Child Justification by 
Authority 
Child Simple and 
Certain Knowledge 
R²=.14 
χ² =32.40, df=16, p=.01, CFI=.98, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.03  
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Table 7-8. Decomposition of significant effects from structural model in Figure 7-4 
Effect Unstandardized 
coefficient 
SE Standardized 
coefficient 
SE R² 
Autonomy-support  
on Child JA 
0.20 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.08 
Responsiveness  
on Child JA 
0.24 0.08 0.14 0.05 
Structure on  
Child JA 
0.18 0.08 0.09 0.04 
Parent JA on 
Child JA 
0.16 0.04 0.15 0.04 
Control on  
Child SC 
0.36 0.05 0.27 0.04 0.14 
Parent SC on  
Child SC 
0.13 0.04 0.14 0.04 
 
2.3  Is  there  a  positive  relation  between  parents’  developmental  positions and children’s  
developmental positions in the EOCM? 
Similar to the method of determining parents’  developmental  positions  from  
their  beliefs  in  SC  and  JA  dimensions,  children’s  beliefs  in  SC  and  JA  were  first  coded  
as low, mid and high, afterwhich their positions were determined from their profile 
across these two dimensions. 185 children had profiles that fit into the four positions: 
23.2% were realists, 50.3% were dogmatists, 2.2% were skepticists, and 24.3% were 
rationalists.  
A correlation analysis  showed  that  parent’s  and  child’s  developmental  positions  
was significantly correlated at φc=.32, p<.05. A regression analysis was subsequently 
conducted  and  the  results  showed  that  parent’s  developmental  position  was  a  significant  
predictor  of  child’s  developmental  position  (β=.25,  p<.05) and accounted for 11% of the 
variance. 
 
Research Question 3. Are dimensions and developmental positions of children’s  EOC  
beliefs significant predictors of their reasoning skills? 
Preliminary correlation analyses showed three significant correlations between 
Child EOC belief dimensions and the two reasoning tasks (see Table 7-1). Child JA 
beliefs were negatively correlated with Structure Differentiation  (r=  -.09, p<.05) and 
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Figure 7-5.  Structural  model  of  children’s  EOC  belief  dimensions  on  their  reasoning  
skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Note:  **p<.01 
Further  analyses  were  then  conducted  in  relation  to  children’s  developmental  
positions in the EOCM, as determined by their profiles across the JA and SC 
dimensions.  Significant  positive  correlations  were  found  between  children’s  
developmental positions and the two reasoning tasks: Reasons Evaluation (r= .18, 
p<.05) and Structure Differentiation (r= .22, p<.01). This indicated that the more 
sophisticated epistemic position the child achieved in the EOCM, the more skilled 
his/her reasoning was. Two linear regression analyses were then conducted to analyze if 
these EOCM positions were predictive of the separate reasoning skills. With regards to 
the first reasoning task of Reasons Evaluation, children’s  developmental  position in the 
EOCM was found to be a significant predictor which accounted for 3% of the variance 
R²=.06 
R²=.01 
-.11** 
-.24** 
Child Justification 
 by Authority Reasoning Task 1: 
Reasons Evaluation 
Reasoning Task 2: 
Structure Differentiation 
 
Child Simple and 
Certain Knowledge 
Child SC beliefs were negatively correlated with both tasks of Reasons Evaluation  (r=  -
.23, p<.01) and Structure Differentiation  (r=  -.11, p<.05).  
χ² = 4.49, df=2, p=.17, CFI=.96, RMSEA=.05, SRMR=.02  
Figure 7-5 shows the results of the path analysis on the structural model. Fit 
indices were found to be acceptable (χ² = 3.55, df=2, p=.17, CFI=.96, RMSEA=.05, 
SRMR=.02). Child JA beliefs did not have any significant direct effects on reasoning 
skills. However, Child SC beliefs were found to have a direct negative effect on both 
skills  of  Reasons  Evaluation  (β=  -.24, p<.01)  and  Structure  Differentiation  (β=  -.11, 
p<.01). A stronger belief in knowledge being simple and certain was found to be 
detrimental  to  children’s  evaluative  abilities  in identifying quality of various reasons in 
argument and in evaluating overall argumentative structures. 
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(β=  .18,  p<.05). Additionally, children’s  developmental  position was also significantly 
predictive of the second reasoning task of Structure Differentiation, accounting for 5% 
of the  variance  (β=  .22,  p<.01).  
Table 7-9 provides the unstandardized and standardized estimates, standard 
deviations and variances of significant parameters from the structural model in  
Figure 7-5.  
Table 7-9. Decomposition of significant effects from structural models in Figure 7-5 
Effect Unstandardized 
coefficient 
SE Standardized 
coefficient 
SE R² 
Child SC on  
Reasons Evaluation  
-0.90 0.16 -0.24 0.04 0.06 
Child SC on 
Structure Differentiation 
-0.27 0.10 -0.11 0.04 0.01 
 
Research Question 4. Can familial variables be significant mediators of the direct 
relationship of SES on children’s  reasoning  skills  and  EOC  beliefs? 
Referring to the correlations table (see Table 7-1), SES was found to be 
significantly associated with every variable in the model except for Conversation-
orientation and Child JA beliefs. It was used as a control variable in all path analyses 
that included parenting variables, in order to eliminate confounding results which may 
be attributed to the influence of SES rather than to the postulated predictor variables. 
With the exception of the first structural model in Figure 7-1 which illustrated the direct 
effects of SES on the variables used, the other structural models revealed no difference 
in the significance of parameters between variables when SES was used as a control 
variable. Hence, SES parameters were not included in these figures when the results of 
the path analyses of the structural models were reported. 
In addition to using SES as a control variable, the current work was also 
interested to test if competent parenting practices could act as compensatory 
mechanisms for reducing the direct influence of SES on child outcomes via the method 
of mediating models. In order to show successful mediation, significant direct 
relationships had to be first established between the predictor, mediating and outcome 
variables. In the following models, the predictor variable is SES, mediating variables 
are any of the familial components of parenting dimensions or family communication 
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patterns, and the outcome variables are children’s reasoning skills and EOC belief 
dimensions. Significant relations of these variables were first identified from the 
previous analyses done. The correlations table (See Table 7-1) revealed that SES did not 
have a significant correlation with Child JA beliefs, thus Child JA beliefs was not 
further analyzed.  
For the outcome variable of Reasons Evaluation, significant unmediated 
relationships were first established using correlations (see Table 7-1) between a) 
predictor variable SES and outcome variable (r= .17, p<.01); b) predictor variable SES 
and mediating variable Conformity-orientation (r= -.28, p<.01); and c) mediating 
variable Conformity-orientation and outcome variable (r= -.15, p<.01). Referring to 
Figure 6-6, the first model was estimated with only the direct path (dotted path) between 
predictor and outcome variables. The mediating variable and two additional path 
estimates were then added in to estimate the second model.  
Figure 7-6. SES on children’s  reasons evaluation skills mediated by family conformity-
orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: **p<.01 
From Figure 7-6, partial mediation was supported as the relationship between 
predictor  and  outcome  variables  was  reduced  (β=  .17,  p<.01  to  β=  .13,  p<.01) but this 
path parameter still remained significant. Thus, Conformity-orientation was significant 
in reducing the direct effects of SES on Reasons Evaluation skills but was unable to 
fully account for this variance.  
For the outcome variable of Structure Differentiation, correlation analyses 
showed a significant relation with SES (r= .10, p<.01) but no significant relations were 
found between this variable and the parenting and family communication variables. It is 
-.12** 
R²=.04 
R²=.08 
-.28** 
.17**/ .13** 
SES 
Reasoning Task 1: 
Reasons Evaluation 
Conformity-
orientation 
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also interesting to note that the results in Figure 7-1 regarding the significant direct 
effect of Control on Structure Differentiation were only found when the structural 
model controlled for SES. Without SES as the control variable, this significant link was 
not found. Therefore, no mediating model was tested as the predictor variable and 
mediating variables did not evidence significant direct relations.  
Lastly, for the outcome variable of Child SC beliefs, significant relationships 
were established between a) predictor variable SES and outcome variable (r= -.23, 
p<.01); b) predictor variable SES and mediating variables of Control (r= -.22, p<.01) 
and Conformity-orientation (r= -.28, p<.01); and c) mediating variables and outcome 
variable (r= .34, p<.01 for Control, r= .34, p<.01 for Conformity-orientation). Referring 
to Figure 7-7, the first model was estimated with only the direct path (dotted path) 
between predictor and outcome variables. The mediating variables and four additional 
path estimates were then added in to estimate the second model.  
Figure 7-7. SES on Child SC beliefs mediated by parental control and family 
conformity-orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Note: **p<.01 
From Figure 7-7, results supported partial mediation again as the relationship 
between  predictor  and  outcome  variables  was  reduced  (β=  -.23, p<.01  to  β=  -.13, p<.01) 
but this path parameter still remained significant. Thus, Control and Conformity-
orientation acted as significant mediators in reducing the direct effects of SES on Child 
SC beliefs but were unable to fully account for the variance in Child SC beliefs. 
.18** -.28** 
R²=.08 
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The structural models in Figures 7-6 and 7-7 show that familial variables can 
significantly mediate the effect of SES on child outcomes. Fit indices for these models 
could not be estimated as these were fully recursive models, that is, all possible paths 
were included so the implied correlation always equaled the observed correlation, thus 
generating perfect fit. In these models, only the significance and size of parameters 
could be compared.  
After establishing that familial variables of Control and Conformity-orientation 
can act as significant mediators of the direct effects of SES on Reasons Evaluation skills 
and Child SC beliefs, the following analyses were conducted to try to gain a deeper 
insight into the explanatory mechanisms behind these links. If familial variables are 
compensatory for direct effects of SES on outcomes, does this indicate that parents of 
low SES families who use less control and are less conformity-oriented have children 
who display on average higher reasoning competence and more advanced epistemic 
beliefs as compared to their peers? Similarly, can parents of high SES disadvantage their 
children by the use of high control and a more conformity-oriented family 
communication pattern? Comparing low and high SES class parents, the use of control 
and conformity-orientation in each class were first split into high/low groups by the 50th 
percentile of each variable.  
Table 7-10. Splitting Control and Conformity-orientation into low and high groups 
 Variables Groups Range N M SD 
Low 
SES 
Control Low 1.0-2.4 43 1.86 .42 
High 2.5-4.0 54 3.11 .48 
Conformity-
orientation 
Low 1.0-2.5 38 2.31 .53 
High 2.6-4.0 55 2.76 .48 
High 
SES 
Control Low 1.0-2.0 111 1.63 .32 
High 2.0-4.0 103 2.63 .48 
Conformity-
orientation 
Low 1.0-2.0 124 1.59 .31 
High 2.0-4.0 80 2.69 .38 
Note: 50th percentile for control (low SES) - 2.5; conformity-orientation (low SES) - 2.6; control 
(high SES) - 2.0; and conformity-orientation (high SES) - 2.0. Range for all variables 1 (min) to 
4 (max). 
For both low and high SES classes, the range of each group, number of 
participants per group, standard deviations, and means of both high and low groups 
concerning the use of Control and Conformity-orientation by parents are shown in Table 
7-10. Out of 99 parents for low SES, 2 cases were missing for the Control variable 
(N=97) and 6 cases for Conformity-orientation (N=93). Out of 215 cases for high SES, 
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1 case was missing for Control (N=214) and 11 cases for Conformity-orientation 
(N=204). Due to the small fraction of missing data, these cases were removed from 
further analyses.  
From Figure 7-6, Conformity-orientation acted as a significant mediator of direct 
effects of SES on Reasons Evaluation. Independent t-tests were conducted to analyze if 
the  means  of  children’s  Reasons  Evaluation skills between high and low use of 
Conformity-orientation within the family in the two SES classes were significantly 
different. From Table 7-11, for the low SES class, the difference between  participants’  
Reasons Evaluation skills on average with regards to coming from a family with low or 
high Conformity-orientation was not significant, t (89) = .88, p>.05. Similarly, this 
difference for the high SES class was also not significant, t (201) = .36. p>.05.  
Table 7-11.  Means  and  Standard  Deviations  of  children’s  reasons  evaluation  skills  in  
low and high groups of Conformity-orientation situated in low and high SES classes 
From Figure 7-7, Control and Conformity-orientation acted as significant 
mediators of the direct effects of SES on Child SC beliefs. A series of Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the separate and interactional effects of 
Control and Conformity-orientation on Child SC beliefs in both low and high SES 
samples. There was homogeneity of variance between groups in both samples as 
assessed by Levene’s  test  for equality of error variances, thus ANOVA was allowed to 
be tested. 
In the low SES sample, there was a non-significant interaction between effects 
of Control and Conformity-orientation on Child SC beliefs, F(1,77)=.00, p>.05. Main 
effects analysis found that children of parents who practiced low control had a 
significantly weaker belief in SC than children of parents who practiced high control, 
F(1,77)= 9.21, p<.01. However, differences in family Conformity-orientation showed 
   Reasons 
Evaluation 
Mean 
difference 
t df p 
Low 
SES 
Low Conformity-
orientation 
M 12.62 .58 .88 89 .38 
SD 2.70 
High Conformity-
orientation 
M 12.04 
SD 3.36 
High 
SES 
Low Conformity-
orientation 
M 14.10 .19 .36 201 .72 
SD 3.73 
High Conformity-
orientation 
M 13.91 
SD 3.46 
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no significant effect on Child SC beliefs, F(1,77)= 2.69, p>.05. Table 7-12 contains the 
means and standard deviations of Child SC beliefs which were significantly different in 
families of the low SES sample. Therefore, only the factor of harsh parental control was 
found to  significantly  alter  children’s  strength  of  belief  in  SC. 
Table 7-12. Means, standard deviations and ANOVA results in low SES sample 
 Child Simple and Certain 
Knowledge Belief (SC) 
Mean 
Difference 
F df p 
Low Control M 2.63 .61 9.21 1 .00 
SD .92 
High Control M 3.23 
SD .73 
In the high SES sample, there was a significant interaction between effects of 
Control and Conformity-orientation on Child SC beliefs, F(1,181)=.5.24, p<.05. Table 
7-13 contains the means and standard deviations of children’s SC beliefs taking into 
account different levels of both Control and Conformity-orientation in the family. When 
looking at these effects, children whose parents used low control scored lower in beliefs 
in SC than those whose parents used higher control, regardless if the family was low or 
high conformity-oriented. Low conformity-orientation with high control was found to 
have children with the strongest beliefs in SC, though low conformity-orientation with 
low control had children who showed the weakest beliefs in SC. 
Table 7-13. Means and standard deviations of Child SC beliefs  
Control Conformity-orientation M SD 
Low Low 1.89 .67 
High 2.47 .96 
High Low 2.68 .87 
High 2.61 .84 
Figure 7-8 shows the graphical form of the interactional effects of Control and 
Conformity-orientation on children’s  SC  beliefs. From the graph, children of parents 
who exercised high control evidenced stronger beliefs in SC than those whose parents 
used low control. However, this was not the case for Conformity-orientation: children 
from families of high conformity-orientation did not always show a stronger belief in 
SC compared to children from families of low conformity-orientation. On one hand, 
when parents used high control, children evidenced strong beliefs in SC regardless of 
their family being conformity-oriented or not.  On the other hand, when parents used 
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low control, children from families who had high conformity-orientation evidenced 
stronger beliefs in SC than children from families who had low conformity-orientation. 
Conformity-orientation seemed to make a difference on child beliefs in SC only when 
parents practised low control. 
Figure 7-8. Interactional effects of Control and Conformity-orientation on Child SC 
beliefs in high SES sample 
 
Main effects analyses also showed that both variables had significant individual 
effects. Table 7-14 contains the means and standard deviations of Child SC belief which 
were significantly different with regards to different levels of Control and Conformity-
orientation in the family.  
Table 7-14. Means, standard deviation and ANOVA results in high SES sample 
 Child Simple and Certain 
Knowledge Belief (SC) 
Mean 
Difference 
F df p 
Low Control M 2.18 .45 10.93 1 .00 
SD .75 
High Control M 2.63 
SD .85 
Low Conformity-
orientation 
M 2.27 .27 3.94 1 .05 
SD .81 
High Conformity-
orientation 
M 2.54 
SD .87 
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Firstly, children of parents who practiced low control had significantly weaker 
beliefs in SC than children of parents who practiced high control, F(1,181)= 10.93, 
p<.01. Secondly, children from families which were less conformity-oriented showed 
significantly weaker beliefs in SC than children from families which were more 
conformity-oriented, F(1,181)= 3.94, p<.05. Therefore, low parental control and low 
family conformity-orientation were associated with weaker beliefs of children in SC. 
Children of parents who used lower control and emphasized less on conformity-
orientation had the weakest beliefs in SC as compared to children of parents who used 
other combinations of control and conformity-orientation.   
The above results reveal that familial practices can be protective factors to help 
children to develop more advanced beliefs about the complexity and evolving nature of 
knowledge, as opposed to it being simple and certain, regardless of families being in 
low or high SES classes. Thus far, the analyses have been conducted within each SES 
class. An additional analysis was conducted to compare between the two SES classes of 
high and low. As the above analyses have shown that interactional effects of Control 
and Conformity-orientation were only significant in high SES, these two variables were 
separately investigated to see if Child SC beliefs were significantly different between 
both groups when both sets of parents used a low level of control or when families were 
less conformity-oriented. Results showed that Child SC beliefs were on average 
significantly stronger, that is, less sophisticated, in low SES families (M= 2.67, SD= 
.94) as compared to those in high SES families (M= 2.04, SD= .78). This difference was 
significant t (136) = 3.98, p<.01. Similarly for families who have low conformity-
orientation, child beliefs in SC were on average stronger in low SES families (M= 2.68, 
SD= .87) as compared to those in high SES families (M= 2.13, SD= .81). This 
difference was significant t (146) = 3.32, p<.01. Therefore, although familial practices 
can be significant to mediating the direct effects of SES, they are insufficient to fully 
negate the effects of SES on child beliefs. In the current study, children from low SES 
families had on average stronger beliefs in SC as compared to their peers from high 
SES.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 DISCUSSION 
There are two purposes of the current dissertation. The first purpose is to 
formulate theoretical models based on the review of the literature for the goals of: a) 
investigating the influence of familial variables, specifically parenting practices and 
family communication patterns, on the fostering of children’s informal reasoning skills 
and epistemological beliefs, b) empirically testing the relation between reasoning skills 
and epistemological beliefs in the domain of informal reasoning, which involves 
problem material of an everyday nature and c) evaluating if certain familial factors can 
mediate the direct effects of SES on the two child competencies, thus acting as possible 
protective factors for more optimal child development. The second aim is to test these 
structural models empirically through quantitative data analyses and path analyses.    
A variety of questionnaires measuring parenting practices, family 
communication patterns and epistemological beliefs (i.e., EOCQ) were administered to 
a sample of 1994 participants: 997 fifth-graders and their parents. This data was taken 
from the longitudinal project FUnDuS “The role of familial support in the acquisition of 
argumentative competence in older children and adolescents” conducted in North-Rhine 
Westphalia, Germany. The measures of informal reasoning skills were only given to the 
fifth-graders and not the parents. The family communication patterns questionnaire and 
EOCQ had to be subjected to exploratory factor analyses as due to modifications made 
to the original scales, the expected factor structure was not confirmed. A third of the 
sample was extracted for the exploratory analyses. The results of these analyses were 
subjected to further confirmatory analyses with the remaining two thirds of the sample. 
All measures revealed an internal consistency of more than .6. Next, path analyses were 
conducted on the structural models with Mplus 6.0, with missing data being accounted 
for by using maximum likelihood estimation. The fit estimates of these models were 
deemed as acceptable, therefore the empirical data was found to fit the theoretical 
assumptions of the proposed structural models (cf. Kline, 2010). 
In the next sections, the results of these analyses will be first discussed with 
regards to the four specific research questions. A general discussion will follow, which 
will highlight the most significant findings of the current dissertation and discuss the 
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implications, limitations and future research directions stemming from these results. 
 
8.1 Research Questions 
  
Research Question 1. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and family 
communication patterns influence children’s informal reasoning competence? 
1.1 Do parenting practices, in terms of the four dimensions of autonomy-support, 
control,  responsiveness  and  structure,  influence  children’s  informal  reasoning  
skills? 
Out of the four parenting dimensions, only the dimension of control was found 
to  significantly  influence  children’s  informal  reasoning  skills. The harsh and intrusive 
control that parents use to obtain child compliance was found to be detrimental for 
children’s ability to successfully evaluate good reasons from poor ones. Controlling 
parents are less willing to listen in parent-child communication and less responsive to 
their children in the goal of promulgating their own views (Baumrind, 1996). Thus, 
reasoning opportunities for children within the family are limited. They articulate their 
views less, and are less able to evaluate and justify in family matters. This association of 
control with decreased evaluative competence of children is in line with previous 
literature on parental use of control. Past studies have established that intrusive control 
is harmful for child and adolescent development (cf. Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009), with 
children of controlling parents displaying social withdrawal, internalizing and 
externalizing problems (cf. Barber et al., 2001; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010) and 
lower academic performance (Gray & Steinberg, 1999).  
When SES was controlled for, it was found that SES accounted for the variance 
explained  by  parental  control  on  children’s reasons evaluation skills but prompted a 
positive direct effect  of  control  on  structure  differentiation,  that  is,  children’s  ability  to  
differentiate and rank varying arguments which differed in the use of components 
indicative of better arguments, such as metastatements, qualifiers and counterarguments. 
However, the positive direction of this association was unexpected. To conclude that 
parental control may be beneficial for reasoning skills is not in line with both theoretical 
literature and the results of the previous structural model without SES. A more possible 
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explanation for this positive association may be attributed to methodological issues such 
as increasing parameter estimates and error terms in the structural model.  
Although the path analyses did not show significant effects of other parenting 
dimensions,  correlation  analyses  showed  that  children’s  skills  in  reasons  evaluation  
shared  a  significant  positive  correlation  with  parents’  provision  of  autonomy-support 
and a negative correlation with control, although further path analysis only showed 
control to be predictive of this skill. Nevertheless, this positive correlation indicated that 
the provision of autonomy-support  by  parents,  that  is,  parents’  endorsement  of  self-
initiated behavior from children, encouragement of child input and provision of choices, 
had  a  significant  association  with  children’s  success  in  evaluating  the  quality  of  reasons  
in arguments.  
The correlation analyses also provided an insight into the relations of parenting 
variables. It was found that when parents used more control, they provided less 
autonomy-support and responsiveness to their children. Thus, more controlling parents 
were in general less encouraging of self-initiated behavior from the child, less 
acknowledging of  children’s  opinions,  less  inclined  to  provide  choices  and  less  willing  
to dedicate time and resources to their children. Interestingly, control was found to be 
positively correlated to structure. Previous literature would expect these two constructs 
to have a negative correlation as control is connected with pressure and coercion while 
structure is the organization of the environment to regulate child behavior and support 
child competence (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010; Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009). An 
explanation  might  be  found  in  the  work  of  Lorenz  and  Wild’s  (2007) who found similar 
results. They attributed this negative relation to children entering into adolescence 
perceiving parental structure as achievement-oriented pressure. This means that pre-
adolescents begin to interpret structure - parental provision of clear guidelines and rules 
- as a manner of orienting their behavior towards adult standards and no longer as 
providing orientation and support in challenging situations. 
1.2 Do family communication patterns partially mediate the relation between parenting 
practices and children’s  informal reasoning skills? 
As mentioned in the results section, the partial mediation models involving 
family communication patterns could not be tested as the first analyses showed that 
most predictor variables regarding parenting dimensions were not significantly related 
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to the outcome variables of reasoning skills. The only exception was the significant 
effect of parental control. Thus, two simpler structural models were tested in place of 
the mediating model: the first structural model aimed to investigate if the two family 
communication patterns - conversation-orientation and conformity-orientation - could 
significantly  predict  children’s  informal  reasoning  skills,  while the second model 
investigated the associations of the four parenting practices with family communication 
patterns at home.  
The results showed that conformity-orientation was negatively predictive of 
children’s  skills  in  reasons  evaluation  but  conversation-orientation had no effects on 
both reasoning skills. Families with high scores in conformity-orientation provide little 
space for divergent thoughts and opinions as they emphasize on the homogeneity of 
beliefs and attitudes and have an aversion to conflicts (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). 
Hence, the cognitively stimulating dialogic environment that children can have is 
limited. Without the allowance to actively discover, explore and articulate their own 
views and perspectives, children are less skilled in strategies of weighing, evaluating 
and identifying good quality reasons from poorer ones.  
Conversation-orientation, that is the degree of unrestrained open family 
interactions about a wide range of topics, was found to not have a significant effect on 
both measures reasoning skills. Correlation analyses, however, revealed a significant 
association with one reasoning measure: the higher the frequency of family interactions 
across a range of topics, the better children performed in evaluating quality of reasons in 
arguments. Nevertheless, conversation-orientation was not shown to be a significant 
predictor of reasoning skills. This finding was not in line with past literature which has 
shown that individuals from conversation-oriented families are more influenced by the 
quality of arguments, such as the structure and quality of supporting evidence, and has 
better developed communicative and problem-solving skills, of which sound reasoning 
skills are assumed to be employed in (Fitzpatrick & Ritchie, 1994, Fitzpatrick & 
Koerner, 1996).  A possible explanation may be that the effects of family 
communication on reasoning may depend more on how parents communicate and what 
these discussions entail, rather than on the quantity and frequency of family 
communication. Some types of communication,  such  as  a  parent’s  provision of 
rationales and explanations over matters of parent-child disagreement, may be more 
effective than others in shaping reasoning skills. A family may have a high frequency of 
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interactions, but these interactions do not necessarily involve high levels of specific and 
advanced reasoning  skills  such  as  articulating  and  evaluating  one’s  reasons, the defence 
of  one’s  standpoint  with  counterarguments  and  rebuttals,  and  the  coherent  formulation 
of a single conclusion with sound justifications. Stein & Albro (2001) also noted that 
arguments within the family can appear to be irrational due to the presence of implicit 
relational goals. The emotions for the family member are reflected in the interactions, 
hence although a wide range of topics in family discussions may be important to help 
the child to form a broad knowledge base to construct arguments from, the manner in 
which family conversations are conducted may be more significant for the promotion 
and advancement of specific and high-level reasoning skills. 
The associations of the four parenting dimensions with conversation-orientation 
and conformity-orientation were also investigated. As expected, the results showed that 
an orientation towards conversation; open frequent discussions over a wide variety of 
topics is created when parents provide more autonomy-support, are more responsive, 
provide clear structure and use less intrusive control. These central components of 
authoritative parenting encourage active interactions between all members in the family. 
This form of openness and supportiveness of the communication between parents and 
children affects family functioning in positive manners (cf. Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 
2002). This open channel of communication is also characteristic of the bidirectional 
style of communication between parents and children in authoritative parenting (cf. 
Baumrind, 1991). 
In contrast, an orientation towards conformity; communication emphasizing 
homogeneity of attitudes, values and beliefs was evidenced when parents practiced low 
levels of autonomy-support,  were  less  responsive  to  children’s  needs  and  used  higher  
control. The positive association of conformity-orientation and control indicated that 
conformity in this context was  achieved  through  parents’  strict  imposition  of  their  own  
attitudes, beliefs and opinions on their children. It was not because children had 
internalized their parents’  values  and  beliefs  and  were  displaying  volitional  conformity  
as a sign of committed compliance under the SDT framework (cf. Kochanska, Coy & 
Murray, 2001). The results confirmed the perspective of Koerner and Fitzpatrick (2002) 
who theorized in the context  of  Baumrind’s  work  that  authoritarian  parents  would  
require the most conformity and permissive parents the least. Authoritative parents were 
placed in the middle of these two groups, requiring some conformity from children in 
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order to possibly provide some structure, harmony and guidance to family decisions. A 
high level of conformity in this context is therefore aimed at avoidance of conflicts and 
an emphasis on homogeneity and interdependence within the family, mostly at the 
expense of individual expressions of freedom.  
 
Research Question 2. Do familial variables such as parenting practices and parental 
EOC beliefs influence children’s EOC beliefs? 
2.1 What are the associations between parental EOC beliefs and parenting practices? 
The correlation analyses of the two dimensions of parental EOC beliefs of JA 
and SC and the four parenting dimensions - autonomy-support, control, structure and 
responsiveness - were examined to provide an insight into the associations between 
parental beliefs on knowledge and knowing and the practices that they use.  
Concerning parental JA beliefs, the results indicated that that the more parents 
justified knowledge by means of authority, the less they provided clear and consistent 
structure for their children. In contrast, the stronger beliefs parents held in JA, the more 
they made use of controlling parenting techniques. Strong beliefs in JA implied seeing 
authorities as sufficient justifications for knowledge  claims.  In  a  child’s  life,  parents  
may  also  see  themselves  as  valid  authorities  who  are  children’s  providers  of  knowledge.  
When parents strongly believe in a hierarchical transmission of knowledge, they may 
see  themselves  as  being  more  ‘right’  as  compared to their children and thus be more 
inclined to use controlling strategies to attain obedience and compliance with little room 
for negotiation or discussion.  On the other hand, when parents recognize that 
authorities are fallible and that learning and knowledge is not just a passive process of 
receiving  and  storing  words  of  “experts”,  they come to understand knowledge and truth 
as human constructions that can be developed, identified, evaluated and communicated 
(cf. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986). At the same time, knowledge 
continues to be dynamic, contextual and evolving. A more complex view of knowledge 
may reduce parents’  reliance on controlling strategies as they recognize the fundamental 
significance of the child exploring and constructing his/her own knowledge views. 
Instead,  they  help  to  support  this  explorative  process  through  the  building  of  children’s  
sense of self-efficacy, competence and self-regulation through the imposition of clear, 
consistent and developmentally appropriate expectations and guidelines (cf. Soenens & 
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Vansteenkiste, 2010; Skinner, Johnson & Snyder, 2005; Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009). 
Parental provision of clear structure is also vital to reduce the complexity of the child’s 
environment as it may be overwhelming for a child to navigate the muddy waters of 
knowledge construction when he/she recognizes the fallibility and uncertainty of 
knowledge claims. Parents have to be sensitive to what the child can manage and 
provide appropriate child-centered support to give the child a sense of predictability and 
security to explore, evaluate and develop their own knowledge base.  
Concerning parental SC beliefs, the results showed that the stronger beliefs 
parents held in SC, the less autonomy-support they provided. They were also less 
contingently responsive to the needs of their children through the dedication of their 
time and resources. In contrast, stronger SC beliefs of parents were associated with 
higher use of control. This finding is similar to those of Ricco and Rodriguez’s  (2006): 
beliefs of knowledge as separate, discreet and unambiguous facts are related to more 
authoritarian practices. With an absolute view of knowledge, parents may not see the 
need  for  the  inclusion  of  children’s  perspectives  or  to  acknowledge  that parenting 
standards  have  to  be  flexible  and  be  subjected  to  change  in  accordance  with  children’s  
development to ensure that they remained child-attuned and age-appropriate. Therefore, 
they provide less autonomy-support in terms of encouraging child-initiated expressions 
and views. They are less sensitive to the needs to the child and are less responsive to 
him/her.  
Apart from examining the individual parental EOC dimensions of JA and SC, 
the correlations between the developmental positions of parents in the EOCM and 
parenting dimensions were also examined. Developmental positions were determined by 
the  individual’s  profile  across  the  two  dimensions  of  JA  and  SC.  The  initial  EOCM  
takes into account three EOC dimensions – JA, SC and Personal Justification. However, 
parents’  and  children’s  scores  for  the  last  dimension  of  personal  justification  were  
excluded from analyses as the internal consistency of this scale was found to be 
unsatisfactory. Despite the exclusion of personal justification, the four developmental 
positions of the EOCM were noted to be differentiable across the two dimensions of JA 
and SC in the ill-structured domains (see Table 7-6, taken from Chapter 7). Therefore, 
parents’  developmental  positions  were  subsequently  determined  with  these  two  
dimensions. 
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Table 7-6. Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Development Model (Greene et al., 
2008) 
 
SC = Simple and Certain Knowledge Dimension; JA = Justification by Authority Dimension;  
PJ = Personal Justification Dimension 
The development of EOC progresses with increasing sophistication across four 
stages – realism, dogmatism or scepticism, and rationalism. A total of 201 parents fit 
into one of the four positions, though conclusions could not be drawn with regards to 
the proportion of parents in each position relative to other positions as many parents did 
not fit into these strict categories and could not be included for analyses. Correlation 
analyses of these developmental positions and parenting dimensions revealed only one 
highly  significant  correlation  between  parents’  developmental  positions and parental use 
of control. The more advanced developmental positions that parents achieved in the 
EOCM, the less strict intrusive controlling strategies parents were found to employ. 
Kuhn (2005) found that parents who functioned at higher evaluativistic epistemological 
levels also tended to hold intellectual value inquiry and debate. Controlling strategies of 
intrusiveness and rigidity are incompatible with these intellectual values. Hence, parents 
who show higher epistemological thinking are more likely to endorse parenting 
strategies that are less authoritarian and more cognitively challenging for children, a 
finding also of Bond and Burns (2006).  
2.2 Do parenting practices and  parents’  EOC  belief  dimensions  influence  children’s  
EOC belief dimensions? 
Firstly,  the  four  parenting  dimensions  as  predictors  of  children’s  EOC beliefs of 
JA and SC are discussed. The results showed that when parents provided autonomy-
support,  children  tended  to  have  stronger  beliefs  in  JA.  Additionally,  children’s  beliefs  
in JA also increased when parents were more responsive in their dedication of time and 
Ill-Structured Domains 
Position SC JA PJ 
Realism High High High 
Dogmatism 
Skepticism 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Rationalism Low Mid Mid 
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emotional support to the needs of the child and gave clear and consistent structure for 
child behaviour. These findings were not in line with expected hypotheses.  
It was expected that strong beliefs in JA were indicative of lower 
epistemological thinking as the individual displays a high reliance on authority figures 
for guidance and the  inclination  of  expressing  to  “know”  something  just  because an 
expert, teacher or other reputable source said it. It was hypothesized that parental 
provision of a secure environment characterized by high autonomy-support, contingent 
responsiveness and supportive structure would not foster stronger beliefs in JA as 
children were made aware that authorities were not always conferred with infallible 
power and access to the “right”  knowledge  due  to  the  self-constructive and evolving 
nature  of  knowledge  made  known  by  parents’  encouragement  of  children  to  discover,  
explore  and  articulate  their  own  thoughts.  The  acknowledgment  of  children’s  views  
enabled children to see the subjectivity and relativity of opinions and to realise the value 
of evaluating and justifying knowledge claims.  
However, the present results showed otherwise. Positive associations were found 
between parental provisions of autonomy-support, structure and responsiveness and the 
JA beliefs of children. Furthermore, correlation analyses also revealed that family 
conversation-orientation was related to stronger JA beliefs of children. Therefore, 
contrary  to  expectations,  children’s  beliefs  in  JA  were found to be significantly 
associated with positive familial variables that built an open, stable and secure family 
environment.  
The literature on epistemic trust can perhaps shed some light on these results. 
Epistemic trust refers to the reliance on others for the provision of reliable and accurate 
information  due  to  recognition  of  one’s  own  lack  of  expertise  or  experience  (Harris  &  
Koenig, 2006). Both children and adults depend on the verbal assertions and claims of 
others for the forming of a coherent understanding of the world, especially in areas 
when firsthand observations cannot be made. The interesting questions lie though in 
whom we trust for accurate knowledge, and the reasons behind this epistemic trust. For 
children, the main authorities whom they approach for epistemic knowledge are often 
familiar individuals in their everyday lives such as parents and teachers. Young children 
with  secure  attachment  were  found  to  favour  their  mothers’  knowledge  claims  as  
compared  to  a  stranger’s  claims  when  presented with novel objects that offered no 
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perceptual cues regarding their name or function, thus displaying higher epistemic trust 
in their mothers as reliable sources of information (Corriveau et al., 2009). There is a 
preference for familiar informants, but familiarity has been found to not be sufficient to 
elicit trust when the quality of parent-child relationship is poor. Securely attached 
children use the caregiver as a base from which to explore and they actively involve 
their caregiver in their interactions with objects. In attachment theory research, these 
caregivers  are  able  to  accurately  interpret  infants’  needs,  to  respond  contingently  and  to  
be flexible in altering instructional specificity according to child competence shown on 
a complicated task (Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001; Meins, 1997).  
These findings of the relation between attachment styles and epistemic trust may 
explain the unexpected results found in this study. Strong JA beliefs indicate that 
children trust authorities to be sufficient justification for knowledge claims and 
epistemic trust literature demonstrates that a warm accepting secure climate fosters 
greater trust of children in familiar informants like their mothers. Thus, epistemic trust 
may act as a mediator between parenting  climate  and  children’s  JA  beliefs;;  accounting  
for the positive relation between the predictor variables of parenting dimensions and the 
outcome  variable  of  children’s  JA  beliefs at the pre-adolescence age. An authoritative 
parenting climate increases the epistemic trust children have in familiar authorities, such 
as parents and teachers in their personal lives. Due to this higher trust, they are 
subsequently  shown  to  possess  stronger  beliefs  in  JA.  Thus,  “authorities”  for  the  
children sample may have been defined in a limited scope consisting of trusted 
individuals whom children have direct access to and can consult for knowledge, and 
may  not  extend  to  the  wider  scope  of  “authorities”  in  the  field  of  epistemological  
thinking which also consists of experts in academic and vocational domains or 
institutional and governmental organizations.  
The present results revealed positive associations of components of authoritative 
parenting such as autonomy-support,  responsiveness  and  structure  with  children’s  JA 
beliefs. Authoritative parenting has been found to be positively associated with a secure 
attachment style (Karavasilis, Doyle & Markiewicz, 2003). The direction of effects is 
unclear  but  this  positive  association  indicates  that  “parents  who  are  warmly  involved 
and encourage individual expression create a climate that fosters the development of 
attachment security, alternatively, more securely attached children may be more likely 
to  elicit  optimal  parenting  from  their  caregivers”  (p.  162).  A  securely  attached child 
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may also be less dependent upon strict limit-setting in order to exhibit age-appropriate 
behaviour. Thus, authoritative parenting may strengthen epistemic trust of children 
towards familiar authorities in their personal lives. In the same manner as attachment 
styles,  parenting  styles  may  act  as  moderators  of  children’s  trust  in  mothers’  knowledge  
claims. Higher epistemic trust may thus evoke stronger JA beliefs of children. 
However, it is important to take note that high epistemic trust does not indicate a 
blind unreasoned type of trust. Rather, further research shows that although children 
have high epistemic trust in some authorities whom they may share a good relationship 
with,  they  still  examine  these  authorities’  knowledge  claims  and  verify  their consistency 
with the available existing evidence. Corriveau et al. (2009) found that although 
securely attached children showed a preference to trust the claims of their mothers as 
compared to a stranger with novel objects, these changed when these claims could be 
verified with perceptual cues made available to the child and discrepancies were seen 
between what they observed and what was claimed. When the perceptual evidence of 
the  test  object  favoured  the  stranger’s  claim  instead  of  the  mother’s,  securely attached 
children  went  with  the  stranger’s  claim.  Thus,  children  showed  reliance  on  trusted  
adults’  knowledge  claims  when  they  could  not  make  firsthand  observations,  but  when  
perceptual cues became available and seemed contradictory to the claims of the familiar 
informants, they were shown to reject these claims.  
Additionally, young children are also capable of monitoring the reliability of 
informants by their past record of epistemic accuracy (i.e., labelling familiar objects 
correctly). They monitored without external prompting and were found to give selective 
trust to the more accurate informant in situations whereby novel objects had to be 
labelled (Pasquini et al., 2007). Even with familiar individuals like teachers, young 
children moderated their  trust  depending  on  the  informant’s  recent  history  of  accuracy  
or inaccuracy (Corriveau & Harris, 2009a). Even after a week, children still showed 
selective trust in the more accurate informant (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b).  
Connecting these findings back to the results of the current study, authoritative 
parenting  may  foster  children’s  epistemic  trust  in  the  claims  of  familiar  authorities,  but  
even  with  this  trust,  children  continue  to  evaluate  adults’  claims  against  the  availability  
of their own personal experiences and observations. This is in line with the rationalist 
level of the EOCM, when individuals use both JA and PJ as means of justification to 
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warrant knowledge claims. Thus, the provision of an involved, structured and 
autonomy-supportive environment may foster high epistemic trust of children towards 
authorities, thus strengthening beliefs of authorities as sufficient justification for 
knowledge claims. However, these children are not blindly compliant or non-critical. 
On the contrary, they recognize the value of learning from others more expert than 
themselves and are capable of moderating this trust according to their own perceptual 
observations and the monitoring of the accuracy history of these informants. This 
epistemic trust and willingness to accept knowledge may be subsequently reflected in 
their epistemic beliefs. A note of caution should be taken regarding that the association 
between epistemic trust and JA epistemic beliefs may change as the child grows and 
develops as the parent-child relationship also undergo changes during the period of 
adolescence. The current results may only be indicative of the pre-adolescent sample 
tested in the study.  
Moving on from  children’s  JA  beliefs  to  their  SC  beliefs,  only parental control 
out of the four parenting dimensions was found to be significantly predictive of 
children’s SC belief. Controlling techniques demand child conformity at the expense of 
individual freedom of expressions and autonomy, and parental knowledge may often be 
passed down as being fixed and non-negotiable. In having to accept and adhere to these 
adult standards without rationales or explanations, the child may come to hold stronger 
beliefs that knowledge is static, definite and absolute.  
Additionally, between the two dimensions of SC and JA, a positive correlation 
was found. The more an individual believed in knowledge being definite, fixed and 
static, the more he/she also believed in authorities as sufficient justification to warrant 
knowledge claims. This correlation is in line with the wider literature, since lower 
developmental positions of epistemological thinking are associated with stronger beliefs 
in both dimensions (cf. Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). A realist has strong beliefs that 
knowledge is absolute and in direct correspondence to external reality, and shows a 
greater reliance on external authorities as experts and transmitters of knowledge. With 
progress, higher epistemological positions begin to view knowledge as increasingly 
tentative, complex and multi-faceted. Knowledge claims thus have to be evaluated and 
justified, and authorities may act as a means of justification but they should not be the 
sole means to verify these claims.  
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Apart  from  parenting  dimensions,  the  associations  of  parents’  EOC  beliefs  with  
children’s  EOC beliefs were investigated next. Dimension-specific transmissions of 
beliefs of EOC were shown to be significant from parent to child. Parental JA beliefs 
had  a  direct  positive  association  with  children’s  JA  beliefs,  while  parental  SC  beliefs  
had a similar  relation  with  children’s  SC  beliefs.  It  has  been  noted  that  the  definition  of  
authorities may differ between the children and parent samples: children may limit 
authorities to their personal circle of familiar individuals from whom they seek direct 
epistemic help and teaching from, such as their parents and teachers, while parents may 
extend this definition beyond the scope of their personal lives to authorities in 
established institutions and governmental posts who are recognized as individuals with 
more expertise with regards to certain domains. However despite some differences in 
defining  ‘authorities’,  the  definition  of  JA  belief  remains  similar  as  the  belief  in  
authorities, personal or external, as sufficient justification for knowledge claims. Having 
JA beliefs per se is not indicative of poor epistemological thinking. Rather, it is when 
JA beliefs dominate as sole justifications for knowledge claims that they may become 
detrimental for the progress of epistemological thinking. 
Parents with stronger JA beliefs may indicate and display more trust in external 
authorities and thus convey this method of knowledge justification to their children. 
Children may acquire this perspective of justifying knowledge and display a similar 
strong reliance and trust in authorities. Likewise for SC beliefs, parents who believe 
knowledge to be fixed, absolute and static will act in ways that are aligned to this belief, 
such as to have non-negotiable parental standards, and may thus convey this belief to 
their children through their actions and words.  
As mentioned in the response to Research Question 2.1, parental JA and SC 
beliefs were found to be significantly associated with their parenting practices. Stronger 
parental SC and JA beliefs were associated with less optimal and effective parenting 
practices such as the higher use of control and lower provisions of autonomy-support, 
responsiveness and structure. Furthermore in family communication, correlations 
showed that stronger parental JA and SC beliefs were related to a higher tendency for 
conformity-orientation. Therefore, familial practices are to some extent reflective of 
parental epistemic beliefs, and may thus act as channels to transmit these beliefs to 
children. Changes in epistemological thinking can occur  “through  conscious  cognitive 
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processes  or  through  emotional  or  subconscious  routes  via  persuasion”  (Greene  et  al.,  
2008, p.155). 
Although significant, the effect sizes of these parent-child transmissions are 
small.  Value  transmission  research  has  found  that  “the  topics  on  which parent-child 
agreement has been found to be strongest are those which are visible, concrete, and of 
lasting importance to parents. Abstract conceptions of values, transient issues and issues 
of little concern to the family have been found to have little or no parent-child 
transmission.”  (Hoge,  Petrillo  &  Smith,  1982,  p.570). Epistemological beliefs are 
abstract conceptions that even adults may not be consciously aware of, thus difficulties 
exist in formulating accurate measure of such tacit beliefs. This increases the difficulty 
of finding significant parent-child agreement. This may explain for the weak effect sizes 
found in the current study. 
2.2 Is  there  a  positive  relation  between  parents’  developmental  positions  and  children’s  
developmental positions in the EOCM? 
Parents’  developmental  positions  (i.e.  realism,  dogmatism,  scepticism,  
rationalism)  showed  a  positive  relation  to  children’s  developmental  positions,  thus  
implying that the more advanced EOC positions that parents showed, the more 
advanced EOC positions children also displayed. A regression analysis further found 
that  parents’  developmental  positions  were  significantly  predictive  of  children’s  
developmental positions. Parents who have more advanced epistemological thinking are 
therefore more able to inculcate more advanced representations of knowledge and 
knowing in their children. As Kuhn (2005) postulated, parental epistemological 
positions and intellectual values may create a subculture in which these values are the 
norm and children who belong to this subculture are highly likely to come to espouse 
them too.  Cano & Cardelle-Elawar (2008) have confirmed the significance of the 
family’s  intellectual  climate  for  children’s  epistemological  beliefs,  although  these  were  
beliefs about learning as measured by Schommer-Aikin’s  EQ (Schommer, 1990; see 
Chapter 4). Nevertheless, these results provide some empirical support for the 
significance  of  parents  in  the  development  of  children’s  personal  epistemological  
beliefs, a perspective long endorsed by Schommer-Aikins (2004) and Anderson (1984). 
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Research Question 3. Are dimensions and developmental positions of children’s EOC 
beliefs significant predictors of their reasoning skills? 
 Children’s  beliefs  in  SC,  but  not  in  JA, were found to be a significant predictor 
of both aspects of reasoning tested: reasons evaluation and structure differentiation. 
Stronger beliefs in knowledge being concrete, definite and certain proved detrimental 
for  children’s  evaluative  skills  in  differentiating  between quality of reasons and overall 
arguments. This confirms findings of past studies demonstrating that epistemological 
beliefs are powerful implicit factors which can enhance or constrain reasoning (cf. Kuhn 
et al., 2008; Yang & Tsai, 2009). Schommer & Hutter (1995) have shown that beliefs in 
SC influences  one’s willingness to think deeply and reflectively about current 
controversial, complex issues in everyday life: the more individuals believe in complex 
and tentative knowledge, the more willing they are to accept multiple perspectives, to 
modify their thinking, to withhold final decisions until reviewing all available 
information, and to acknowledge the complex, tentative nature of everyday issues. 
Additionally,  children’s  overall  developmental  positions in EOCM were found 
to be significantly predictive of both aspects of reasoning; higher positions were 
associated with better reasoning skills. The recognition of the value of skills in 
evaluation and justification of knowledge claims may be enhancing of reasoning skills 
as individuals who function at higher epistemological positions are more critical and 
therefore are more inclined to practice reasoning in various everyday situations. This 
finding confirms the importance of implicit epistemological beliefs to skilled reasoning. 
To focus on epistemological thinking is to focus on developing individuals who value 
reasoning, thinking and judgment. Mason and Scirica (2006) has suggested that the 
presentation and discussion of controversial topics can act as a means to stimulate 
change and refinement of epistemological thinking: in analyzing evidence, generating 
reasons, and making or defending claims, individuals are required to deal with the 
source, structure, and credibility of knowledge.  
 
Research Question 4. Can familial variables be significant mediators of the direct 
relationship of SES on children’s  reasoning  skills  and  EOC  beliefs? 
Based on previous results, two familial variables, namely control and 
conformity-orientation, were identified as possible mediators of the direct effect of SES 
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on  two  child  outcomes:  children’s  reasons  evaluation  skills  and  SC  beliefs.  These  
variables were identified as possible mediators as they had significant direct relations 
with both predictor and outcome variables. Successful mediation indicates that the 
mediator accounts, either fully or partially, for the relation between predictor and 
outcome, speaking to why or how such effects occur (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The first mediating model showed that family conformity-orientation was 
significant in reducing the direct effect of SES on children’s  skills reasons evaluation. In 
the midst of disadvantaged environments characterized by lower SES, which have been 
shown to be related to less cognitive stimulation at home and lower cognitive 
functioning of children (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002), a lower degree of conformity-
orientation can aid to provide children with increased cognitive stimulation through 
family discussions. Conversely, a higher degree of conformity-orientation can impede 
children’s  reasoning  skills  even  in  high  SES  environments,  preventing  them  from  
reaching their full potential for good reasoning. Further within class analyses in the high 
and low SES samples, however, did not show significant differences of reason 
evaluation skills between children from families who were less conformity-oriented as 
compared to those who were more conformity-oriented.   
The second mediating model showed that both control and conformity-
orientation were significant in reducing  the  direct  effect  of  SES  on  children’s  SC  
beliefs. In the low SES sample, there was no significant interactional effect of the two 
variables. However, a significant interactional effect was found in the high SES sample. 
Conformity-orientation was found  to  only  significantly  affect  children’s  SC  beliefs  
when  parents  practiced  low  control.  When  parents  used  high  control,  children’s  SC  
beliefs were strong regardless of the level of conformity-orientation in the family. When 
parents used low control, children from low conformity-oriented families had weaker 
SC beliefs than children from high conformity-oriented families.  
In both samples, control was found to have a significant main effect on 
children’s  SC  beliefs  while  conformity-orientation showed no significant main effect. 
Thus, parental control has emerged to be a highly significant factor associated with 
children having stronger beliefs of knowledge being simple, static, concrete and certain. 
Further analyses of child SC beliefs in low and high SES samples found that beliefs 
significantly differed between families who used high and low levels of control. In low 
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SES families, when parents exercised low control, children were found to exhibit 
significantly weaker beliefs in SC as compared to children whose parents exercised high 
control. Likewise, in high SES families, when parents exercised low control, children 
showed significantly weaker beliefs in SC as compared to those whose parents 
exercised high control. Thus differential levels of parental control are significant in 
altering child belief in SC in both low and high SES classes. The level of intrusive 
control that parents exert can shape children to see knowledge as fixed, concrete and 
static or to see it as complex, evolving and interrelated, which subsequently has effects 
on learning and reasoning. Even when children are in more advantageous high SES 
environments, the high use of parental control can impede children from having more 
advanced knowledge perspectives.  
Therefore, in high SES, a family environment characterized by low parental 
control and low conformity-orientation is seen as most beneficial for the shaping of 
weaker SC beliefs in children. In low SES families, parental control is found to 
strengthen SC beliefs of children. Therefore in order for children to develop more 
complex and evolving views of knowledge, harsh and rigid parenting strategies should 
be kept to a minimum. 
 
8.2 General Discussion 
The above section has discussed the results in response to the four main research 
questions of the current work. This section aims to shortly highlight the most significant 
findings from the above sections and discuss their implications. The limitations of the 
current work will also be discussed along with directions for future work.  
The above results provide some empirical support for the significance of 
parenting practices and family communication patterns on the fostering of children’s  
informal reasoning skills and epistemic beliefs. The parenting dimension of control has 
emerged as a highly significant factor which is detrimental to the fostering of reasoning 
skills – in reasons evaluation skills (when not controlling for SES) and structure 
differentiation skills (when controlling for SES) - and to the fostering of epistemic 
beliefs.  
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Parental  EOC  beliefs  were  found  to  significantly  predict  children’s  EOC  beliefs.  
There was a dimension-specific transmission of beliefs, with parental SC beliefs 
predictive  of  children’s  SC  beliefs  and  likewise  for  JA  beliefs.  Parental  developmental  
positions in the EOCM were also significantly predictive of child developmental 
positions. Therefore, a successful intergenerational transmission of EOC beliefs was 
seen.  
In addition, parental EOC beliefs were found to share significant correlations to 
parenting practices, indicating that these implicit and often unconscious knowledge 
beliefs which parents hold have associations with the strategies that parents choose to 
use when bringing up their children. Parents who hold more sophisticated beliefs, that 
is, weaker beliefs in SC and JA, tend to use less controlling strategies and provide more 
autonomy-support, structure and responsiveness. They are also less inclined to focus on 
conformity-orientation in family communication efforts. A causal relationship between 
beliefs and behaviors is not suggested here; rather beliefs and behaviors are understood 
to be interdependent.  “By  interdependent,…  neither  beliefs  nor  behaviors  are  primary  in  
causation; rather, each impacts the other and, in turn, is itself impacted by the other”  
(Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002, p.41).  
Nonetheless, given the relevance of parental epistemological beliefs to 
parenting, parental interventions that enable parents to revise these beliefs may facilitate 
different parenting strategies and exert an indirect positive impact on child development 
when parents are supported to develop and advance their epistemological beliefs. Bond 
and  Burns  (2006)  noted  that  “parenting  behaviors  do  not  occur  within  a  vacuum;;  rather,  
they  are  embedded  within  parents’  cognitive-developmental frameworks that guide 
parenting belief systems and behaviors. Thus in order to promote constructive parenting 
most  effectively,  we  would  do  best  to  support  parents’  own  social-cognitive 
development that is the foundation for developmentally responsive and supportive 
parenting”  (p.563).  They emphasized that to focus on the revision of parental 
epistemological beliefs is to focus on underlying frameworks that shape parenting 
behaviors which is more likely to produce sustained and effective parenting. 
Epistemological development through adulthood can be facilitated by intensive, 
systematic intervention, such as a program combining high quality reflective dialogue, 
individual and group narrative, and collaborative problem-solving in a safe and 
affirming setting has been found to lead to significant and sustained gains in young 
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mothers’  epistemological  growth (Bond et al., 2000). Naturally frequent occurrences of 
impactful experiences that challenge parents’  currently held beliefs can also effect 
changes and advancement of their epistemological beliefs (cf. Belenky et al., 1986). In 
addition,  mother’s  expectations  and  involvement  in  parent  education  classes have been 
shown to vary as a function of their epistemological perspectives (Burns and Bond, 
2004). Thus, parenting  programs  can  do  more  to  promote  parents’  epistemological  
development for the improvement and sustenance of more constructive and effective 
parenting.  
The current work also  confirmed  the  significant  association  between  children’s 
epistemological beliefs and reasoning skills in the informal reasoning domain. More 
sophisticated representations of knowledge and knowing were associated with higher 
ability in evaluation of reasons and arguments. This result reinforces findings that 
epistemological beliefs are significant predictors of informal reasoning skills when 
applied to everyday problems (cf. Kuhn, 1991; Mason & Scirica, 2006), and to enhance 
children’s  epistemological  beliefs  will  also  lead  to  enhanced  reasoning  skills 
With regards  to  enhancing  children’s  epistemological  beliefs,  the extent to which 
children ask questions has been suggested as a significant factor to enable children to 
reflect on their own epistemology. Harris  and  Koenig  (2006)  asked  if  “persistent  
variation in the exchange of information via conversation leads to important differences 
among children in their working epistemology. More specifically, children may vary in 
the extent to which they think of dialogue, particularly dialogue involving questions, as 
an important vehicle for enlarging their understanding of aspects of the world that they 
have  not  personally  experienced”.  Such  a  strategy  is  metacognitive  in  nature  and  
compatible with suggestions made by psychologists to foster critical thinking (cf. Yang 
& Tsai, 2009; Kuhn, 1999). The manner in which children approach family 
communication in terms of the number and types of questions that they ask may be 
indicative of their working epistemology. Encouraging children to ask questions may 
help to increase the articulation of their self-initiated thoughts and to enhance their 
experience of viewing knowledge as constructive and evolving, thus advancing their 
epistemological thinking.   
Lastly, further analyses of mediation models reinforce the significance of 
parenting practices and communication in optimizing the family environment for the 
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growth of the child.  When parents use less control and enforce less conformity-
orientation in the family, children are able to evidence better skills in reasons evaluation 
and weaker SC beliefs. In low SES families where children are disadvantaged in terms 
of available resources, support and cognitive stimulation, the use of more effective 
parenting strategies may act in a compensatory manner to reduce the negative effects 
associated with an impoverished environment, although this reduction is limited as SES 
affects child development through many channels (cf. Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). 
Likewise  in  high  SES  environments,  parents’  choice  of  harsh  strategies  and  restrictive  
communication  can  impede  the  development  of  children’s  skills  in  reasoning  and  
epistemological thinking.  
 
8.3 Limitations 
Firstly, the measures of parent-child communication may have been too global 
and not sufficiently specific and indicative of the level of reasoning used in family 
communication. The specificity of components of parent-child communication should 
therefore be increased in future work to gain a clearer idea of the distinct skills of 
reasoning used by parents, such as the extent to which they generate reasons in conflicts 
with children, the extent to which they defend their arguments and the likelihood of 
them providing reasonable justifications for their conclusions. Conversation-orientation 
did not show a significant effect on children’s  reasoning  skills, implying that a high 
frequency of family interactions and discussion on a wide range of topics may not 
indicate the use of higher-level argumentative strategies. More specific measures 
investigating the frequency and types of argumentative strategies used in parent-child 
discussions (e.g. generating supportive reasons, counterarguments, rebuttals etc.) may 
be more beneficial to revealing significant relations between of family communication 
and children’s  reasoning  skills. Dialogic exchanges between parent and child on topics 
which they may differ in opinions may also provide some insight to the naturalistic 
process of how children reason and imitate, acquire and refine their reasoning skills in 
home settings. Furthermore, the value that parents place on debates and their ways of 
allowing and expressing disagreement in the family can also be investigated as factors 
which can encourage or discourage reasoning within the family context.  
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Secondly, all measures of this study were based on a self-report methodology 
and  only  children’s  reports  of  parental  behavior  were  used.  Self-report measures allow 
one to use a substantially larger and more heterogeneous sample than what can be 
obtained through observational methods, and larger samples increase the chance of 
detecting theoretically important findings that may remain unidentified in smaller 
efforts (cf. Lamborn et al., 1991). However, the sole reliance on self-reports may lead to 
overestimation  of  some  relations.  With  respect  to  children’s  reports  of  parents, some 
studies which have correlated objective assessments of family life with both 
adolescents’  reports  of  their  parents’  behavior  and  with  their  parents’  reports  suggest  
that adolescents, not parents, are more accurate (cf. Gray & Steinberg, 1999). 
Researchers  have  also  argued  that  children’s  perceptions  of  their  parents’  behavior  are  
as  important  influences  on  their  development  as  are  parents’  actual  behavior  
(Brofenbrenner, 1979; Schaefer, 1965). In SDT, it is the degree to which adolescents 
perceive a sense of choice and volition from their parents that ultimately determine their 
self-determination and well-being (Soenens et al., 2007). Nevertheless, some of the 
obtained relations may be due to common source and method variance. Future work 
could do well to use multiple methods by combining self-reports with observations and 
to assess from different sources of information.  
Furthermore,  the  lower  internal  consistencies  of  the  children’s  epistemological  
scales as compared to the parent sample may have introduced a source of error that may 
have interfered with the statistical ability to reveal significant associations. The results 
also showed that more than half of the sample of children who could be classified into 
EOC developmental positions (N= 185) were dogmatists. Thus in the children sample, 
there  may  have  been  insufficient  variance  in  children’s  EOC  positions  to  reveal  stronger  
effect sizes and may account for the weaker correlations with other variables in this 
study.  
Lastly, due to time limitations and the large sample size, the measures of 
informal reasoning competence were restricted to mainly evaluative skills in 
differentiating quality of reasons and arguments. Other components of reasoning skills 
(e.g. generation of reasons, counterarguments, and justifications) should also be 
measured in future work in order to provide a more balanced and comprehensive 
indicator of the overall reasoning skills that children have. Additionally, the associations 
found in this work should be further studied while controlling for other factors which 
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are not measured in this study but have demonstrated associations with reasoning. Some 
examples are cognitive ability such as intelligence (cf. Means & Voss, 1996; Perkins, 
Faraday & Bushey, 1991) and language competence (cf. Kuhn, 1991). 
 
8.4 Future Research Directions 
In the current work, parenting practices and family communication patterns have 
been  studied  in  a  linear  fashion  in  relations  to  children’s  epistemological  beliefs  and  
reasoning. Significant associations were evidenced, but further research should 
investigate if more complex relations between parenting variables and child outcomes 
exist, such as if curvilinear effects are more representative of these relations. Structure 
has been found to have curvilinear relations with academic performance (Kurdek, Fine 
& Sinclair, 1995), self-regulation (Kurdek & Fine, 1994) and psychosocial development 
(Gray & Steinberg, 1999); moderate levels of structure are perceived to be more 
beneficial compared to high levels of structure as high structure may be viewed as adult 
imposition of rigid control.  Similarly, autonomy-support has been found to have a 
curvilinear relation with psychosocial development, with greatest gains evidenced for 
increases from moderate to high levels of autonomy support (Gray & Steinberg, 1999). 
Likewise, responsiveness also showed a curvilinear relation with psychosocial 
development whereby the greatest gains were seen with increases from low to moderate, 
and from moderate to high levels of responsiveness (Gray & Steinberg, 1999). Thus, in 
the same manner with respect to reasoning, structure may be more beneficial at moderate
 levels. Too little structure can be chaotic (Skinner, Johnson & Snyder, 2005) while too 
much can be perceived as intrusive control. Additionally, the amounts of 
autonomy-support and responsiveness may be only beneficial when they pass through 
certain critical thresholds. After these thresholds, the effects on children may reach a 
temporal or permanent plateau. These curvilinear relations may also be reflective in the 
fostering of children’s epistemological thinking and reasoning, whereby parental 
provisions of autonomy-support, responsiveness and structure may only be significant 
and optimal they fall in a certain threshold. Further work can seek to clarify and specify 
these relations. 
Additionally, the interactive effects of different parenting practices should be 
analyzed. The different dimensions of parenting evidence significant correlations with
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each other and this statistical overlap may account for shared variance in aspects of 
child development. Gray and Steinberg (1991) noted that this overlap may simply 
reflect  the  actual  nature  of  parenting  styles  as  no  single  characteristic  of  a  parents’  
behavior exists entirely independent of other qualities. They found that components of 
authoritative parenting not only acted independently to influence adolescent 
competence, but also acted in combination with each other. Some parenting practices 
can be compensatory for others in achieving positive developmental outcomes, such as 
their finding that the presence of autonomy-support is an adequate protective factor 
against adolescent psychological distress in the absence of parental responsiveness and 
vice versa.  
Future research should also be directed towards a longitudinal data set in order 
for causal conclusions to be drawn. However, although the methodology of the current 
study restricts claims of causality, it does provide a preview of the significant 
associations  of  familial  variables  to  aspects  of  children’s  reasoning  and  epistemological  
beliefs. Longitudinal data can help establish the extent to which familial variables are 
causal  to  changes  in  children’s  reasoning  and  beliefs.  Furthermore, it can also 
investigate the bidirectionality of the parent-child relation by monitoring over-time 
changes in parenting practices and communication strategies as  a function  of  changes in
 children’s  reasoning  ability  and  epistemological  thinking. It seems logical to presume 
that as children develop in their cognitive competence, parents would also have to 
adjust their parenting strategies and communication methods in order to remain 
child-attuned.   
Last but not the least, the family consists of more than just parents; the only 
socialization agents which were investigated in this study. It will also be interesting to
 look at the role of other key members such as siblings, or extended family members 
who may have frequent and regular contact with children, such as grandparents, and 
investigate their roles in fostering change in children's reasoning skills and 
epistemological beliefs. With a wider scope, a more comprehensive and fine-grained 
picture of the role of family in fostering these cognitive competencies may be 
obtained.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
Education, both formal and informal, should seek to cultivate a thinking 
generation. Inherent in the ability to think well are the competence for skilled reasoning 
and  implicit  epistemological  beliefs  which  can  enhance  one’s  reasoning.  The  current  
dissertation had two broad aims focusing on these two  aspects  of  children’s  thinking - 
informal reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs, where the influence of family and 
parental socialization have been less explored. The first aim was to formulate informed 
theoretical models based on the findings of current literature while the second was to 
empirically test these models with the use of quantitative statistical analyses and path 
analyses. These models informed by past theoretical and empirical research consisted of 
three objectives:  
2. to test the significance  of  this  association  between  children’s  informal  
reasoning skills and their personal epistemological beliefs as demonstrated in previous 
studies studying reasoning and epistemological thinking, and  
3. to investigate if familial factors can significantly mediate the direct effects of 
socioeconomic status, which has an established influence on family and parenting 
factors, on these child outcomes.  
1. to explore the influence that familial variables had on two associated child 
outcomes - children’s  informal  reasoning, which has an inherent emphasis on argument 
skills, and children’s  epistemological  beliefs, which are conceptualized in this study 
under  Greene  et  al.’s  (2009,  2010)  EOCM,  
These aims were directed towards answering research problems identified in the 
literature on informal reasoning and personal epistemology. The first concerned the 
scarcity of family-based research in both informal reasoning and personal epistemology 
development. The second was the need for a more informed understanding of the skills 
of informal reasoning implicated in everyday life, as compared to formal reasoning with
 well-structured problem material which has been a prominent topic of cognitive 
psychologists for many decades. The third concerned the significant relation of 
reasoning and epistemological beliefs evidenced in many studies of scientific reasoning 
and the need to further investigate this within the domain of informal reasoning. 
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The significant results of the current work are summarized below with regards to 
the three above-mentioned objectives of the hypothesized theoretical models which 
were subjected to empirical testing: 
a) Children’s  informal  reasoning  skills - the use of harsh parental control and a 
conformity-orientated family communication pattern were found to be 
detrimental  for  children’s  evaluative  reasoning  skills.   
b) Children’s  personal  EOC  beliefs  – the use of harsh parental control fostered 
stronger beliefs in simple and certain knowledge, thus contributing to lower-
level  epistemological  thinking.  Parents’  EOC  beliefs  showed  significant  
correlations to their parenting practices, with more advanced beliefs 
associated with more effective practices. Parental EOC beliefs were also 
shown to be significant predictors  of  children’s  EOC  beliefs,  with  successful  
transmissions from parent to child occurring within each dimension and also 
in their overall developmental positions. In this study, unexpected 
associations between children’s  beliefs  in  justification  by  authority  and 
parenting variables characteristic of authoritative parenting were found. 
These associations have been attributed to the possibility of the mediating 
factor of epistemic trust.    
2. The association  between  children’s  informal  reasoning  skills  and  EOC  beliefs  
was found to be significant, confirming previous research. Beliefs in simple and 
certain  knowledge  significantly  predicted  children’s  reasoning  skills:  stronger  
beliefs led to decreased competence in both evaluation of quality of reasons and 
arguments.  Children’s  overall  EOC  developmental  positions  also  significantly  
predicted evaluative reasoning skills, with higher positions evidencing better 
evaluative skills.  
3. Mediating models analyses showed that the use of parental control was 
significant  in  altering  the  effects  of  SES  on  both  outcomes  of  children’s  
reasoning and EOC belief. Children of parents who exercised less harsh control 
displayed higher reasoning skills of evaluating quality of reasons in arguments 
1. Although modest, certain familial variables were shown to be significant for the 
fostering of the two cognitive aspects of good thinking: 
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and held weaker beliefs in knowledge being simple and certain. In high SES 
families where parents practiced low control, conformity-orientation was found 
to  be  an  additional  significant  mediator  on  children’s  simple  and  certain  
knowledge beliefs. A low degree of conformity-orientation in family 
communication was beneficial to fostering weaker beliefs in knowledge being 
simple and certain; an indicator of higher-level epistemological thinking. 
The home environment provides countless opportunities for parents to provide 
cognitive  scaffolds  for  the  advancement  of  children’s  reasoning  skills  and  
epistemological beliefs. It is insufficient for parents to solely rely on telling children the 
value of argument as a model to knowing, for as Kuhn (2005) wisely noted: 
“intellectual  values  cannot  be  instilled  by  exhortation  – by telling students that a 
particular kind of activity is valuable, or even how or why it is valuable. Only their own 
experiences can lead them to the conviction that inquiry and reasoned argument offer 
the most promising path to deciding between competing claims, resolving conflicts, 
solving problems and achieving goals. The more fruitful adult role is that of introducing 
young people to activities that have a value that becomes self-evident as the youths 
engage  them  and  develop  the  skills  they  entail.  An  essential  aspect  of  the  adult’s  role  is  
conveying his or her belief in the value of the activity and commitment to it. As 
students’  skill  and  commitment  and  self-direction increase,  the  adult’s  role  fades”  
(Kuhn, 2005, p.35-36). Parents therefore have to provide the opportunities for children 
to experience the use of argumentative reasoning in everyday life and to see its worth in 
their own practice of it. At the same time, parents are the models whom children look up 
to, and their beliefs and commitment to the value of these skills are essential for 
children to also develop their own beliefs and commitment to the intrinsic and 
instrumental significance of effective reasoning.  
At this point, it is important to note that even with family and school efforts, the 
advancement of reasoning and epistemology is not expected to be accomplished in a 
short period of time. While it is important to provide children with opportunities for 
reflective dialogue and space to articulate, observe and practice their argument skills, 
there is a need to give time for the maturation of the epistemic and metacognitive levels 
of cognition. As epistemological developmental models point out: the progression of 
personal  epistemology  takes  time  and  is  significant  related  to  one’s  educational  
experiences (see Chapter 4). With regards to argument skills, major improvements in 
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various strategies have been evidenced across preadolescence to early adolescence 
(Kuhn, 1991). This is congruent with the wider developmental literature regarding 
Piaget’s  cognitive  stage  of  formal  operations  and  Vygotsky’s  theory  which  regarded  
metacognitive thought as absent till late childhood (cf. Kuhn, 1991).  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
Kuhn  (2005)  wrote  that  “all  parents claim to want better schools for their 
children, but they themselves often do not live lives that demonstrate a respect for 
education and respect. In the end, we can only promote the development of intellectual 
values in young people to the extent that the communities of which they are a part of 
themselves  reflect  these  values”  (p.130).  Therefore,  as  much  as  the  school  environment  
plays  a  major  role  in  developing  children’s  competencies  and  thinking,  it  is  but  only  a  
part  of  the  child’s  life  and  community. Every child is embedded in a complex multi-
level system (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1979), and the family environment is central to the 
progress of child development due to its direct and frequent contact with the child. 
Parents are the main socialization agents in the home setting. Thus, in order for children 
to become good reasoners and thinkers, parents must also develop and model good 
reasoning and epistemological thinking in order to consistently reflect and promote 
effective thinking to their children at home.  Furthermore,  parents’  epistemological  
beliefs have also been shown to influence their parenting and communicative strategies. 
Thus there is a need to focus on the revision of parental epistemological beliefs so as to 
focus on the underlying frameworks that shape parenting behaviors which is more likely 
to produce sustained and effective parenting (Burns & Bond, 2006; Bond, Belenky & 
Weinstock, 2000).  
The current research makes its contribution to the scarce empirical work 
regarding the role of family, specifically concerning parents as socialization agents, in 
the  development  of  children’s  good  thinking  with  specific  focus on  their  informal  
reasoning skills and epistemological beliefs. Previous literature has contained hints of 
these relations but lacked empirical support to show for it. Thus, this work elaborated on 
these hints with well-established theories from the parenting literature to formulate 
research hypotheses for empirical testing. The results of this empirically-based study 
contribute to a more informed understanding of the significant influence of familial 
practices on these two components inherent in children’s ability to think well. 
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Returning to the starting words of this dissertation where Marybeth Hicks (2012) 
wrote “imagine  what  might happen if we stop parenting by thoughtlessly developing 
habits over time and instead institute fundamental changes in the way we approach our 
roles  as  parents.  Suppose  we  all  thought  more  about  what  we’re  doing  and  used  the  
knowledge we gain in our thinking  to  do  things  better”.  To  focus  on  parents’  
epistemological beliefs is to focus on their thinking which underlies what they are 
doing. If fundamental changes are effected in their epistemological beliefs, more 
effective parenting and communication strategies may come into play. This combination 
of more advanced epistemological beliefs and effective parenting practices increases the 
inclination for children to develop successfully as thinkers; capable of more 
sophisticated knowledge views and of more effective and skilled reasoning in everyday 
life. This provides the platform for them to be meaningfully engaged in personal and 
societal issues; flourishing in their personal lives and contributing maximally to the 
wider society. Therefore, the more parents themselves know and practice good thinking, 
powered by the knowledge generated through research by educators, scientists and 
psychologists, the more mindful and effective parenting can become. In answer to Hicks 
(2012) challenge to imagine what might happen with more mindful parenting, a 
probable answer might well be that the next generation of children will become better 
thinkers; flexible and strategic in their ability to inquire, analyze and evaluate. Imagine 
the implications of that.  
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APPENDIX 
Scale 1: Parenting Scale (Wild, 1999) 
 
Dimension 1: Autonomy-support (11 items)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Items in German Items in English 
Wie werden bei Euch zu Hause 
Entscheidungen getroffen und 
Dinge besprochen? 
How are decisions made and things discussed in 
your home? 
Wenn wir zu Hause beratschlagen, 
was wir am Wochenende oder im 
Urlaub machen, gehen meine Eltern 
auf meine Vorschläge ein. 
When we discuss at home what to do on 
weekends or vacations, my parents use my 
suggestions. 
Meinen Eltern finden es gut, wenn 
ich meine Meinung sage. 
My parents find it good when I voice my 
opinions. 
Wenn ich mir etwas wünsche und 
nicht bekomme, erklären mir meine 
Eltern, warum. 
When I wish for something and do not get it, my 
parents explain the reasons why. 
Meine Eltern frage mich oft nach 
meiner Meinung. My parents often ask for my opinion. 
Wenn meine Eltern etwas von mir 
wollen, erklären sie mir auch 
warum. 
When my parents want something from me, they 
explain to me the reasons for doing so. 
Meine Eltern lassen mich selbst 
Pläne für die Dinge machen, die ich 
tun will.  
My parents even let me make plans for the things 
I want to do.  
 
Meine Eltern ermutigen mich, ... My parents encourage me... 
... ganz alleine zu entscheiden, 
wofür ich mein Taschengeld 
ausgebe. 
.. to decide on my own what I spend my pocket 
money on. 
... darüber nachzudenken, was ich 
am Fernsehen sehen möchte. 
... to think about what I want to see on television.  
... darüber nachzudenken, wohin ich 
in den Ferien fahren möchte. 
... to think about where I want to go for holidays.  
... auch mal alleine zu Verwandten 
und Freunden zu fahren.  
... to also make time to see relatives and friends by 
myself. 
... mir beim Einkaufen meine 
Kleider selbst auszusuchen.  
... to pick my own clothes when shopping.  
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Dimension 2: Responsiveness (6 items) 
 
Wie ist das Verhältnis zu euren 
Eltern? 
How is your relationship or rapport with your 
parents? 
Zu meinen Eltern habe ich vollstes 
Vertrauen. 
I have full trust in my parents. 
Meine Eltern kümmern sich um 
mich, wenn ich Probleme habe. 
My parents care for me when I have problems. 
Meine Eltern kennen meine 
Freunde. 
My parents know my friends. 
Meine Eltern nehmen sich Zeit, 
wenn ich etwas mit ihnen bereden 
möchte. 
My parents make time for me when I want to talk 
to them about something.  
Ich kann mit meinen Eltern offen 
darüber reden, was ich denke und 
wie ich mich fühle.  
I can openly share with my parents what I think 
and how I feel. 
Meine Eltern wissen oft, was ich 
denke und wie ich mich fühle.  
My parents often know what I think and how I 
feel. 
 
 
Dimension 3: Control (6 items) 
 
Wie streng sind eure Eltern?  How strict are your parents? 
Wenn ich etwas tun möchte, was 
Ihnen nicht gefällt, verbieten sie es 
mir einfach.  
When I want to do something that my parents do 
not like, they forbid me to do so.  
Wenn ich nicht sofort tue, was sie 
mir sagen, dann gibt`s ein 
Donnerwetter.  
When I do not immediately do what my parents 
say, huge arguments occur. 
Meine Eltern sagen häufig: ``Das 
wirst du verstehen, wenn du 
erwachsen  bist.“ 
My parents frequently say: ``You will understand 
when  you  grow  up.” 
Bei schlechten Noten machen mir 
meine Eltern schon mal das Leben 
schwer. 
With bad grades, my parents make my life 
difficult.  
Meine Eltern meinen, in 
Auseinandersetzungen sollte ich 
eher zurückstecken, als andere 
Leute ärgerlich zu machen.  
My parents think I should back down in disputes 
rather than to make other people angry.  
Meine Eltern wollen, dass ich ihnen 
sofort gehorche.  
My parents want me to obey them immediately.  
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Dimension 4: Structure (11 items) 
 
Wie sieht euer Familienalltag aus? How does your family's everyday life look like? 
Es gibt Zeitbeschränkungen für meine 
Freizeitbeschäftigungen (z.B. Fernsehen, 
draußen spielen). 
There are time restrictions for my free time (e.g. 
Watching television, playing outside).  
Jedes Familienmitglied ist bei uns für 
bestimmte Aufgaben im Haushalt 
verantwortlich (z.B. Müll rausbringen, 
abwaschen).  
Each family member is responsible for certain 
tasks in the household (e.g. Bringing out the 
garbage, washing up).  
Bei uns weiß jeder, wer wann welche Dinge 
zu erledigen hat. 
With us, everyone knows who, when and what 
things to do.  
Ich denke, ich weiß, was meine Eltern gut 
finden und was nicht.  
I think I know what my parents find good and 
what not. 
Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas nicht erlauben 
wollen, lassen sie sich von mir auch nicht 
herumkriegen.  
When my parents do not allow something, they 
cannot be won over in any way. 
Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas verbieten und 
ich bettele eine Weile, erlauben sie es 
schließich doch. 
When my parents forbid something and I beg 
for awhile, they allow it in the end.  
Wenn meine Eltern sagen, dass ich ins Bett 
gehen muss, bringe ich sie leicht dazu, dass 
ich noch länger aufbleiben darf. 
When my parents say that I must go to bed, I 
bring light to the fact that I still may stay up 
longer.  
Wenn ich meinen Eltern nur lange genug 
etwas vorjammere, geben sie schließlich nach. 
If I moan or gripe about something long enough 
to my parents, in the end they give in to it.   
Wenn meine Eltern mir einmal etwas 
verbieten, bleiben sie dabei und erlauben es 
mir auch später nicht.  
When my parents forbid something once, they 
stay with that decision and also will not allow it 
later.  
Wenn meine Eltern etwas verbieten, kann es 
sein, dass sie es ein anderes Mal doch 
erlauben. 
When my parents forbid something, it can 
happen that they allow it some other time. 
Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas verbieten, kann 
ich machen was ich will, sie bleiben dabei.  
When my parents forbid something, I can do 
what I want but they still stay with it.  
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APPENDIX EXEMPLER OF PARENTING QUESTIONNAIRE USED 
 
  
        
                             
 
                                 
 
 
         
 Meine Eltern ermutigen mich,  … 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
7 …  ganz  alleine  zu  entscheiden,  wofür  ich  mein  Taschengeld  ausgebe. 
    
8 …  darüber  nachzudenken,  was  ich  im  Fernsehen  sehen  möchte.     
9 …  darüber  nachzudenken,  wohin  ich  in den Ferien fahren möchte. 
    
10 …  auch  mal  alleine  zu  Verwandten  und  Freunden  zu  fahren.     
11 …  mir  beim  Einkaufen  meine  Kleider  selbst  auszusuchen.     
 
 
 
 
 
         Wie werden bei Euch zu Hause Entscheidungen getroffen und Dinge   
          besprochen? 
 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
1 Wenn wir zu Hause beratschlagen, was wir am Wochenende oder im Urlaub machen, gehen meine Eltern auf meine Vorschläge ein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Meine Eltern finden es gut, wenn ich meine Meinung sage.     
3 Wenn ich mir etwas wünsche und nicht bekomme, erklären mir meine Eltern, warum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Meine Eltern fragen mich oft nach meiner Meinung.     
5 Wenn meine Eltern etwas von mir wollen, erklären sie mir auch warum. 
    
6 Meine Eltern lassen mich selbst Pläne für die Dinge machen, die ich 
tun will. 
    
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   Wie ist das Verhältnis zu euren Eltern? 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
1 Zu meinen Eltern habe ich vollstes Vertrauen.     
2 Meine Eltern kümmern sich um mich, wenn ich Probleme habe.     
3 Meine Eltern kennen meine Freunde.     
4 Meine Eltern nehmen sich Zeit, wenn ich etwas mit ihnen bereden möchte. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Ich kann mit meinen Eltern offen darüber reden, was ich denke und wie ich mich fühle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Meine Eltern wissen oft, was ich denke und wie ich mich fühle.     
 
 
                                    
 
           
   Wie streng sind eure Eltern? 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
1 Wenn ich etwas tun möchte, was Ihnen nicht gefällt, verbieten sie es mir einfach. 
    
2 Wenn ich nicht sofort tue, was sie mir sagen, dann gibt´s ein Donnerwetter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Meine  Eltern  sagen  häufig:  „Das  wirst  du  verstehen,  wenn  du  erwachsen  bist.“ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Bei schlechten Noten machen mir meine Eltern schon mal das Leben schwer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Meine Eltern meinen, in Auseinandersetzungen sollte ich eher 
zurückstecken, als andere Leute ärgerlich zu machen. 
    
6 Meine Eltern wollen, dass ich ihnen sofort gehorche.     
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        Wie sieht euer Familienalltag aus? 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
1 Es gibt Zeitbeschränkungen für meine Freizeitbeschäftigungen (z.B. Fernsehen, draußen spielen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Jedes Familienmitglied ist bei uns für bestimmte Aufgaben im Haushalt verantwortlich (z.B. Müll rausbringen, abwaschen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Bei uns weiß jeder, wer wann welche Dinge zu erledigen hat.     
4 Ich denke, ich weiß, was meine Eltern gut finden und was nicht.     
 
 
 
                                 
 
  Wie leicht sind eure Eltern zu überreden? 
stimmt 
gar 
nicht 
stimmt 
wenig 
stimmt 
ziemlich 
stimmt 
ganz 
genau 
1 Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas nicht erlauben wollen, lassen sie sich von mir auch nicht herumkriegen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas verbieten und ich bettele eine Weile, erlauben sie es schließlich doch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Wenn meine Eltern sagen, dass ich ins Bett gehen muss, bringe ich sie leicht dazu, dass ich noch länger aufbleiben darf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Wenn ich meinen Eltern nur lange genug etwas vorjammere, geben sie schließlich nach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Wenn meine Eltern mir einmal etwas verbieten, bleiben sie dabei und erlauben es mir auch später nicht. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas verbieten, kann es sein, dass sie es ein anderes Mal doch erlauben. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
Wenn mir meine Eltern etwas verbieten, kann ich machen was ich will, 
sie bleiben dabei. 
    
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Scale 2a 
Epistemic and Ontological Cognition Questionnaire (EOCQ; Greene et al., 2010) 
 
Simple and Certain Knowledge  Items 
In (math/history), the truth means different things to different people.  
To know (math/history) well, you need to memorize what you are taught. 
In (math/history), what is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. 
(Mathematicians'/Historians') knowledge of the facts about math does not change. 
(Math/History) is so complex that humans will never really understand it.  
 
Justification by Authority Items 
If a (mathematician/historian) says something is a fact, I believe it. 
Things written in (math/history) textbooks are true. 
I believe everything I learn in (math/history) class. 
If a (math/history) teacher says something is a fact, I believe it. 
 
Personal Justification Items 
In (math/history), everyone's knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely 
right answer. 
In (math/history), if you believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are 
wrong. 
In (math/history), what's a fact depends upon a person's point of view. 
(Mathematical/Historical) knowledge is all factual and there are no opinions.  
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Scale 2b 
R-EOCQ – Revised Domain-general EOCQ 
 
Simple and Certain Knowledge  Items 
The truth means different things to different people.  
To know a subject well, you need to memorize what you are taught. 
What is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. 
An expert's factual knowledge does not change. 
Fields of knowledge are so complex that humans will never really understand it.  
 
Justification by Authority Items 
If an expert says something is a fact, I believe it. 
Things written in textbooks are true. 
I do not doubt what I learn in class. 
If a teacher says something is a fact, I believe it. 
 
Personal Justification Items 
Everyone's knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely right answer. 
If you believe something is a fact, no one can prove to you that you are wrong. 
What's a fact depends upon a person's point of view. 
Knowledge is all factual and there are no opinions.  
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APPENDIX EXEMPLER OF EOCQ USED  
(Child Version in German) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
Wie beurteilt ihr die folgenden Aussagen? lehne völlig ab 
lehne 
ziemlich 
ab 
lehne 
eher ab 
stimme 
eher zu 
stimme 
ziemlich 
zu 
stimme 
völlig zu 
1 Die Wahrheit bedeutet Unterschiedliches für verschiedene Menschen. 
      
2 Um sich in einem Thema auszukennen, musst du wissen was du dazu gelernt hast. 
      
3 Was heute eine Tatsache ist, wird auch morgen eine Tatsache sein. 
      
4 Das Wissen der Experten ändert sich nicht.       
5 Wissensgebiete sind so kompliziert, dass Menschen sie nie wirklich verstehen werden. 
      
6 Wenn ein Experte sagt, etwas sei eine Tatsache, habe ich kein Problem, ihm zu glauben. 
      
7 Dinge, die in meinen Schulbüchern stehen, sind richtig.       
8 Ich zweifle nicht an, was ich im Unterricht lerne.       
9 Wenn mein Lehrer etwas sagt, ist das eine Tatsache und ich glaube es. 
      
10 Das Wissen von jedem kann unterschiedlich sein, da es nicht eine absolut richtige Antwort gibt. 
      
11 Wenn ich glaube, etwas ist richtig, kann mir niemand das Gegenteil beweisen. 
      
12 Es ist von der Meinung einer Person abhängig, was für ihn eine Tatsache ist. 
      
13 Wissen besteht aus Fakten und nicht aus Meinungen.       
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Scale 2c 
German R-EOCQ 
Child and Parent Versions 
 
Child Version 
1. Die Wahrheit bedeutet Unterschiedliches für verschiedene Menschen.  
2. Um sich in einem Thema auszukennen, musst du wissen was du dazu 
gelernt hast. 
3. Was heute eine Tatsache ist, wird auch morgen eine Tatsache sein. 
4. Das Wissen der Experten ändert sich nicht. 
5. Wissensgebiete sind so komplex, dass Menschen sie nie wirklich 
verstehen werden. 
6. Wenn ein Experte sagt, etwas sei eine Tatsache, habe ich kein Problem, 
ihm zu glauben. 
7. Dinge, die in meinen Schulbüchern stehen, sind richtig. 
8. Ich zweifle nicht an, was ich im Unterricht lernen. 
9. Wenn mein Lehrer etwas sagt, ist das eine Tatsache und ich glaube es. 
10. Das Wissen von jedem kann unterschiedlich sein, da es nicht eine absolut 
richtige Antwort gibt. 
11. Wenn ich glaube, etwas ist richtig, kann mir niemand das Gegenteil 
beweisen. 
12. Es ist von der Meinung einer Person abhängig, was für ihn eine Tatsache 
ist. 
13. Wissen besteht aus Fakten und nicht aus Meinungen. 
Parent Version 
1. Die Wahrheit bedeutet Unterschiedliches für verschiedene Menschen.  
2. Um sich in einem Thema auszukennen, müssen Sie wissen was Sie dazu 
gelernt haben. 
3. Was heute eine Tatsache ist, wird auch morgen eine Tatsache sein. 
4. Das Faktenwissen der Experten ändert sich nicht. 
5. Wissensgebiete sind so komplex, dass Menschen sie nie wirklich 
verstehen werden. 
6. Wenn ein Experte sagt, etwas sei eine Tatsache, habe ich kein Problem, 
ihm zu glauben. 
7. Dinge, die in meinen Lehrbüchern stehen, sind richtig. 
8. Wenn ich in etwas unterrichtet werde, zweifle ich es nicht an. 
9. Wenn mein Lehrer, der mich in unterrichtet etwas sagt, ist das eine 
Tatsache und ich glaube es. 
10. Das Wissen von jedem kann unterschiedlich sein, da es nicht eine absolut 
richtige Antwort gibt. 
11. Wenn ich glaube, etwas ist richtig, kann mir niemand das Gegenteil 
beweisen. 
12. Es ist von der Meinung einer Person abhängig, was für Sie eine Tatsache 
ist. 
13. Wissen besteht aus Fakten und nicht aus Meinungen. 
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Scale 3 
Family Communication Patterns Items (Based on the RFCP; Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 
2002) 
 
Conversation Orientation (N=11)   
In German  In English 
1. Meine Eltern fragen nach meiner 
Meinung, bevor sie über 
Familienangelegenheiten entscheiden. 
My parents ask for my opinion before family 
decisions are made. 
2. Bei uns werden Dinge erst dann 
entschieden, nachdem wir sie besprochen 
haben. 
With us decisions are made after we have 
spoken about it. 
3. Ich unterhalte mich gerne mit meinen 
Eltern über meine Erlebnisse. 
I like to speak with my parents about my 
experiences. 
4. Ich kann meinen Eltern fast alles sagen. I can tell my parents almost everything. 
5. Ich erzähle meinen Eltern häufig, was ich 
so am Tag gemacht und erlebt habe. 
I frequently tell my parents what I did and 
experienced in the day. 
6. Meine Eltern begründen ihre Meinungen 
im Gespräch mit mir. 
My parents justify their opinions in 
conversations with me. 
7. Es fällt mir leicht, mit meinen Eltern 
darüber zu reden, was in mir vorgeht. 
It is easy for me to speak with my parents 
about what is going on within me   
8. Es fällt mir leicht, mit meinen Eltern über 
meine Gefühle zu sprechen. 
It is easy for me to speak with my parents 
about my feelings.  
9. Wir sprechen häufig in unsere Familie 
über Gefühlen.   
We speak often about emotions in our 
family. 
  Conformity Orientation (N=6)   
In German In English 
10. Meine Eltern erwarten, dass Kinder den 
Erwachsenen nicht widersprechen sollen. 
My parents expect that children should not 
have conflicts with adults. 
11. Meine Eltern erwarten, dass Kinder mit 
Erwachsenen nicht herum diskutieren 
sollen. 
My parents expect that children should not 
enter into discussions with adults.  
12. Wenn ich mich mit meinen Eltern 
unterhalte, spreche ich ungern über 
Dinge, die mich betreffen. 
When I talk with my parents, I do not like to 
talk about things that concern me. 
13. Meine Eltern sind an meiner 
Meinung/Position interessiert, selbst wenn 
sie nicht mir ihrer übereinstimmt. 
(Recoded) 
My parents are interested in my 
opinion/position even when it does not match 
with theirs. (Recoded) 
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Appendix 4a 
Items for measuring CASMIN (German/English) 
 
Welchen allgemeinen Schulabschluss haben Sie? 
What is your general education? 
Mutter 
Mother  
 Vater 
Father 
 keinen Abschluss 
Incomplete general education 
 
 Hauptschulabschluss 
Elementary school education 
 
 Realschulabschluss / mittlere Reife oder vergleichbares 
Secondary school education or equivalent 
 
 Fachhochschulreife / Fachabitur 
Technical College/ Technical School 
 
 Abitur / allgemeine Hochschulreife 
High School Leaving certificate/ General University  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Welchen beruflichen Ausbildungsabschluss haben Sie? 
What degree of vocational training have you received?  
Mutter 
Mother 
 Vater 
Father 
 keinen beruflichen Abschluss 
No vocational degree 
 
 Berufsabschluss mit gewerblicher od. landwirtschaftlicher Lehre 
Vocational qualification with industrial or agricultural teaching 
 
 Berufsschulabschluss mit kaufmännischer od. sonstiger Lehre 
Vocational qualification with commercial or other teaching 
 
 Berufsfachschulabschluss 
Vocational qualification 
 
 Meister/Techniker od. gleichwertigen Abschluss 
Craftsman/Engineer or equivalent qualification 
 
 Fachhochschulabschluss 
College Degree 
 
 Hochschulabschluss 
University Degree 
 
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Appendix 4b 
Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN) 
German education and vocational training levels (in German Language) 
 
CASMIN-Klassifikation  
Levels Educational and Vocational description 
1a Kein Abschluss 
1b Hauptschulabschluss ohne berufliche Ausbildung  
1c Hauptschulabschluss mit beruflicher Ausbildung 
2a Mittlere Reife ohne berufliche Ausbildung 
2b Mittlere Reife mit beruflicher Ausbildung  
2c_gen Fachhochschulreife/Abitur ohne berufliche Ausbildung 
2c_voc     Fachhochschulreife/Abitur mit beruflicher Ausbildung 
3a Fachhochschulabschluss  
3b Hochschulabschluss 
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Appendix 5a 
Informal Reasoning Task 
First Task - Reason-Evaluation  
 
Tom spoke at recess to a few friends about this matter. They also think that Marie 
should confess everything. He asks them why they think so. They gave various reasons. 
How good do you find these reasons? Indicate which reason you find best, the second 
best, and so on. Give every reason a ranking grade from 1 to 6 and write this in the 
circles. 
Attention: You can only give each ranking grade once! You can cross out the grades on 
the scale above so that you know which grades you have already given out.  
Very good            Dissatisfied 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Marie   should   confess.   I   think   that   cheating   is   not   good.   I   think   it  was   bad   of  
Marie  to  cheat.” 
 
 
“It  is  better  for  Marie  to  confess  now.  Then  perhaps  the  punishment  will  be  
lighter.  If  they  find  out  otherwise,  it  might  be  more  severe.”  
“Marie  should  confess  what  she  has  done  at  the  painting  competition.  One  of  our  
class rules writes that we should be  fair.”  
“Marie  should  confess  that  she  has  broken  the  rules.  A  competition  must  be  fair  
for  all.  Breaking  the  rules  was  unfair.”  
“Marie  should  confess.  A  friend  of  mine  cheated  in  his  Math  homework  once  and  
confessed  to  that  after.”  
“Marie  should confess what she has done. Our teachers and parents always say 
that  one  should  not  cheat.”  
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Hello Marie,  
Perhaps you should tell the teacher 
what you have done. But perhaps 
you should also not tell that you 
broke the rules. Perhaps you 
should discuss this matter once 
more with your friends. 
Sincerely, Steffen 
      Grade: _____ 
 
Hello Marie, 
If you want to be honest, you 
should confess this matter. If you 
want to keep the prize, naturally 
you should not confess. Perhaps 
you should discuss this matter 
once more with your friends. 
Sincerely, Kristina 
      Grade: _____ 
 
Hello Marie,  
What you should do depends on what you think is 
important. If you think honesty is important, then 
you should confess that you did not obey the 
competition rules. If you think that it is more 
important to keep the prize, then you should not 
say that you broke the rules of the painting 
competition. Perhaps you should discuss this 
matter once more with your friends. 
Sincerely, Merve                      Grade: _____ 
 
Hello Marie,  
What you should do depends on what is important 
to you. If you think honesty is important, then you 
should confess. But perhaps you should not do it 
anymore. If you think that it is more important to 
keep the prize, naturally you should not confess. 
But maybe someone will find out. Then you should 
cheat less. Perhaps you should discuss this matter 
once more with your friends.  
Sincerely, Luca  Grade: _____ 
 
Appendix 5b 
Informal Reasoning Task  
Second Task – Argument-analysis  
 
Tom convinced Marie to confess. They go to their teacher and tell him everything. After 
which their teacher spoke to the whole class about this incident. As homework all 
students were to imagine that Marie had not confessed this matter and to write a letter 
giving her advice on what to do next. Four students read out their letters the next day.  
Which advice do you find good? Give each letter a grade from 1 (very good) to 4 
(satisfactory)! Indicate which advice you find the best, the second best and so on. 
Attention: You can only give each grade once! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
